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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses a neglect of legal analysis in the scholarship on cultural relativism, international 
human rights law, and Asian values. While a wealth of scholarship exists on cultural relativism as a 
philosophical or political question, and while the cultural rights of members of minority groups are 
often addressed from a legal perspective in the context of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
interaction between broader cultural values – those operant at the societal level – and human rights 
standards has not been adequately analysed as a question of law. 
Chapter I provides an overview of the debates on cultural relativism to detail how questions 
of law have been neglected, and how they would complement the existing scholarship if fully 
addressed. It concludes there is a need to examine how far international human rights law permits 
cultural values to affect the manner and extent of implementation as an empirical issue.  
Chapter II makes it clear that the core question is one of interpretation – i.e., in seeking to 
establish whether cultural values are permitted to affect implementation of human rights norms in 
any fashion, this hinges on how the terms of international human rights treaties are interpreted so as 
to permit it, or not.  
Chapter III then takes this principle and sets out what the accepted rules of treaty 
interpretation are, and how international human rights treaty terms in particular are to be 
interpreted in light of their unique character. This leads us to what is sometimes argued to be the 
legal basis for the programmatic interpretation of human rights treaties: Article 31(3)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, or subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the 
parties on a given interpretation. We postulate that the interpretations given by the United Nations 
human rights treaty bodies are potentially constitutive of subsequent practice under the Vienna 
Convention, and, if so, we argue that this would be the most appropriate focal point for answering 
our core question.  
The rules guiding the use and formation of subsequent practice, however, are not clear. 
Chapter IV examines what guidelines have been developed in other contexts; in particular, this 
involves surveying the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and the World Trade 
Organization’s Dispute Settlement Procedure, and drawing some inferences from that jurisprudence 
to arrive at a method for assessing the development of subsequent practice in international human 
rights law. 
Using this pattern of analysis, Chapter V then illustrates how it can be applied by using a case 
study – the interpretive practice of the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women regarding Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia – and draws preliminary conclusions to 
demonstrate how this mode of analysis addresses the gap in the scholarship.  
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Introduction 
 
Arguments over the role of culture in the way human rights law is created, implemented and 
interpreted have a long pedigree, stretching back to the famous Statement on Human Rights 
issued by the American Anthropological Association in 1947 in response to the Commission 
on Human Rights’ drafting of its Universal Declaration.1 The Association's document held 
that “respect for the culture of differing human groups” was equally important in the new 
world order as respect for individuals2, and a debate over this claim has continued ever 
since. Though the system of international human rights law has evolved along strictly 
individualist lines, the notions that human groups should have the right to their own cultural 
practices, languages, values and traditions, and that societies have cultural mores which 
radically affect how they interpret and implement human rights norms, has been a constant 
undercurrent. In the 1980s and 1990s, this undercurrent came to the surface when Asian 
States such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia began to advance what came to be known 
as the ‘East Asian challenge for human rights’, in which it was argued that individualistic, 
Western human rights were incompatible with Asian social and cultural norms. This, as 
Donoho succinctly puts it, reflects one of the principal challenges confronting the 
international system – namely, “how to develop and implement meaningful human rights 
standards in the face of profound diversity”.3 
 This question has been confronted by scholars working in numerous fields – in 
                                                     
1
Executive Board, American Anthropological Association, ‘Statement on Human Rights’, 49 (4) American 
Anthropologist 539 (1947). 
2
Ibid., p. 539. 
3
D. Donoho, “Relativism versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for Meaningful Standards” 27 (2) 
Stanford Journal of International Law 345 (Spring 1991), p. 346.  
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philosophy3, in political philosophy4, in international relations5, in sociology6, as well as in 
law – and has created an entire sub-branch of scholarship. Yet for all of that has been 
written on the subject, it is apparent that this body of work has generally tended to avoid 
dealing with one crucial element of the overall picture: the relationship between cultural 
values at the societal level and international law itself – i.e., how international law in fact 
resolves conflicts between traditional norms and human rights standards as questions of 
law, if it does so at all; and whether and to what extent cultural values affect the obligations 
of States which are party to human rights treaties. While there is a wealth of scholarship on 
cultural diversity and the law from cultural rights or minority rights perspectives7, as well as 
on legal pluralism in international and domestic contexts8, when it comes to ‘grand’ cultural 
values – differences between East and West, perhaps most notably – and their impact on the 
law, this area is relatively unexplored. This, it seems, is primarily because scholars have quite 
naturally focused on foundational questions (being interested in the philosophical bases for 
cultural relativism and universal human rights) and implementational concerns (how human 
rights are to be protected in view of the prevalence of traditional values which seem to 
                                                     
3
 See e.g. R. Pannikar, “Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?” 30 Diogenes 75 (1982); M. 
Hamashita, “The Non- and Anti-Democratic in Post-Modernity” 55 (4) Diogenes 27 (2008). 
4
 See e.g. J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999); S. Macedo, “What Self-Governing Peoples Owe to One Another: 
Universalism, Diversity and the Law of Peoples” 72 Fordham Law Review 1721 (2003-2004); D. Bell, East Meets 
West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia (2000); M. Davis, “Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The 
Debate Over Human Rights and Asian Values” 11 Harvard Human Rights Journal 109 (1998). 
5
 See e.g. T. Franck, “Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?” 91 (4) American Journal of International Law 593 
(1997); T. Pogge, “What We Can Reasonably Reject” 11 (1) Philosophical Issues 118 (2001); R. Goodman and D. 
Jinks, “How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law”, 54 Duke Law Journal 621 
(2004). 
6
 See e.g. M. Roshwald, “Toleration, Pluralism and Truth” 55 (3) Diogenes 25 (2008); B. Ibhawoh, “Between 
Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the African State” 22 (3) HRQ 
838 (2000). 
7
 See e.g. R. Grillo, “Cultural Diversity and the Law: Challenge and Accommodation” MMG Working Paper 09-
14, 2009; Grillo, R., R. Ballard, A. Ferrari, A.J. Hoekema, M. Maussen & P. Shah (eds.) Legal Practice and Cultural 
Diversity (2009); A. Renteln, The Cultural Defence (2004); D. McGoldrick, “Multiculturalism and Its Discontents” 
5 (1) Human Rights Law Review 27 (2005); E. Baylis, “Minority Rights, Minority Wrongs” 10 UCLA Journal of 
International Law and Foreign Affairs 66 (2005). 
8
 See e.g. P. Berman, “Global Legal Pluralism” 80 South California Law Review 1155 (2006-2007); S. Merry, 
“Legal Pluralism”, 22 (5) Law and Society Review (1988); B. Tamanaha “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to 
Present, Local to Global” 30 Sydney Law Review 375 (2008). 
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mitigate against them), both of which are of profound importance. Yet it has created a 
bifurcation, in which abstract and practical questions are answered, while mid-level 
concerns – what we shall come to see as issues of interpretation – are passed over. This, in 
turn, has left much of the scholarship on this issue untethered from its own subject: human 
rights are legal rights as well as being representative of certain political philosophies, yet this 
critical legal element of their composition is commonly ignored in the literature on cultural 
relativism. 
 The aim of this thesis is to address this apparent bifurcation by confronting the area 
of weakness identified in the overall body of scholarship on this issue: the relative lack of 
eagerness to address cultural relativism as a question of international human rights law. 
Since this is an empirical rather than a normative concern – a question of fact rather than 
values – it will require what will be referred to as an empirical approach, using the word 
‘empirical’ in its traditional meaning as an approach emphasising fact over theory. What, in 
other words, do the legal facts suggest about the relationship between cultural values and 
the law? 
 In essence, we reduce the debate to one, core empirical question: To what extent 
does international law permit cultural values to affect how human rights treaty obligations 
are implemented? The thesis then set out a legal approach to answering this question, 
gradually narrowing our scope and crystallising around rules of interpretation which, it is 
suggested, will provide a new perspective on this crucial problem of balancing universal 
human rights standards with profound diversity. 
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I. Cultural Relativism and Human Rights, and the Role of the Law 
 
Introduction 
 
The arguments surrounding cultural relativism in international human rights law are well-
rehearsed. In this chapter I survey the literature and identify what I believe to be a critical 
failure on the part of most of the scholars who have approached the topic: a neglect of the 
law itself. While a wealth of far-reaching political, philosophical, sociological and 
anthropological attempts have been made to advocate one position or another on the need 
to ‘respect culture’, almost none of these have been based on a firm understanding of how 
international human rights law itself actually accommodates culture in the way it is created, 
interpreted and implemented. In particular, there are very few analyses of which I am aware 
of the way in which the institutions charged with interpreting the law – the treaty bodies, 
courts, and States themselves – have actually grappled with the cultural question in relation 
international human rights law as law. In the absence of such an analysis, the debate, I will 
argue, is divorced from the actual reality of the legal response to cultural values, and thus 
critically disengaged from its own subject. 
 The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I briefly describe and analyse two 
separate debates that have taken place over the very broad question: how far should 
'cultural differences' be taken account of when assessing how a given State implements or 
fails to implement agreed human rights norms? These two debates are, in order of 
abstraction, the discussions surrounding the 'nature of rights' (which questioned whether 
human rights could ever be truly universal in any meaningful sense), and the 'East Asian 
Challenge' for human rights (in which, drawing on the Asian values literature, a vociferous 
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discourse emerged advocating a uniquely Asian understanding of human rights which 
required a repositioning of the political and legal framework for the entire system of 
international human rights). 
 As we shall see, it is in the very phrasing of the question – how far should cultural 
differences be taken into account, rather than how far are cultural differences taken into 
account – which forms the crux of the problem. It is this emphasis on the normative rather 
than the empirical9 which draws scholars away from the law and into the political and 
philosophical. This is problematic for the discourse as a whole, because without a clear 
empirical understanding of the way the law functions, normative suggestions will naturally 
have little or no effect: based on a lack of knowledge, they can hardly be expected to be of 
great impact or value. 
 The challenge, then, is for an analysis of what international law actually 'does' when 
it comes to assessing, analysing, and interacting with culture. The final section of this 
chapter will comprise a framework on which such an analysis can take place. The particular 
focus of this framework is an understanding of what we actually mean when we talk about 
culture, what we can reasonably expect the law to do, and how it has evolved. 
 
A. Relativism versus Universalism and the Nature of Rights 
 
At its most abstract, the discussion over culture and rights has largely revolved around the 
question of whether human rights norms should be viewed as applying universally (i.e. that 
                                                     
9
 I use the term 'empirical' in its philosophical sense – that is, as an approach to epistemology which sees 
human knowledge as emerging from facts rather than reason or theory. It is used in this sense throughout this 
thesis. 'Empirical research' in the lay sense of scientific method or social science research I refer to as 
'methodological empiricism'. 
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culture is or should be irrelevant to their validity10) or as applying differently or not at all 
depending on the culture of the society in which they are interpreted (stemming from the 
cultural relativist position that values – notions of truth and morality – are socially 
constructed, and hence contingent on cultural context11). As with most such debates, in 
reality we find that scholars who have written on the topic tend to fall on a spectrum of 
positions somewhere between the two extremes: nobody argues that human rights should 
always be interpreted in precisely the same way in every human society on earth, and 
nobody argues that cultural context is so important that even the most basic rights such as 
the prohibition of torture or the right to a fair trial should be viewed as contingent on social 
mores. But, broadly, it is possible to identify groups of advocates who can be said to be 
'universalist' or 'relativist' in their outlook. 
 It is important at this stage, although the implications of the point will be argued in 
more detail below, to be absolutely clear about the nature of the arguments that tend to be 
advanced. Because the universalist/relativist debate is rather abstract, it tends to be the case 
that scholars have approached it as a philosophical, ethical, or political question rather than 
a legal one. This means that the entire argument tends to take place without reference to 
how existing law came into being, how it tends to be interpreted and implemented, and how 
it has evolved.  Thus, in examining the literature on the issue, we are faced with much in the 
way of normative assertion and persuasive argumentation, but little in the way of concrete 
evidence; ultimately, this makes the entire debate a somewhat sterile and irresolvable one. 
 One of the most prominent theorists of the nature of rights in recent decades has 
                                                     
10
 See e.g. Donnelly, J., “Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights” 6 (4) HRQ 400 (1984).  
11
 For a typical definition, see Binder, G., “Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law” 5 
Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 211 (1999), page 214. 
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been Jack Donnelly, whose work has rather dominated the field since the 1980s.12 Donnelly, 
in his own words, summarises his oeuvre as "a defence of a conception of 'universal' human 
rights that acknowledges and incorporates the obvious historical contingency of both the 
idea of human rights and its dominant international expressions".13 The core of this 
argument is, essentially, that although human rights are not timeless, unchanging, or 
absolute, and that although there will always be particular interpretations owing to cultural 
difference, levels of economic development, geography, and so forth, human rights must by 
definition in some sense be 'universal' because in order to have any meaning or value they 
are held by all human beings.14 Moreover, in practical terms, human rights are universally 
accepted inasmuch as almost all States are party to the UDHR and almost all States at least 
claim to adhere to and accept that human rights exist; Donnelly calls this 'international 
normative universality'.15 
 Donnelly sets out a vision of human rights as being equal, inalienable, and universal – 
as being the rights that one is entitled to simply as a human being.16 (This is, of course, 
hardly a novel proposition.) They inhere, in his view, in man's 'moral nature', and constitute 
what is needed for every human individual to realise for him/herself a 'life of dignity'.17 
Though this is a utopian ideal, as he acknowledges, it is also a practical tool for realising it; 
human rights are a "self-fulfilling moral prophecy [which says:] Treat a person like a human 
being and you'll get a human being"18, and also a checklist of how, realistically, a society goes 
                                                     
12
 See e.g. J. Donnelly, "Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights", 6 Human Rights Quarterly 400 (1984); 
"Human Rights and Group Rights" 13 Bulletin of the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy 6 (1989); and 
"Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights" 76 (2) 
American Political Science Review 303 (1982). 
13
 J. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory & Practice (2
nd
 Edition, Cornell University Press, 2003), Preface. 
14
 Ibid., Introduction, p. 1. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid., p. 10. 
17
 Ibid., p. 14. 
18
 Ibid., p. 15. 
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about achieving this.19 Donnelly readily admits that this is an entirely philosophical theory, 
baseless in terms of science20, and comprised entirely of axioms.21 Recognising that simply 
asserting a foundation for human rights based on nature and morality22, or human needs23, 
is inadequate, and that even the core human rights Covenants - which appeal to "human 
dignity" - are hardly persuasive as a philosophical argument, he dismisses this problem by 
arguing that in fact there are good reasons for accepting the system of human rights set out 
in the UDHR, when set against competing theories and practices.24 He calls the UDHR an 
"attractive moral vision of human beings as equal as autonomous agents living in states that 
treat each citizen with equal concern and respect"25. This boils down to, essentially, a 
Dworkinian view of the role of government and society, in which the government treats 
every individual as an equal in every aspect26; this requires that personal liberty and 
economic liberty be protected and each individual be insulated as much as possible from 
social and economic inequalities, and in Donnelly's view the UDHR is the best tool for 
realising such goals.27 
 It is here that Donnelly is forced to tackle the issue of universalism and culture, for as 
he readily admits, his defence of the UDHR, and in fact that document itself, rests on an 
understanding of the world that is firmly within the liberal tradition of Locke, Kant, 
Rousseau, Rawls and Dworkin. And this means that it is not based on a "transhistorical, 
                                                     
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid., p. 14. 
21
 Ibid., p. 17. 
22
 For instance, J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980). 
23
 For instance, A. Dyck, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities: The Moral Bonds of Community (The Pilgrim 
Press, 1994). 
24
 J. Donnelly, supra note 13, p. 21. 
25
 Ibid., p. 38. 
26
 See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977). 
27
 J. Donnelly, supra note 13, pp. 44-47. 
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'anthropological' consensus".28 Rather, it is a historically specific product of modernity and 
the political dominance of 'the West' in the world since the 19th Century. Indeed, it is only a 
slight oversimplification, in Donnelly's view, to say that the international human rights 
Covenants "set out a hegemonic political model something very much like the liberal 
democratic welfare state of Western Europe, in which all adult nationals are incorporated as 
full legal and political entities to an extensive array of social welfare services, social and 
economic opportunities, and civil and political liberties".29 Rights are necessary in liberal 
democratic welfare states, and strongly linked to them historically, and since liberal 
democracies and liberal economics tend to be dominant in the world, this is largely the 
reason why human rights have achieved the kind of global normative hegemony that they 
have.30 
 In Donnelly's view, therefore, it is not the case (as some theorists31 have argued) that 
conceptions of human rights are present in all societies and cultures, and that people in all 
societies share similar beliefs about dignity and rights. Non-Western cultural and political 
traditions, according to him, do not have either the practice or the concept of 'human 
rights', though they may have systems of duty and obligation which are functionally 
equivalent.32 Surveying traditional Islamic, African, Chinese and Indian societies33, he 
concludes that "it simply is not true that all peoples at all times have had human rights ideas 
and practices, if by 'human rights' we mean equal and inalienable paramount moral rights 
                                                     
28
 Ibid., p. 51. 
29
 Ibid., p. 61. 
30
 Ibid., pp. 61-70. 
31
 Such as in A. Pollis & P. Schwab (eds.), Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (Praeger, 1980), Y. 
Khushalani, "Human Rights in Asia and Africa" 4 (4) Human Rights Law Journal 403 (1983), or A. Renteln, 
International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (Sage, 1990). 
32
 J. Donnelly, supra note 13, p. 71. 
33
 Ibid., pp. 71-88. 
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held by all members of the species"34 , and that the literature which argues otherwise is 
"theoretically muddled or historically inaccurate (or both)".35 It is rather the case, he argues, 
that while every society has its own understanding of justice and fairness, their legal and 
political practices are not human rights masquerading under another name; they are 
different and separate, usually because they do not do what human rights does – they do 
not inhere in all human individuals equally, but make distinctions between people. The 
Indian caste system, for example, "denies the equal worth of all human beings"36 by 
assuming that there are fundamental and inalterable differences between human beings 
who are members of different castes; this is effectively opposite to human rights, which 
assume an inherent and equal dignity arising in all people simply as a result of being human. 
Donnelly quite rightly points out that this does not make human rights an inherently 
superior basis for a society's moral, political and legal system than caste or any other.37 It is 
important, as he says, to have such debates. But to pretend that there is no difference 
between Western liberal human rights and traditional practices in other regions of the world 
will result in a debate that has no grounding in reality.38 
 This means that, for Donnelly, cultural relativity is a fact – "moral rules and social 
institutions evidence astonishing cultural and historical variability".39 But it does not follow 
that culture necessarily creates a problem for the universal model; while there is some 
conflict between different societies over some international human rights norms, by and 
large there is considerable overlapping consensus40 on the rights contained in the UDHR – at 
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least at the level of abstract statements of orienting value.41 When it comes to interpretation 
of the rights, and implementation (or 'form'), consensus disappears, but this is not 
necessarily damaging to universality of concepts and universality of human rights itself. For 
instance, there is consensus among most if not all States that everybody should have the 
right to protection from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.42 Though interpretation 
might differ (for instance, is the death penalty 'cruel'?), this does not damage the near-
universal consensus around the norm.43 Similarly, while there is consensus around freedom 
of expression, there are differing levels of implementation and restriction on that right – for 
instance, surrounding pornography, which is permitted in some States but prohibited 
entirely in others.44 Much is true of almost all of the rights contained in the UDHR. 
 This leads Donnelly to state that human rights are "relatively universal"45. Yet we can 
identify some flaws in his argument. First, conceptually, his division of 'abstract statements 
of orienting value' from 'interpretation' and 'implementation' is useful for the purposes of 
advancing his own position, but is not particularly compelling otherwise; of course, at some 
level of abstraction there is almost always agreement on any norm, but the higher the level 
of abstraction, the more banal and amorphous norms become. It is all very well that, for 
instance, the right to life is respected as an 'orienting value' in Iran, Italy, China, North Korea, 
Brazil and the United States, but in practical terms, we may question how useful this 
apparent consensus is, given that it produces such vastly different results from State to 
State. In fact – especially when it comes to actual questions of law – interpretation and 
implementation are much more important than agreements about concept; if we wish to 
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have a system in which it is possible to determine whether a State has acted in violation of 
the law, interpretation and implementation are everything. To continue with Donnelly's 
example of the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, the details (whether, 
for instance, the death penalty should be considered cruel) are of fundamental and 
paramount importance as legal questions – far more so than any content-less overlapping 
consensus on terminology of the abstract norm – and if there is no agreement on 
interpretation and implementation of the abstract norms we can hardly expect a coherent 
legal human rights framework to develop. We can here contrast Donnelly's appropriation of 
Rawls's overlapping consensus with Cass Sunstein's notion of the low-level incompletely 
theorised agreement46, which takes effectively the opposite approach: 
 
Well-functioning legal systems…tend to adopt a special strategy for producing agreement 
amidst pluralism… They agree on the result and on relatively low-level explanations for it. They 
need not agree on fundamental principle. They do not offer larger or more abstract 
explanations than are necessary to decide the case. When they disagree on an abstraction, 
they move to a level of greater particularity. The distinctive feature of this account is that it 
emphasises agreement on (relative) particulars rather than on (relative) abstractions.47 
 
That is, in Sunstein's view at least, a 'well-functioning' legal system tends to avoid 
foundations and focuses on outcomes; judges seek the lowest possible level of abstraction 
they can in order to decide a case.48 This is desirable in his view because the social function 
of rules is "to allow people to agree on the meaning, authority, and even the soundness of a 
governing legal position in the face of disagreements about much else".49 Judges may have 
widely differing opinions in principle, but be able to reach a decision on the particulars 
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nonetheless, and this is a virtue inasmuch as it allows contentious and problematic issues to 
be set aside or even ignored in the name of reaching whatever agreement or decision can be 
reached. 'Deep theorising' is sacrificed, in other words, to expediency. 
Donnelly's account of universal human rights, for Sunstein, would represent an 
incompletely theorised agreement at 'mid-level principle'50  – consensus around certain 
norms (e.g. people should have the right to freedom of expression) without agreement 
either on the general theory that accounts for them (utilitarianism, libertarianism, 
Kantianism, Marxism, etc.) nor the particular outcomes that result from them (e.g., should 
pornography be permitted or not?). This may be compelling as a description of how the 
current system has come into existence – it is certainly a plausible description of how the 
international human rights framework, such as it is, is constituted – but it tells us little or 
nothing about how particular outcomes arise, why they do so, and whether they are 
desirable. That is, we know that there is broad consensus among States that there ought to 
be a rights-based prohibition against cruel punishments contained in a human rights treaty. 
This is what Donnelly would call consensus around an abstract norm or an orienting value, 
and what Sunstein would call agreement on a 'mid-level principle'. Yet this tells us nothing 
about the particulars – what constitutes 'cruelty' being foremost among them – and, 
specifically, how the right is interpreted by the treaty bodies and other international 
interpretive bodies, and how it is given form (if at all) in the legal systems of individual 
States. 
This is the second flaw in Donnelly's work – a lack of reference to international law as 
law. Though he devotes some time to describing the various international human rights 
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regimes51 and discussing the priority of national action52, broadly speaking his perspective is 
that of a scholar of international relations and political theory, not law. Thus, he offers no 
analysis of how either States, regional human rights courts, or the United Nations treaty 
bodies, actually interpret international human rights norms – leaving his conceptual analysis 
almost entirely empirically53 void. How, for instance, are we to verify that there is genuine 
consensus even at the abstract level, as he asserts, without first thoroughly examining the 
legal evidence, in the form of case law and authoritative decisions and interpretations, and 
discovering the extent to which consensus actually exists? And how are we to determine 
whether that consensus has any effect on 'facts on the ground'? 
To put it in more concrete terms, if we discover that, despite apparent consensus 
around the right to freedom of expression, that this right is interpreted in one State to be 
restricted to the point at which criticism of the government is illegal, true consensus can 
hardly be said to exist around that right even if it apparently does so in semantic form. So 
much we have already argued. And it is especially true with regard to culture and the way it 
affects how societies 'view' rights within their own legal systems, and the way in which 
human rights courts and quasi-judicial bodies respond to that. Crucially, then, a more robust 
and detailed legal analysis is required. 
Like Donnelly, several other writers have argued that despite the 'descriptive truth' of 
cultural relativism, liberal rights made universal are the best means by which to promote 
'human dignity'. Sloane, for instance, notes that it is entirely correct that means of 
protecting human dignity vary according to the culture and society in which they develop54, 
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but universal human rights – which developed in the West and are a unique product of it55 - 
have a normative force which makes them preferable. This normative force stems from 
liberal human rights' enshrinement of individual autonomy, which allows human beings to 
pursue their own concept of the 'good' unfettered and unimpeded by government or 
institutions.56 He then goes on to argue that, in fact, in protecting value pluralism, a liberal 
human rights framework would be the most inclusive means by which human dignity could 
be fostered and promoted; in allowing individuals and "cultural units" to pursue their own 
values and ideals as they see fit (within reason) through defending their rights to autonomy, 
it would paradoxically be the framework most accommodating of different conceptions of 
what is 'good'.57 He contrasts it with other, traditional means of promoting 'human dignity', 
which demand universal assent and coerce people into adopting certain sets of values.58 
However, unlike Donnelly, Sloane is willing to accept that any consensus which exists 
around universal human rights as encapsulated by the UDHR is tenuous and superficial at 
best: the level of consensus was so abstract, he notes, that the language of the final text 
allowed in many instances almost antithetical interpretations.59 Essentially, he makes the 
same point which we have already set out – that consensus between different States and 
societies at a certain level of abstraction clearly does exist, but the content of that consensus 
might be, in practical terms, meaningless. The fact that consensus is so weak or meaningless 
forces Sloane to make a normative defence of universal human rights, which leads him to 
the conclusion (though he states it weakly) that universal human rights are the creation and 
preserve of the Western nation-state, which, since it is the predominant political form on 
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the planet, ensures that universal human rights are the "appropriate concept"60 for 
protecting human dignity in the modern age - rather than any other traditional means of 
doing so that might once have prevailed in some areas of the world. Once again, this forces 
us to ask questions about the empirical basis for his position: his assertion may in fact be 
true, but until a detailed examination of how the law deals with culture in practice – at both 
the domestic and international levels – it cannot be argued that the apparent consensus is 
meaningless or otherwise. 
In contrast to Donnelly, Abdullah An-Na'im argues for a reformation of the 
international human rights system based on the understanding that human rights norms 
must be seen as legitimate within the culture or society in which they are to be given form, 
in order for them to achieve genuine recognition and internalisation.61 This means that, 
unlike Donnelly (who argues simply that the existing consensus on abstract orienting values 
is enough to demonstrate 'relative universality', despite the historic specificity of human 
rights) and Sloane (who argues that human rights are the product of the liberal West and 
uniquely appropriate for a world which the liberal West dominates), An-Na'im adopts a quite 
strongly Rawlsian position, seeking an overlapping ("cross-cultural") consensus around a set 
of norms that promote 'human dignity' – rather than an imposed and legalistic insistence on 
Western, liberal human rights. 
In doing so, he notes (correctly and obviously) that 'universality' of a legal norm can 
either refer to its universal validity (i.e. nominal support in all societies), or its universal 
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application (i.e. enforcement as law in all societies), or both.62 In his view, both are mutually 
supportive and inclusive – if a right is considered to be valid within a given society, it is likely 
to find application within that society; and at the same time, if a right can be in some sense 
'located' within the pre-existing cultural practices of that society, its international expression 
is more likely to be considered valid within it. To take an example, An-Na'im makes the 
argument that the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment can, 
in Islamic societies, be related to the already-existing Sharia principle that Koranic principles 
of punishment should not apply in situations in which there is reasonable doubt.63 This, he 
argues, will allow the norm to be internalised in a more organic and acceptable way to 
Islamic societies – and thus bring about greater compliance with the agreed-upon 
international norm than would be realised by simple coercion. 
However, regarding freedom of expression he makes a somewhat different, perhaps 
slightly contradictory (or at least orthogonal) argument. Here, using the examples of Kenya 
and Sudan, he makes the instrumentalist point that freedom of expression can reduce or 
ameliorate ethnic tensions and provide the best means of mediating conflict64, and then 
goes on to make the ultimately circular argument that, in denying the right to freedom of 
expression, the government of Sudan is failing to allow its citizenry the capacity to 
"verify…facts for themselves…or debate…matters of fundamental national importance".65 
This means that his 'strategy of integration' makes little reference to cross-cultural dialogue 
or embedding rights within cultural norms, but simply boils down to a rather banal 
argument for "[emphasising] that the struggle for protecting this right never ends", 
producing "institutional and educational measures to secure achieved gains", and giving 
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"due regard must also be given to the role of external factors and actors", amongst other 
things.66 
Once again, we are forced to ask what the ultimate conclusion to the 'cross-cultural 
dialogue' approach is, beyond a very broad and not particularly strong normative argument 
in favour of a certain conceptualisation of international human rights law. And again, the 
salient point seems to remain: what is the empirical basis upon which the edifice rests? To 
what extent does cross-cultural dialogue already take place in the interpretation of human 
rights law? Do international courts and monitoring bodies already make any attempt to 
understand how different societies might interpret or incorporate abstract, agreed-upon 
norms? Do the actual legal systems in countries like Kenya and Sudan reflect the culture of 
the society at large, and how does this affect the way in which international human rights 
law actually becomes implemented? These questions are left unanswered. 
Similarly to these authors, Charles Beitz argues for a view of human rights as 
aspiration: if fully and universally realised, he argues, they will be the "necessary conditions 
of political legitimacy, or even of social justice"67; they are a "certain ambition about how 
the world should be".68 Like Donnelly and Sloane, he denies the timelessness or descriptive 
universality of human rights69, but rather views them as standards "appropriate to the 
institutions of modern or modernising societies".70 Also like Donnelly, he points to the 
'virtual unanimity' surrounding international human rights norms at a certain level of 
generality71, and, anticipating a certain criticism which we have already made, goes on to 
suggest that the genuine differences that exist surrounding interpretation and 
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implementation are merely to do with political practice rather than genuine cultural 
differences; arguments tend to be about relative prioritisation of one right over another, or 
of rights over other values and vice-versa.72 
He developed these ideas more fully in his book The Idea of Human Rights73, which 
makes the oft-noted assertion that the lack of philosophical coherence behind human rights 
is not a weakness, but rather one of its strongest features: in being divorced from any single 
religious or cultural tradition it is a doctrine that can be endorsed from many different 
viewpoints – which allows it to be a kind of value-neutral “general understanding of the 
purposes of human social organisation”.74 This means that the notion of human rights as an 
order of values deriving from deep universal norms is wrong; in fact, the universality which 
human rights exhibit is entirely practical, arising from the fact that human rights are now a 
“global practice”75 – there is a “global discursive community whose members recognise the 
practice’s norms as reason-giving and use them in deliberating and arguing about how to 
act”.76 It is a political rather than a philosophical doctrine that has been deliberately 
constructed for a certain function in global political life.77 This is not to say that there is total 
agreement throughout the community on the actual content of rights, nor what they result 
in. It is only to say that there is near-universal agreement that there is a distinctive class of 
norms called human rights, and that they are guides for actions or reasons for actions within 
a society.78 This means that we should reject both “naturalistic theories”79 (those based on 
an understanding of rights as inhering in natural rights, or arising from the need to protect 
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‘human dignity’ or fulfil ‘human needs’) and “agreement theories”80 (those, like An-Na’im’s 
or Donnelly’s, which see human rights as inhering in intercultural agreement around what 
norms are acceptable) about human rights, in favour of a “practical conception”.81 
Drawing on the later work of Rawls82 on international human rights, Beitz then sets 
out this practical conception as, essentially, a repositioning of first principles around practice 
rather than around foundations – taking human rights as they are found in international 
political life, and constructing an understanding of human rights based on that.83 This 
understanding sees human rights as, critically, an emergent enterprise, in the absence of a 
central global authority, that was/is undertaken by the international community in pursuit a 
certain aim – basically, a remedy for the deficiencies or structural faults that arise from the 
inescapable fact that it is the sovereign State which is at the centre of international law. 
(These deficiencies are, specifically, the fact that sovereigns had the autonomy to abuse 
their own citizens and that those sovereigns who abused their own citizens would be more 
likely to undertake aggression against their neighbours84). They are, in other words, sui 
generis. The end result of this is a theory of human rights as a set of norms which guide 
global political action, created by the members of the international community, and 
contested between them – universal in the sense that, in principle, they are accepted as 
carrying normative weight worldwide, but not in the sense that their content is unanimously 
agreed. 
Beitz makes no pretence to a legal argument, and in fact seems to downplay the 
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important of human rights as law, preferring to envisage them as a “background norm” by 
which various government politics can either be justified or criticised.85 Even though human 
rights exist within treaty law and arguably as customary law in some cases, describing them 
as legal rules is mistaken, because: a) although viewing them as legally binding will help 
make judgements about them in courts, it will not be ‘dispositive’ in aiding “practical 
reasoning about conduct in global politics”86; b) since international law is less well-
developed than municipal law, “the obligation to comply must turn more substantially on 
background considerations”87; and c) reasonable disagreement should be possible between 
the members of the international community on all but the most simple cases, because of 
the importance of respect for each other’s practical reasoning – which would be 
undermined by thinking of human rights as settled rules.88 This means that human rights 
should not be conceptualised as a canonical list; rather, “a theory of rights [should] clarify 
the uses to which they may be put in the discourse of global political life and…identify and 
give structure to the considerations it would be appropriate to take into account…in 
deliberating about their content and application”.89 
Beitz’s reasoning is, in many respects, persuasive. It is easy to have sympathy with 
the view that enshrining human rights in treaty law does not, in general, form a guide for 
global politics (or, indeed, domestic politics). In fact, it could readily be argued (and often is 
argued) that human rights as international law are a hindrance to practical reasoning in the 
domestic and global spheres.90 Yet Beitz does not provide us with a concrete, factual base on 
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which to rest his argument. What is ‘reasonable disagreement’, and does international 
human rights law (by which is meant the entire edifice of treaty and customary law as well 
as courts, States, private actors, quasi-judicial bodies, and so on) already allow for it, or not, 
and to what extent? 
Anthony Langlois, in his 2001 book The Politics of Justice and Human Rights91 comes 
to a similar conclusion to Beitz. Exploring the work of Cass Sunstein (as described above), he 
attempts to understand global human rights discourse through the lens of the incompletely 
theorised agreement92, imagining a kind of ‘safety net’ in which diverse and plural view on 
morality can interact. Within this safety net there are no foundational justifications or 
agreements on abstract principle, only a general discourse which finds “sufficient 
commonality for there to exist outcomes which can then be incompletely agreed”.93 But 
while there can never be a Dworkinian human rights Hercules because there can never be 
complete agreement between all States on the fundamental underlying principles, the 
alternative is not random agreement reached indiscriminately. Rather, there exists a kind of 
normative structure provided by the codification of the discourse in the form of treaty law 
and other authoritative texts, which acts in an analogous fashion to stare decisis as 
envisaged by Sunstein, giving form to the discourse.94 
Langlois identifies two problems with Sunstein’s work, however, noting that a) 
incompletely theorised agreement itself relies on a foundational principle, at least of a kind 
(namely, that incompletely theorised agreement itself must be sacrosanct if it is to provide a 
guide to human action), and that b) in some areas it is impossible to find even mid-level 
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agreement on certain principles (Langlois uses the example of an environmental movement 
which holds the preservation of the environment above all other principles, pitted against a 
religious movement which envisages nature as being entirely subject to the dominion and 
stewardship of humans; in this case, there can be no agreement on outcomes – so one 
group’s “normative position [must] be dismissed”.95) So although, in his eyes, incompletely 
theorised agreement provides a useful tool and a way of avoiding the problems associated 
with trying to find universal agreement on grand norms, it cannot work in all cases (in some 
scenarios, normative positions have to be dismissed), and it requires a theory of just 
institutions – i.e., it requires that there is agreement on the framework surrounding it – on 
the very notion of incompletely theorised agreement itself. This takes the debate into the 
realm of theory and abstract principle almost by default. 
The problem, for Langlois, is that incompletely theorised agreement belongs in the 
realm of the judiciary and assumes, at least, that there is relative political agreement 
surrounding the fundamental principles of liberalism, so that the so-called safety net 
remains intact.96 In other words, Sunstein envisages incompletely theorised agreement as 
operant in the legal sphere, but not in the political sphere: there, abstract theories of what is 
good and right in a liberal democracy have to be (and largely are) settled. This is not true in 
the global community – rather the opposite, in fact. So, like Beitz, Langlois speaks mainly to 
the sphere of politics, and views such a move as unavoidable: if the principles and 
institutions in which the law operates are themselves contested (as they are in the global 
discourse) then the key issues surrounding human rights must be above and beyond the law 
– they must be political. But within politics, unlike in law, he argues, not even outcomes can 
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be agreed; almost no decisions are met with universal assent. Rather, collective decisions are 
made based on a formative discourse in which various parties argue their cases and contest 
principles. This means that not even incompletely theorised agreement is really possible 
here – instead, the issues will always remain fundamentally contested. Rather than being a 
“fixed body of normative principles which merely need to be enacted once they have been 
recognised by right reason”97, in fact any model of human rights should be “an arena for the 
discussion, debate and institutionalisation of our various and sometimes antithetical 
conceptions of justice and emancipation”.98 
This leads Langlois to what he calls a political account of universal human rights, 
mostly based on the work of Chantal Mouffe.99 Unlike Donnelly, he is cynical about any 
apparent consensus which exists surrounding human rights, citing Brown to the effect that 
the current version of ‘universal’ agreement is best seen as “a willingness to subscribe to 
unspecific norms which do not, in practice, affect state behaviour”.100 Outside of basic 
values, such as the prohibition of torture or genocide, and perhaps the right to economic 
subsistence, Langlois does not see major substantive agreement.101 When it comes to other 
areas – women’s rights, abortion, freedom of religion, etc. – agreement is not to be found, 
and unlike Donnelly, Langlois bases this assertion on at least some methodologically 
empirical research.102 
Langlois argues that what is needed is recognition of conflict, antagonism, diversity 
and disagreement within the field of human rights – an embracement of the fact that human 
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rights norms are contestable and contested.103 Rather than being fixed philosophical 
standards, they are best seen as being entirely political and discursive, and thus forever 
“dynamic, evolving and changing”.104 This does not mean they are entirely arbitrary, but 
rather that “the criteria for what is finally adopted into the discourse are determined by the 
state of the discourse at any one point in time, conceptualised as a set of living shared 
practices, combined with those ideas and ways of life that can be absorbed through 
interaction, discussion, living together, and so forth”.105 It is not arbitrary, therefore, but 
arises in an emergent fashion from the discourse of many different traditions, perspectives, 
and voices. 
As with the views of Beitz, it is easy to find sympathy with Langlois’s general theory. 
But there are, again, several criticisms we can make of his approach, which manifest as 
genuine weaknesses in his entire framework. The first criticism is that, setting aside the 
merits of his general theory, we are still left with a situation in which human rights claims 
and counterclaims are adjudicated as law in both domestic and international/regional 
courts, and in which quasi-judicial proceedings are one of the primary means by which 
human rights norms are interpreted outside of the domestic context. In some sense, then, 
politics is actually far less relevant than Langlois might suggest; there might not be any true 
consensus or unanimity on the interpretation or implementation of the law, but it most 
certainly is still law inasmuch as it is justiciable and enforceable as such. Therefore, whatever 
model of human rights he advocates, he cannot simply ignore the fact that legal concerns 
are relevant at some stage, whether in the substance of human rights themselves or simply 
in the understanding that there is such a thing as public international law and it has real-
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world effects. 
The second criticism is that there is little or no substance to his conclusion, other 
than that human rights is a political discourse that remains fundamentally contested and 
contestable. In what fora this takes place, and how it proceeds, is left unclear. This is a 
concern, and is linked to Langlois’ rejection of the importance of law: currently, at least, the 
law is the means by which existing standards that have been arrived at discursively find 
expression and enforcement, and there needs to be some explanation for how this would 
occur in a world in which contestability and disagreement on the norms themselves was 
embraced. Whether we find sympathy with Langlois’ vision or not, his account is lacking an 
explanation for how the norms arrived at through his contested processes find expression. 
This leads us to the third (linked) criticism, which is that Langlois, like the other major 
theorists listed above, does not given an adequate empirical account of the situation that 
pertains currently within the law. Law itself can be “dynamic, evolving and changing” with or 
without reference to politics – and in fact it is impossible to argue that international human 
rights law has not evolved and changed over the course of the 60 years since its general 
inception. This is true not only in the naïve sense – i.e., inasmuch as there are new 
international and regional human rights treaties and courts. It is also true in the more 
complex and interesting sense in which the interpretations of the terms of those treaties, 
and the jurisprudence of those courts, have evolved and changed over time. Because 
Langlois refers human rights almost entirely to the realm of politics, he neglects this point, 
and its relevant to his wider theory is therefore left totally unexplored. 
 
Whether or not we view the arguments of these various thinkers as persuasive either 
descriptively or normatively, what is indisputable is that all of them would benefit from a 
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more empirical and grounded understanding of how the law currently intersects with 
culture, how the cultural defence has worked in practice, how relevant judicial bodies have 
dealt with the notion of cultural relativism, and how States have interpreted the major 
human rights treaties through the lens of culture and how courts and quasi-judicial bodies 
have viewed those interpretations. Such an empirical account would provide a more 
concrete basis on which to approach the fundamental and foundational questions which 
these thinkers have attempted to answer. As we shall see, much the same is true of 
scholarship surrounding the less abstract debate surrounding the so-called ‘East Asian 
Challenge’ for human rights. 
 
B. The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, and Asian Values 
 
A more concrete discussion of cultural difference occurred in the 1990s, when in the lead-up 
to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights a discourse on ‘Asian values’ – a set of 
supposedly uniquely Asian institutions, characteristics and philosophies – coalesced around 
the notion that the existing global human rights framework was Western-centric and not 
suited to application in Asian societies because of their own distinct character. The concept 
of Asian values bears discussing in some detail, as it will become especially important in the 
latter half of the thesis, and serves as a useful springboard for elaborating on the rationale 
behind the empirical approach the thesis takes.  
The first and most important consideration on this point is the nebulousness of the 
concept of Asian values itself, which is not only ill-defined even by its proponents, but 
defined differently in different contexts. (It is notable that this extends to whether it is 
referred to as “Asian values” or “‘Asian values’” – with the former tending to be used by its 
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advocates and the latter by its critics – or even, more recently “values in Asia”106. For the 
sake of simplicity, this thesis avoids the use of scare quotes.) The second is the fact that the 
notion has been subject to significant criticism, as being artificial, without empirical basis, 
and a political tool. And the third is the way in which its importance has waxed and waned 
over the course of the previous 20 years – it was of significant importance in the early 1990s, 
became dismissed as outmoded107 in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and has since been 
somewhat revived.  
Generally speaking, “Asian values” could be defined as a common set of values shared by 
the different societies present in East and Southeast Asia. These common values are not 
always agreed upon. Sopiee lists a stress on the community over the individual, the 
privileging of order and harmony over personal freedom, union of religion with other 
spheres of life, emphasis on the importance of thriftiness and hard work, respect for political 
leaders, belief that government and business can work cooperatively for the good of society, 
and an emphasis on the family as the basic foundation of society108. In an oft-cited 1993 
article, Tommy Koh listed ten uniquely Asian characteristics that were incompatible with 
universal human rights: 
 
 A scepticism about individualism; 
 Belief in strong families; 
 Reverence for education; 
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 Belief in the virtues of saving and frugality; 
 Hard work seen as virtuous; 
 ‘National teamwork’; 
 A social contract between the people and the state, with the government 
maintaining law and order and providing citizens with jobs, housing and health care; 
 Deliberate efforts to build ‘communitarian’ societies; 
 Desire for a ‘morally wholesome’ environment in which to bring up children; 
 A belief that the press should be free only under the proviso that it behave 
responsibly.109 
 
Another frequently referred-to survey conducted in 1994, meanwhile, found that among 
Asian academics, officials, businessmen, journalists and religious leaders, orderly society, 
harmony and accountability of public officials were chosen as the most important societal 
values, in contrast to the USA, where freedom of expression, personal freedom and 
individual rights were considered most important.110 And while it noted some similarities 
between American and Asian correspondents’ views, it also noted some strongly ingrained 
attitudes of most Asian correspondents against interpersonal conflict and in favour of 
consensus, and the high importance those correspondents placed on the role of government 
as guardian of societal order.111 
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 Amongst governments themselves, there was some level of both commonality and 
variance. The Singaporean government, in its official statement on values in 1991, put it that 
the core of Asian societies revolved around collectivity and community: society is placed 
above self; the family is the basic building block of society, rather than the individual; and 
major problems are resolved through consensus rather than contention112. Malaysian and 
Indonesian leaders were much more likely to emphasise the prominent role of religion – 
Islam – within Asian societies alongside this preference for communalism, while in the 
Singaporean case if there was any ideological emphasis it was more likely to be 
Confucianism113.    
 These examples are broadly illustrative of the values that are generally advanced as 
‘Asian’. Of particular emphasis, found throughout the literature, is the preference for 
communal interests (whether ‘society’, the family, the nation, etc.) over individual rights, the 
importance of social harmony (especially consensus-based decision making), and the view of 
government as inherently benevolent.   
 Of course, as could only be expected, the notion of Asian values has been subject to 
considerable, not to say vociferous, critique. Most fundamentally, it has been described as 
simply failing to reflect the reality of Asian diversity. All the world’s major religions are 
represented in Asia and are state religions or enjoy comparable status in at least one Asian 
country; there are socialist, democratic and feudal political structures in different areas of 
the continent; and economic systems range from subsistence hunter-gathering societies to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
paper presented at “Asian Values” and Democracy in Asia, Conference of 28
th
 March 1997; available at 
http://unu.edu/unupress/asian-values.html#COMMONALITIES 
112
 Government of Singapore, Shared Values (1991), p. 5, para. 26. 
113
 There is no need to belabour this point, except to note that it is covered extensively in, e.g., A. Langlois, 
Politics of Justice, supra note 91. 
 31 
 
planned economies and developed free markets114. Simply put (at least in Ghai’s view), it 
would be surprising if there were in fact common values held amongst all of that apparent 
difference. As well as this empirical observation, however, he and other commentators are 
keen to note the existence of dissenting voices within the continent, from pro-human rights 
NGOs, to ethnic minorities, to “the oppressed and marginalised” – whoever they may be – 
to members of the middle classes seeking a greater level of individual freedoms115. 
Elsewhere, it is argued that Asian values are not in fact particularly Asian at all, but merely a 
means of conceptualising Western constructs useful to Asian leaders – whether a market 
economy (a strange assertion given that most Asian values proponents advocated a strong 
role for government within the market), national unity, faith in the government, etc. – as 
Asian in order to give them additional justification116. Other commentators have argued that 
the concept of Asian values simply embodies a kind of reverse Orientalism117. This lead 
Daniel Bell to suggest that Asian values, as commonly presented, are in fact “not Asian, not 
values”118, and it became fashionable to suggest replacing the phrase “Asian values” with 
“values in Asia”. 
 Moreover, the initial momentum generated for Asian values was very much a 
product of rising material wealth in the continent – a result of rapid developmental success. 
(Most of the governmental proponents of the concept were unabashed about this, making 
significant claims about the rise of Asia and mocking those Asian States, such as the 
Philippines, which were perceived as lagging behind as a result of their adherence to liberal, 
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Western values119.) This momentum, naturally, ground to a halt in the Asian financial crisis of 
1997, when most Asian countries experienced devalued currencies, rising debt-to-GDP 
ratios, credit crunches, and stock market slumps, and briefly faced default; and this, in turn, 
lead to an era of triumphalism on the part of the critics of Asian values, who were quick to 
declare victory in a manner which, to the modern reader, seems amusingly short-sighted in 
light of the direction Asian development has taken since the 1997 crisis120. Nonetheless, this 
serves to show the extent to which Asian values, as a distinct notion, has seen its fortunes 
wax and wane with the pace of economic growth; at the same time as indicating its 
survivability, it also demonstrates its malleability and lack of clarity. These problems 
with the concept of Asian values – its malleability, its reductionism, and the dubiousness of 
some of its empirical claims - should not be underplayed, but, equally, should not be 
exaggerated. As Peerenboom puts it, a plurality of Asian values is still Asian values121. The 
fact that a diversity of values can be found throughout Asia does not make them less Asian; 
and nor does the existence of difference obviate the existence of dominant patterns. And 
strong patterns of differences between ‘East’ and ‘West’ do exist. It is notable that most, if 
not all, survey data on the matter (though, unfortunately, scant) indicate statistically 
significant gaps in opinion between people in Asia and the US or Europe122 on a number of 
issues, particularly regarding individualism and consensus. 
 Asian values, however, was not the only strand of the East Asian challenge, as it was 
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bundled together with disparities in economic development, issues of morality and legal 
pluralism, questions of the politics of globalisation and post-colonialism, and the importance 
of nation-building, as one of a package of related but distinct concerns. Separating the 
‘cultural’ elements is important, therefore. More crucially still, much of the debate occurred 
at the political/discursive level, both among scholars and government representatives – with 
those two groups rarely if ever referring to the actual legal processes which (supposedly) 
give international human rights their force. The rhetoric was almost entirely pitched at a 
foundational level, challenging the assumptions on which the system is founded rather than 
the way the law actually operates. As with the more theoretical arguments outlined in the 
first part of this chapter, most writings on the East Asian Challenge suffer from an 
overemphasis on the normative (how the system ought to be) at the expense of the 
empirical (how the law in fact currently operates and deals with diversity). This results in a 
clear problem: the theory does not speak to the practice in anything like a convincing 
fashion. It is not a novel observation that this is a general problem within scholarship on the 
Asian values issue: it has been obvious for decades that there is a need to base any critique 
of the general position to be based on some kind of grounded empirical understanding of 
the legal processes and institutions within East Asian states.123 What has rarely been noted is 
that the same is true of international legal processes and institutions, which are after all the 
crucial filter between treaty law and domestic law. 
 Typically, the arguments of Asian government representatives have been rhetorically 
targeted at rejecting external scrutiny of the way in which they implement the human rights 
norms that they have recognised. Often, this is based merely on accusations of hypocrisy 
and rather transparent tu quoque attacks. For instance: 
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[Western criticisms of the human rights record of Asian States, writes Kausikan] grate on East 
and Southeast Asians [because] it is, after all, the West that launched two world wars, 
supported racism and colonialism, perpetrated the Holocaust and the Great Purge, and now 
suffers from serious social and economic deficiencies.124 
 
At the Vienna Conference Datuk Badawi made a similar point: 
 
Nowhere is the double-standard approach to human rights more glaring [he noted] than in the 
West’s evasion of its responsibilities through its inaction in the face of the massive and grave 
violations of human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina...[this] apathetic and meek response to 
genocide, ethnic cleansing and rape, in the heart of Europe, makes a total mockery of their 
preaching and posturing on the promotion and protection of human rights...We ask ourselves 
what credentials do they still have to preach about human rights when the most blatant abuse 
of those rights before their very eyes goes unpunished?125 
 
This ‘argument from double standards’ is not a particularly convincing one, either political or 
legally; the fact that one or more parties to a multilateral treaty fail to fulfil their obligations 
under that instrument does not have any particular effect on the obligations of the other 
parties except in certain circumstances126; Asian States which are parties to a given human 
rights treaty are bound by it irrespective of whether Western states are guilty of hypocrisy or 
not, and are still obligated to undertake reports to, and submit to monitoring by, the 
relevant monitoring committees. (Indeed, more thoughtful commentators have been keen 
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to stress the distinction between the political and legal, with Kausikan, for example, stating 
that although Western approaches to human rights issues in Asia had to be "formulated with 
greater nuance and precision", the ICCPR and ICESCR themselves were "flexible enough"127 
to accommodate adequate discretion for culturally diverse interpretations.) More subtle 
positions are taken, however, foremost among them what we might call the ‘argument from 
prioritisation’, which boils down to two linked debates about implementation and 
compliance – namely, whether the implementation of certain rights into domestic law 
should be prioritised in time and resources over that of others; and where the emphasis 
should be in the inevitable conflicts of rights that occur in any legal system.128 
 This gives the argument two separate strands. One is based on rather more prosaic 
matters – resource allocation, comparative levels of development, and brute economics. The 
other is more abstract and philosophical, and relates to issues of cultural and societal mores 
and their relative value in different contexts. We shall examine each in turn: 
 
i) Priority of Resource Allocation: 'Economic Relativism' 
 
It has been held on many occasions that it is sometimes necessary for there to be a kind of 
rights triage taking place when States (particularly developing countries) make decisions on 
how to implement rights protections in their domestic law. To take a paradigm example, 
since the right to food is unquestionably of more direct importance to people who are 
starving in a famine than the right to freedom of expression, it would be perverse not to 
concentrate on realisation of the former even at the expense of implementation of the latter 
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in such a situation, given that realisation of both would require some expense of monetary 
and other resources, and such resources are finite. As the Chinese government stated in 
1991, “to eat their fill and dress warmly were the fundamental demands of the Chinese 
people who had often suffered cold and hunger” - the implication being that freedom of 
expression and other civil and political rights were hardly the most pressing matter facing 
the country at that time, so regardless of the suitability or otherwise of implementing 
comprehensive systems for protecting such rights within China, their realisation should not 
be the State's immediate focus.129 
 The argument, of course, is tied strongly to the debate surrounding the indivisibility 
or otherwise of civil and political, and economic and social, rights: a well-worn bugbear of 
international human rights law which does not require detailed exposition here. The 
argument from prioritisation forcefully promotes the idea that the protection of economic 
and social rights can and should take preference over that of civil and political rights in 
certain contexts, and that the relationship is not so much of indivisibility as it is hierarchical – 
with comprehensive realisation of economic and social rights the necessary foundation for 
others. “[The] first task was to lift [Singapore] out of the degradation that poverty, ignorance 
and disease had wrought,” as Lee Kuan Yew put it in 1992. “Since it was dire poverty that 
made for such a low priority given to human life, all other things became secondary.”130 
Occasionally this is expressed as simple prioritisation of economic development over 
anything else. Liu Huaqiu advocated this view very forcefully at the Vienna Conference: 
“When poverty and lack of adequate food and clothing are commonplace and people’s basic 
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needs are not guaranteed...human rights are completely out of the question.”131 At other 
times the emphasis seems to be on economic growth (and thus fulfilment of economic and 
social rights) and the role it plays in fostering a society in which, eventually, civil and political 
rights can be comprehensively protected: essentially, once poverty is no longer a concern 
and society is thus more stable, the resources of the State can be directed towards 
developing the kind of civic infrastructure which allows for the protection of 'negative' 
rights. As the Singapore spokesman at the 1991 session of the General Assembly's Third 
Committee put it: 
 
[In developing countries] the conditions required were stability, consensus and cooperation, 
without which the countries concerned would be unable to produce an adequate agricultural 
surplus on which to build their industrial sector, and feed their peoples. In the urban sectors, 
economic restructuring meant dislocation, job losses and lower standards of living. If, during 
the process, everybody had the right to express freely his desires and frustrations, confusion 
and discord would reign. 
 
The more developed a country was, the more democracy was relevant, since it would then 
have an urban population with a trained and well-educated workforce which would have 
more demands, particularly regarding the administration of the country. A more 
representative system of government would then have to be introduced to meet such 
demands and to facilitate the country's move to the next stage of development.132 
Of course, the argument rests on a large set of nested assumptions: That it is possible 
for there to be a meaningful trade-off in monetary and human resources between giving 
'right a' versus 'right b' full effect; that such a trade-off could be measurable in any empirical 
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sense; that such a trade-off can be taken in isolation so that it can be viewed objectively; 
and that individual governments have the legitimacy and expertise to make such trade-offs 
in a fair and effective way. Clearly, all of these assumptions are questionable, even on their 
own terms, and they are the point at which the most effective attacks against the argument 
from prioritisation have been targeted. However, nor are they either readily refutable or 
restrained to the rhetoric of East Asian elites – they are issues which every legal system must 
deal with if it is to interact with the concept of human rights in any productive sense.133   
Rhoda Howard (speaking directly to the situation in Africa, but making broader points 
about the prioritisation of rights) has attempted to formulate a critique of economic 
relativism through an amorphous argument that human dignity, self-respect and autonomy 
are “fundamental requirements of human nature” that should not be subordinated in 
importance to mere physical wellbeing134. The implication of this is that self-actualization in 
a democratic society was in its own way just as important to individual human beings as 
adequate food, clothing and housing. However, her arguments regarding “fundamental 
requirements of human nature” are poorly defined, and she often makes self-contradictory 
points – on the one hand stressing the importance of individualistic civil and political rights, 
while on the other claiming that “ones belonging to, and fulfilling ones role in” common 
social structures such as kinship systems and ‘the community’ are vital and that 
communitarianism must be protected within African states.135 She also seems to advance an 
implicit argument for a hierarchy of rights, in spite of her stated position, when she notes 
that evidence from Nigeria suggests that different values take on different importance for 
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individuals in different wealth categories.136 
More persuasive and coherent, perhaps, is the critique advanced by Yash Ghai, who 
argues that economic development and economic rights are not the same thing, and that 
what the ‘prioritisation’ argument masks is naked pursuit of economic development for its 
own sake.137 In his view, apparent prioritisation of economic over civil and political rights is 
an excuse for focusing on economic development in general, which “increases state 
resources, enables governments to establish larger armies, enhances the status of their 
leaders, and secures the support of the populace.”138 This makes the Chinese or Singaporean 
insistence on fulfilling economic rights a canard – the emphasis is not on the rights of the 
populace themselves, but rather on strengthening the power of the authoritarian State 
through economic growth. This argument would seem to be at least partially borne out by 
the facts. After all, economic development in Asia has not in general resulted in the creation 
of institutions and procedures for the protection of economic and social rights, at least as 
legally enforceable ones. 
Leading economists have further advanced this critique. One of the most prominent 
has been Amartya Sen, who has spoken of the danger of confusing post hoc with propter hoc 
– i.e. that merely because Singapore, China, Vietnam, Malaysia (and before them Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan) have undergone rapid economic development under authoritarian 
regimes, that does not make the trade-off between civil and political rights versus economic 
rights necessary for economic development.139 Sen in fact argues that the opposite is the 
case – that “freedoms are not only the primary ends of economic development, they are 
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also among its principal means”140. This, he believes, is because democracy and the so-called 
negative civil and political rights protect the individual, who is the main agent of social 
change and thus development141, and also because those rights specifically mitigate against 
government abuses which might result in the violation of economic rights. Famously, for 
example, he argued that a free press was a necessary factor in the prevention of famine, 
because it allows for public scrutiny of government policies (such as those of Mengistu) that 
might directly or indirectly result in famine.142 Thus, rather than there being a trade-off to be 
made between protecting economic development and protecting civil and political rights, 
the two were in fact mutually supportive. 
William Easterly, following on from Sen, notes that there are numerous cognitive 
biases associated with the notion that “benevolent autocracy” such as that espoused by East 
Asian government spokespeople at the Vienna Conference can be beneficial to the economic 
and social wellbeing of the populace.143 One of the most important of these biases is the 
reversing of conditional probabilities: 9 out of 10 big economic growth success stories in 
recent decades have been autocracies – so the probability that, if a given country is a growth 
success, it is an autocratic one, is 90%. However, what is relevant is the probability of 
whether a State will be a growth success if it is autocratic – and in actual fact this is only 
around 10% (while 9 out of 10 large economic successes in recent decades were autocratic, 
the other 80 autocratic States had either low-mediocre growth or failed disastrously). Thus, 
the relevant probabilities have been confused.144 Another such cognitive bias is the failure to 
recognise or understand regression to the mean: or, in other words, that random sequences 
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sometimes feature streaks. It may be true that China experiences exceptional economic 
growth rates for a number of years in a row – but it does not necessarily follow that this is as 
a result of its autocratic form of government, or that it will continue indefinitely. With the 
large number of countries in the world, it would be unusual not to expect that some among 
their number would experience positive growth for a number of years irrespective of their 
leadership and government, by pure random sorting, and this would be no indicator of 
future performance – which tends to revert to the mean.145 
 
ii) Absolutist Prioritisation 
 
The second strand advocates the prioritisation of the implementation of some rights over 
others regardless of the state of economic development in the given society, simply by virtue 
of their intrinsic value.  For example Lee Kuan Yew, speaking in 1994, appeared to advocate 
in absolutist terms what might be called rights to personal security (freedom from crime, 
freedom from antisocial behaviour) over rights to individual freedom (freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, freedom from arbitrary detention, and so forth): 
 
[A]s a total system [he writes], I find parts of [American society] totally unacceptable: guns, 
drugs, violent crime, vagrancy, unbecoming behaviour in public – in sum the breakdown of civil 
society. The expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has 
come at the expense of orderly society. In the East the main object is to have a well-ordered 
society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedoms. This freedom can 
only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy.146 
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Likewise, other commentators have spoken in favour of severe forms of punishment in the 
name of protecting the life and physical wellbeing of 'law-abiding' members of society 
through deterrence of potential criminals (as Mahbubani puts it, "the tougher the 
punishment, the less the likelihood of reoccurrence...[in Singapore] the benefit of the doubt 
is given to the victim, not the criminal"147). Another common motif is that while human 
rights are to be respected as a general rule, "[they] must be exercised with strict regard for 
the family and the community"148 – presumably meaning that the rights of individuals are to 
be protected only in as much as they do not subordinate family or societal harmony. 
 Again, the prioritisation of certain rights over others in absolutist terms rest on a set 
of assumptions, similar in nature to those on which the 'economic relativist' argument are 
based, and likewise is vulnerable to a large group of critiques. Again, however, given that 
trade-offs between rights have to be made within any society and legal system, simply by 
virtue of the fact that protection of one individual's rights will almost by necessity involve 
prioritisation over the rights of another, the argument is not readily refutable without an 
extended and complex debate.149 
 However, it seems that there is something rather circular about the argument from 
absolutist prioritisation, as some writers have implied. While it may be true that a group of 
people could exercise their freedom by voluntarily surrendering certain rights (freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, freedom from arbitrary detention) in the name of others 
(to personal safety), or even forswearing democratic governance to be “happy slaves”150, it is 
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difficult to imagine how they might communicate this desire to their leaders without the 
protection of the very rights which they apparently foreswear. If democratic institutions are 
not present in a society, how are its populace to transmit their desire to restrict their 
freedoms (or otherwise) to the government?151 The argument is paradoxical. 
 The responses to this critique would seem to be twofold. The first is practical: the risk 
of ethnic conflict and social disruption in most Asian States is so severe that freedom of 
expression must needs be curtailed152, effectively rendering the point moot. The populace 
may wish to live as happy slaves or they may not, but the need for the governing institutions 
to preserve the stability of society is more pressing. This would hardly be a persuasive 
response, as it merely defers the question, which then becomes: do the citizenry prefer to 
risk societal stability in the name of being able to transmit their views to the government, or 
not? 
 The second response is cultural: people in East Asian societies prefer to sacrifice 
individual freedoms for personal safety and societal stability; they prefer a social contract to 
exist in which the State “provide[s] citizens with their basic needs for jobs, housing, 
education and health care” and the citizens abide by the law and respect authority.153 In 
other words, there are cultural predispositions in Asia away from individualistic civil and 
political rights and towards a group-based, communal, consensus-oriented vision of society. 
 This leads us around full circle to our starting point: that East Asia and the West are 
different in some important, cultural sense which makes it difficult or impossible, and 
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illegitimate, to create and impose universal standards on human rights across Eastern and 
Western societies. This last facet of the ‘East Asian Challenge’ shall be briefly examined in 
more detail now. 
 There is a considerable amount of academic literature dealing with ‘political culture’ 
and the role which culture plays in allowing democracy and democratic institutions to 
evolve.154 Much of this has revolved around the notion of culture prerequisites: that in order 
for a society to develop into a democracy (with fully realised civil and political rights) it must 
have a certain set of cultural characteristics, often referred to in a bundle as a ‘civic 
culture’.155 Mostly, these characteristics are associated with the Western, liberal tradition – 
implying that, in order for a society to become democratic and civil-rights-respecting, it must 
be a Western one (or, perhaps, renege on its own traditional cultural mores). 
 A complementary scholarly movement sees the political culture of East Asia being 
dominated by a supposedly Confucian tradition. This movement arose out of a reversal in 
attitudes in both Singapore and China towards Confucianism during the 1980s and 1990s, 
which had previously been seen as retrograde and a barrier to development in Singapore 
and as hampering revolutionary change in China.156 During this period, both countries began 
to rehabilitate Confucianism and propound its virtues as an indigenous Asian philosophy of 
government and society, more suited to the (real or imagined) cultural predispositions of 
Asian people. It was argued that Confucianism, with its emphasis on reverence for leaders, 
strong familial and communal ties, and maintaining social order157, was somehow more 
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suited to the cultural prerequisites of Asian societies and Asian people, who prize social 
order and communitarianism and have a different set of institutions and an un-civic political 
culture158 based around the family and established hierarchies. 
 Many scholars have taken issue with these positions, attacking their depiction of 
Confucianism, their depiction of ‘Asian’ culture, and their understanding of how democracy 
evolves. Englehart, for instance, portrays Singapore’s rehabilitation of Confucianism as a 
cynical attempt to give plain authoritarianism a veneer of philosophical or cultural 
credence.159 Rather than being a genuine attempt to put Confucian ideals into practice, he 
argues, it was a means of giving ideological coherence to the blend of economic liberalism 
and political authoritarianism that the ruling party (the People’s Action Party, or PAP) 
advocated from the 1980s.160 The fact that it was not a sincere movement is borne out, in 
Englehart’s view, by the fact that there was “scant evidence” of Confucianism in Singapore 
before the 1980s161, and in fact the PAP had attempted to systematically eradicate Confucian 
schools during the 1970s.162 Meanwhile, most non-Chinese people living in Singapore were 
extremely hostile to what they saw as Chinese expansionism which threatened their own 
cultural traditions.163 Ultimately, he concludes, the effort to unify the Singaporean populace 
around a notion of Confucian ethics was an attempt to falsely depict the nation as 
homogenous, to “essentialise [Singaporean] citizens as people who are obedient and 
devoted to the community”, and an “auto-orientalist” fiction falsely conceiving of Western 
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and Eastern people as “utterly different”.164 
 Moving on to China, De Bary devotes considerable effort to demolishing the 
rehabilitation of Confucius carried out by the government since the late 1980s, by examining 
the issue on Confucianism’s own terms.165 Arguing that Confucianism is in fact completely 
compatible with a notion of human rights, he points out that for much of its lifespan the 
Chinese Communist Party saw Confucius’ teachings as dangerously individualistic. They were 
seen as an anachronism in the era of world revolutionary struggle, in which individuals were 
to dissolve themselves in the Party and place its interests above all their personal 
concerns.166 (Mao Tse Tung himself condemned “Confucian individualism” on numerous 
occasions.167) In fact, until the late 1980s, Confucianism was seen as a danger to the 
common cause, whether of class struggle or Chinese nationalism.168 
 As was argued by Englehart in reference to Singapore, De Bary considers the revival 
of Confucianism in the 1980s and 1990s to have been an appropriation of certain cultural 
practices or trends by the government for entirely Statist ends: “defend[ing] the right of the 
State to act on behalf of the people as a whole, often at the expense of the individual”.169 It 
came to be seen, after the death of Mao and the retreat from rhetoric of class warfare and 
revolution, as a better unifying ideology on which to found a long-term governing tradition 
than Marxist-Leninism, and thus became rehabilitated by the political mainstream. This 
involved a ‘repackaging’ of Confucianism as being supportive of authoritarian and autocratic 
government, thus associating ancient Chinese cultural traditions of governance and social 
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organisation with a powerful dynastic State.170 
 De Bary does not dismiss cultural differences between East and West, acknowledging 
that Confucianism and Chinese society in general does greatly value communitarianism, and 
prefers to emphasise mutual respect through reference to “rites” rather than “laws”171. This, 
indeed, echoes Chinese scholars who emphasise that Confucianism advocates virtue and 
ethics over norms.172 But, he argues, the communitarianism that the Confucian tradition 
espouses is the very opposite of how it appears in the rhetoric of the Chinese leadership: it 
envisages the ‘community’ as a crucial intermediary between the individual and the State, 
protecting the interests of the individual or local group against governmental authority.173 
On the contrary to the prevailing view that China presents on the international stage, 
Confucianism communitarianism would serve, in his view, to support the development of a 
civil society in which citizens bear both rights and responsibilities, emphasising “norms of 
human respect, personal responsibility, and mutual support that could supplement modern 
legalistic definitions of human rights” and balancing the relationship between the individual 
and the State.174 
 Similarly, Anthony Woodiwiss, in his book Globalisation, Human Rights, and Labour 
Law in Pacific Asia175, attempts to reconcile the existence of what he sees as genuine cultural 
differences between Asian and Western societies with the universalising ambitions of 
human rights. A comparative study comprising the legal systems of Hong Kong, The 
Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, his book examines the cultural and sociological context 
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for labour law in each of these States, and suggests that there is indeed a particular 
'patriarchialist' approach to rights within each of those societies176. It then goes on to argue 
that the notion of universal human rights can be accommodated in such traditions, while 
also at the same time being reconciled with Asian patriarchialist interpretations; meanwhile 
States in Pacific Asia will evolve and adapt towards the practice of 'enforceable benevolence' 
due to the influence of global human rights norms. In essence, according to Woodiwiss, 
“there is nothing about either patriarchalism as a discourse or Pacific capitalism as a set of 
institutions that is intrinsically antipathetic to the maintenance of respect for human 
rights”177, but whereas in the West human rights are pursued as 'liberties', in the Asian 
patriarchalist societies examined, they may be presented rather as 'claims'.178 
  
  We need not draw any general conclusions about the persuasiveness or otherwise 
of the many arguments and positions taken around the issue of Asian values. Rather, we 
need only point out what these many thinkers and commentators have not primarily 
addressed, and that is, very broadly, the issue of international human rights law as law. 
Though Woodiwiss and, to a much lesser extent, De Bary discuss some aspects of municipal 
law in Asian States in the course of setting out their arguments, they do not focus a great 
deal of attention on either how international legal standards find their implementation in 
domestic law in practice, or how international norms are interpreted. Rather, they are 
focused at a level that is either too abstract (do different cultures understand ‘rights’ in 
different ways, and to what extent?), too normative (are Asian governments which have 
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espoused some form of Asian values-based cultural defence justified in doing so?), or too 
instrumentalist (how can cultural differences in Asia be reconciled with universality of 
human rights?). 
This creates a large gap between, on the one hand, conceptual, sociological, and 
political arguments over the nature of international human rights norms, and on the other, 
analysis of the role of culture in society and as a foundation of legal systems. While these 
different discourses are important to the question of how culture features in the 
interpretation of norms given force as international human rights law, they do not answer it 
fully. This is problematic for two reasons. First, and most obviously, regardless of any other 
issue, we must at least concern ourselves with addressing that which gives international 
human rights norms their force, and thus gives rise to the entire debate: the law. Without 
treaties, courts, and quasi-judicial bodies, human rights would no doubt still be an important 
aspect of international relations, but their enforceability (or otherwise) at law  is the crucial 
element of their current composition and status. Even if it may be argued that international 
human rights law is inadequately enforced or has minor or non-existent effects outside of 
the law itself, the fact that the law exists, was created by States, and continues to be created 
and discussed by them, indicates at least that they consider it to be representative and 
meaningful in some sense. What the law ‘does’ about culture and human rights, then, 
cannot and should not be ignored or glossed over. 
This point bears some elaboration, as it brings to the fore the important and 
somewhat fashionable issue of 'verticalization'179, or the pluralisation of international norm-
making. Broadly speaking, this refers to the (perhaps obvious) recent phenomenon which 
                                                     
179
 See e.g. J. Klabbers, "Setting the Scene", p. 14, in J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein (eds.) The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP, 2009).  
 50 
 
finds international legal rules in the classical sense being joined or perhaps even superseded 
by more non-traditional processes and actors in the creation of international norms180. That 
is, more simply, there is a growing trend in international legal scholarship to view 
normativity in international rules as being more accurately represented as a continuum from 
law to non-law, rather than a question of distinguishing legal rules from non-law181. This is 
tied to two other trends: an interest in the pluralisation of law-making processes in the 
international sphere182 and a linked interest in the process-based work of the New Haven 
Law School183. These trends are more than adequately summarised and tackled in Jean 
d'Aspremont's recent Formalism and the Sources of International Law184. 
 This thesis bears this scholarly trend in mind, while not addressing it directly. It is 
undoubtedly true that norm-creation in the international sphere has become increasingly 
pluralised, fragmented, and verticalised since the Second World War, for many reasons. 
However, the significance of the scholarship examining this trend seems overplayed, both in 
terms of its empirical value and its practical usefulness. For instance, while it seems a 
plausible criticism of traditional positivism/formalism that "the doctrinal quest for 'the law' 
is a…disconnected enterprise, explaining little of how international law actually operates, 
how it affects decisions, interacts with municipal law, and shapes norms"185, and while it also 
seems a plausible description of international norm-making that "private parties, [NGOs], 
and/or mid-level technocrats coalesce around shared, on-the-ground experiences and 
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perceived self-interests, 'codifying' norms that at once reflect and condition group 
practices"186, it seems a semantic deceit to conflate these process-based rules, agreements, 
codes of practice and behavioural norms with 'law' in the strict sense. Much is made in the 
New Haven Law School literature (and especially the "New" New Haven Law School 
literature187) of transnational legal process188 - the means by which States come to 
internalise international norms in the absence of coercion - or the "world constitutive 
process"189 (viewing the creation of international law as a continuous, social process arising 
from the interaction between a vast array of actors not limited to States or international 
bodies).  Yet too little of the literature devotes itself to considering whether there is a 
distinction between process- and socially-created norms in the international sphere and 
international law itself; it is infrequently considered that modern human societies, 
communities and groups all have socially-created norms, and social processes by which 
norms are created, yet at the same time they also have a phenomenon which their members 
consider to be notionally separate from those norms, which they call "law". It may well be 
the case that such a distinction is a fiction190, or disguises the manner in which social norms 
and law are linked, or form a penumbra. But even if this is true, the fiction retains meaning. 
Social rules and norms regulate behaviour, but human actors treat law differently from non-
law, and maintain the distinction - and the distinction affects them in concrete ways. The 
same is true of States: the New Haven scholars are undoubtedly correct that process and 
community is crucial in affecting the manner in which States and international actors behave 
and create norms which influence their behaviour. But recognising this does not, and should 
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not, lead us to the conclusion that there is no such thing as "international law" that is 
worthy of study and analysis as a distinct phenomenon. On the contrary, we might treat that 
distinction as worthy of study in its own right - though that would be beyond the remit of 
this thesis. 
Moreover, purely in practical terms, process-based, soft-law oriented approaches are 
extremely difficult to analyse and quantify persuasively. As Berman puts it, "to the extent 
that international human rights are now an important element of global legal consciousness, 
it is because of a long process of rhetorical persuasion, treaty codification, and other forms 
of 'soft law' slowly changing the international consensus, not because of positive decree"191; 
yet the usefulness of this assertion must be questioned given its absence of empirical 
support, not to mention the near-impossibility of empirical support (for how can the process 
of rhetorical persuasion, treaty codification and other forms of soft law be separated as a 
variable from all those other potential variables which might be of relevance, sufficient to 
establish its impact?). The concern is not that Berman is incorrect, but rather that the extent 
to which he is correct is impossible to ascertain. The "New" New Haven scholars have in 
large part to resort to mere proof-by-example192 - which may be in large part inappropriate 
or hasty generalisations.  Taking international law doctrinally as positive law - what might be 
called an Oppenheimian approach - avoids this problem for obvious reasons. Secondly, if we 
are to make normative or instrumentalist assertions or recommendations, there must at 
least be a clear understanding of the status quo for such suggestions to have any effect or 
bearing on reality. This should go without saying, but it is a point which has not been 
adequately addressed in the scholarship to this stage. It bears repeating that, before “ways 
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forward” are postulated, it is vital that we have a solid understanding of what is both 
currently possible within the existing framework, and what the existing framework contains. 
Ultimately, this returns us to a point that was made at the beginning of this chapter; 
that the literature has been heavily biased towards what should be the case, versus what is 
the case. Questions which have interested scholars working in the Asian values issue have 
tended to be: how universal should human rights be? How should the system take account 
of any cultural differences that might exist between East and West? What should be done 
about recalcitrant Asian States? Where they have been empirical they have been directed 
abstractly towards the philosophical (how universal are human rights?) and neglected the 
concrete (what does international law itself say about the nature of universality?). 
We once again find ourselves returning to the requirement for there to be an 
empirical assessment, from a legal perspective, of what international human rights law 
actually 'does' when it comes to assessing, analysing, and interacting with culture. The 
second section of this chapter will comprise a framework on which such an analysis can take 
place. The particular focus of this framework is an understanding of what we actually mean 
when we talk about culture, what we can reasonably expect the law to do, and how its 
approach to ‘culture’ has evolved and developed. 
 
 
 
 
 
II. International Human Rights Law and Cultural Values 
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Two questions have by now arisen which require answering, and this will comprise the basic 
structure of this second Chapter. The first of these questions is, in what sense are we 
referring to ‘culture’? This is a nebulous term in common usage, and the nomenclature 
surrounding the debates over it is equally nebulous. However, culture has a certain meaning 
in international human rights law, referring to cultural rights under the ICESCR and also 
under Article 27 of the ICCPR, as well as certain aspects of the developing law on indigenous 
rights. Some space will need to be devoted to clarifying this issue, and in particular what 
aspects of culture and cultural rights will not be discussed in this thesis. 
 The second question is methodological: at what level should our analysis be 
conducted? That is, following on from our assessment of what we mean by ‘culture’ in this 
context, and what is to be excluded or included in our analysis of the law’s stance on it, we 
must examine with more specificity where within the body or structure of the law the issue 
of cultural values is likely to ‘appear’ most frequently and where it is likely to be most 
relevant. For, irrespective of how unified the different parts of the overall system are, it is 
inescapable that international human rights law is very broad and can be approached from a 
number of different perspectives – whether foundational, interpretational, or operational. 
Likewise, the manner in which we frame our analysis will be strongly influenced by the 
perspective from which we make our approach. We will need to set out in more specific and 
focused terms from which analytical angle we will approach the issues raised. 
 Ultimately, I will argue that the most interesting and illuminating angle from which to 
conduct our analysis is at the interpretational level, examining the role that the United 
Nations treaty bodies have played in analysing culture, how they have dealt with cultural or 
societal values which might affect implementation of treaty provisions, and what the 
implications of their approach are. From this, I shall set out in greater detail the structure 
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that the analysis will take. 
 
A. Terminology and Clarification: What is Culture? 
 
i) Is a Definition Necessary? 
 
In the literature surrounding the issue of culture and human rights law it is, perhaps, at first 
glance surprising that so few scholars have devoted relatively little energy to defining what 
‘culture’ means. Most have been satisfied with a lay definition or have simply elided the 
issue – Donnelly, for instance, while noting that the way ‘culture’ is discussed in much of the 
argumentation is “highly problematic” and rests on “dubious caricatures”, he is satisfied to 
deal with it as it has been presented in the “elite and popular discussions of international 
human rights”.193 Some writers use such terms as ‘culture’, ‘custom’, and ‘traditional 
practices’ interchangeably.194 Others tend to fold religious practices or viewpoints into 
‘culture’ more generally, without any attempt at justification195, or else examine human 
rights from an ‘Islamic’ or ‘Buddhist’ perspective without undertaking to expand on whether 
or not religion is or should be treated separately from culture when it terms to foundations 
and interpretations of human rights.196 And in much of the Asian values discourse, those 
involved tend to avoid specifying what is meant by terms like ‘culture’, ‘values’, ‘tradition’, 
and so forth. This is not true universally of course, and some scholars have made an effort to 
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draw distinctions between, for instance, culture in the artistic, ‘high culture’ sense versus 
the anthropological sense, or between material heritage, artistic heritage, and values.197 
These definitions, however, seem rather banal and obvious, although necessary given the 
evolving practice of UNESCO and the CESCR Committee.  
 There is, certainly, much productive research to be done examining the relationship 
between law and culture in general, and indeed a wealth of scholarship exists in this area.198 
We have already, in Chapter I, given a brief description of the work of academics like De Bary 
and Woodiwiss, who have positioned a critique of Asian values around careful analysis of 
culture and law in various Asian States.199 However, Donnelly’s approach – taking the 
terminology as it is found in the discourse at face value, rather than to aiming to provide a 
sociologically or anthropologically accurate analysis of its meaning – is certainly the most 
appropriate for our purposes. Since our aim, that is, is to address the position of cultural or 
societal values in the context of international human rights law itself, our first and primary 
concern must undoubtedly be how the relevant actors (States Parties to human rights 
treaties, human rights treaty bodies, and so on) use the nomenclature, rather than a 
sociological approach which would be orthogonal to it – and which would probably raise 
more questions than it answered.200 
  This means that, notwithstanding the fact that the reality is obviously much more 
complicated and nuanced than is presented by either States Parties to the human rights 
treaties or human rights treaty bodies themselves, and regardless of the fact that many 
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scholars have pointed out inconsistencies, oversimplifications, and misrepresentations201 in 
the way in which these actors have portrayed culture, we ought to take it as it is represented 
by them at face value, for the purposes of this thesis at least. That is, we shall take an 
instrumentalist view of the terminology surrounding ‘culture’ and refrain from establishing a 
comprehensive and clear definition. Our definition, such as it is, is merely “that which is 
presented, as ‘culture’ within the discourse”, which should suffice for the purposes of our 
examination. 
 However, this, in itself, is more complicated than it appears at first glance. This is 
because the term ‘culture’ is not merely a lay term in international human rights law, but is 
itself a right; individuals under the jurisdiction of any State Party to the ICESCR have the right 
to culture, and there are other substantive cultural rights in the major human rights treaties. 
Yet this is not generally how the term ‘culture’ has been used in the Asian values debate. 
Before proceeding, then, we must decide on the parameters for this thesis: what are we 
referring to specifically when we examine the way in which cultural or social values are 
presented in international human rights law? 
 
ii) Defining Parameters 
 
We shall begin by outlining what will, for the sake of clarity, be largely ignored in the course 
of this thesis: cultural rights and culture’s role in the principle of non-intervention. 
 Cultural rights are a relatively undeveloped area in terms of scholarship, but in recent 
years they have been the focus of a considerable amount of discussion.202 Much of this has 
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revolved around four key areas: the ‘classical’ right to participate in cultural life; the rights of 
members of minorities and indigenous peoples to participate in their own cultural practices 
and the implications for statehood and sovereignty203; the question of self-determination 
and the right of groups qua groups to their own culture204; and the issue of multiculturalism, 
recognition/protection of cultural diversity, and so forth.205 To this can be added several 
subsidiary issues which do not require greater detailing here, such as cultural rights in the 
WTO, the protection of cultural artefacts, commercial use of the traditional cultural products 
of indigenous peoples, and various others.206 This adds up to a rather complex interweaving 
of different intellectual strands, which will be briefly summarised below; as will become 
clear, none of these aspects of the law/culture interaction are relevant to the focus of this 
thesis to any great extent. 
Cultural rights, classically understood, are contained within Article 15 (1) (a) of the 
ICESCR, in the form of the right of everyone to participate in cultural life, enjoy the benefits 
of scientific progress, and benefit from their scientific or artistic products.207 It is widely 
recognised that the formulation is problematic, nebulous, and difficult to adjudicate: it is 
described as a “remnant”208 and its apparent depiction of ‘cultural life’ as a monolithic entity 
“unrealistic”209. It is perhaps for this reason that Article 15 of the ICESCR slipped from notice 
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and remained almost entirely unaccounted for in the workings of the CESCR for many years, 
until very recently.210 For a considerable period after the ICESCR’s coming into effect, the 
Committee only created a set of guidelines for State parties making reports on their progress 
in implementing these cultural rights211, and otherwise spoke merely so as to attempt to 
draw a distinction between the right to benefit from ones scientific or artistic products and 
intellectual property rights.212 
 The basic understanding of this right would seem to be that individuals have the right 
to express a cultural life as they see fit (whatever that might mean), and whatever 
community they might belong to213; or, as the ESCR Committee put it, there is a “right of 
everyone to take part in the cultural life which he or she considers pertinent, and to 
manifest his or her own culture”214. This becomes problematic when we explore the matter 
in any depth: does this mean that individuals have the right to participate ‘in’ cultural life, 
that they have a right ‘to’ culture, or both?215 And what does the right to participate in 
cultural life actually mean? If it is merely a participatory right, it would seem merely an 
adjunct to the rights to freedom of expression and association. But a right ‘to’ a culture 
would not seem to be borne out by the terms of the treaty itself, which only discusses the 
right to “participate in the cultural life of the community.” 
 This problem, it would appear, reflects a confusion between the original intention of 
the drafters of the Article (and of Article 27 of the UDHR) that the right to take part in 
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cultural life meant the right to have contact with works of art, museums, libraries, theatres, 
cinemas and so on, rather than the right to use one’s own language or practice one’s own 
religion or cultural traditions216, and the broader approach taken subsequently by, for 
instance, UNESCO, which emphasised culture as a “way of life”217, as well as the ICESCR in its 
Concluding Observations.  
 The CESCR attempted to clarify matters in its 2009 General Comment No. 21.218 This 
involved a definition of “cultural life” which meant a “broad, inclusive concept encompassing 
all manifestations of human existence”219 whereby “individuals and communities…give 
expression to the culture of humanity. This concept takes account of the individuality and 
otherness of culture as the creation and product of society.”220 It encompasses “ways of life, 
language, oral and written literature, music and song, non-verbal communication, religion or 
belief systems, rites and ceremonies, sport and games, methods of production or 
technology, natural and man-made environments, food, clothing and shelter and the arts, 
customs and traditions through which individuals, groups of individuals and communities 
express their humanity and the meaning they give their existence…”221 The language used is 
mellifluous to say the least, but it is at least clear that the broader definition of culture – not 
limited to ‘high culture’ but including the anthropological sense – was preferred. 
 The CESCR’s emphasis, in its view on cultural diversity, is clearly on minority and 
indigenous groups and on women, children, migrants, and disadvantaged groups.222 Partly, 
this comes in the requirement for States Parties to the ICESCR to give effect to specific rights 
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in the Covenant in a way that is “pertinent and suitable to a given cultural modality or 
context, that is, respectful of the culture and cultural rights of individuals and communities, 
including minorities and indigenous peoples”.223 The Committee described this as a 
requirement for ‘cultural appropriateness’, insofar as it was compatible with human rights 
guaranteed by international law and did not limit their scope.224 And partly, it required an 
active role from States in ‘respecting, protecting and fulfilling’ cultural rights, which meant, 
amongst other things, refraining from hindering individuals from choosing their own 
identify, from expressing themselves in the language of their choice, from creative activity 
with other groups members, and accessing their own cultural and linguistic heritage225; 
respecting cultural heritage, particularly of disadvantaged and marginalized groups, cultural 
products of indigenous groups, and creating legislation prohibiting culture-based 
discrimination226; and adopting policies to protect and promote cultural diversity, free 
association, cultural activities, and so on227.  
 The Committee was also keen to stress that cultural rights were individual in nature, 
and it was careful to make this clear: the language it uses is rather meticulous in that 
respect, describing the Covenant as requiring States Parties to “create and promote an 
environment within which a person individually, or in association with others, or within a 
community or group, can participate in the culture of their choice”.228 This is in keeping with 
the standard view, which is also inherent in Article 27 of the ICCPR, which uses the phrase 
“persons belonging to…minorities”, indicating that minority rights are possessed by 
individuals alone, not groups or communities. This standard conception, elaborated on in 
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the HRC’s General Comment on Article 27, is that “the rights protected under Article 27 are 
individual rights [although] they depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to 
maintain its cultural, language or religion”.229 Or, in other words, the tendency is to view 
minority rights as individual rights with a “limited collective dimension”230; much the same 
seems to be true of cultural rights. 
 This has not stopped many theorists and scholars from attacking the notion of 
cultural rights as inhering only in individuals, since those rights have such a strong group 
dimension and are almost meaningless without recognition of that fact.231 Probably the 
most notable of these theorists is Will Kymlicka, who argues that the classical understanding 
of cultural rights is inherently flawed, because individuals’ well-being (especially their 
cultural well-being) is so closely bound to the group or collective which they belong to.232 
This means that some accommodation for group interests, between the individual and the 
State, must be accounted for.233 Indeed, Kymlicka argues that the traditional ‘culturally 
neutral’ liberal individual human rights are a de facto crystallisation of a group right of a kind 
– the rights of the majority – because they invariably shore up the language, culture, 
calendar and social mores of that majority.234 It is also sometimes argued that one legal 
instrument or another indicates a developing sense in international law that “peoples” could 
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or should possess cultural rights.235 Most notable among these is the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which contains several articles which at 
least heavily imply that indigenous peoples qua peoples, rather than individuals, have 
cultural rights236 - though of course, the document is not legally binding. 
 Cultural rights are clearly conceptually linked with cultural relativism – a fact that has 
not gone unnoticed in the scholarship on the issue.237 Both cultural rights and cultural 
relativism, as Stamatapolou memorably puts it, potentially threaten the “delicate and fragile 
universality concept that has been painstakingly woven” into the system of international 
human rights law238 by generating a troubling debate about the importance of respecting 
cultural values in general. The apparent contradiction between requiring States to respect, 
protect and fulfil the cultural rights of individuals under their jurisdiction while at the same 
time eliminating cultural practices which might impact negatively on other individuals’ rights 
is an obvious one, imaginable in a wide variety of circumstances and familiar to us through 
cases such as Lovelace v Canada239. Perhaps the classic case where this contradiction might 
be found is in Islamic personal law regimes vis-à-vis divorce proceedings, polygamy, and so 
on. It is certainly a problem of which the CESCR is acutely aware, and it attempted to address 
in its General Comment, when it emphasised the duty incumbent on States Parties to the 
Covenant to fulfil their obligations under Article 15 (1) (a) in tandem with all of their other 
human rights obligations: “while account must be taken of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, it is the duty of 
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States, regardless of their political, economic or cultural systems, to promote and protect all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms”.240 In other words, limitations on the right of 
everybody to take part in cultural life would be necessary “in particular in the case of 
negative practices, including those attributed to cultures and traditions, that infringe upon 
other human rights”.241 These limitations must be in the name of legitimate aims and 
proportionate to them, and must only be as is necessary in “the promotion of general 
welfare in a democratic society”.242 Of course, the detail of how this is to be achieved is 
more difficult to establish. 
 However, it is absolutely not the case that the States at the centre of the ‘East Asian 
Challenge’ have relied on cultural rights in their argumentation. Indeed, at almost no stage 
do Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, or China attempt to portray the problem of culture as 
being solvable through a robust interpretation of cultural rights – their arguments do not 
rely on claims to the effect that individuals under their jurisdiction have a right to engage in 
cultural life. That is, while it is somewhat easy to imagine a theory of Asian values which 
used the notions of proportionality and legitimacy to balance human rights in general with 
the rights of individuals in Asian States to engage in their own ‘Asian culture’ and have it 
protected and promoted, in actual fact this kind of reasoning has not been pursed.  
 Similarly, the attempted repositioning of the cultural rights discourse (to which can 
be added the work of such writers as Anaya243 and Schachar244) away from individuals and 
towards groups is firmly and self-evidently aimed at communities, collectives, and groups 
within States, particularly minorities and indigenous peoples. It should be seen, in other 
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words, as an attempt to develop a moral and legal argument for the protection of ‘subaltern’ 
minority cultures that is more robust than the current rather weak individual rights to 
participate in a culture and not to be discriminated against. It is therefore quite clearly 
distinct from the kind of positions which Asian governments – who tend to espouse such 
notions as the “Chinese people”, “Singaporean society”, and so forth - have taken. These 
positions, indeed, have rather obviously been in express opposition to the kind of argument 
that Kymlicka and others have made – as critics have noted on numerous occasions.245 While 
it could, perhaps, be argued that the natural conclusion to the Kymlickian perspective is that 
‘the majority’ in a State, just like minorities, should have group rights which find expression 
in their own State’s legal system and social norms, and hence the State should be free from 
external critique, this argument has in fact not been made, or at least has tended to 
manifest itself in different terms. 
The reasons for this are easy to speculate about: neither Singapore nor Malaysia is 
party to the ICESCR or the ICCPR, and China is only party to the ICCPR insofar as it applies in 
Hong Kong; none of these States has ever been particularly enthusiastic about the 
promotion and protection of individual rights of any kind. Moreover, the link between 
cultural relativism and cultural rights is as potentially problematic from an Asian values 
perspective as it is from a universalist one: once individual cultural rights become the vehicle 
for relativist arguments, they bring with them rights that are intrinsically linked to them, 
such as to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly, 
freedom of association, and so on – which might by their very nature begin to undermine 
the core of Asian values itself, which as will be recalled attempted to de-emphasise the 
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individualistic, and hence Western, character of human rights. This might explain the 
reluctance to follow this line. Similarly, recognition of group cultural rights would also raise 
the issue of minority and indigenous rights, which is an area which East Asian statesmen 
have generally been keen to avoid.246  
While it is recognised, then, that there is a clear conceptual overlap between cultural 
relativism and cultural rights, and that the issues of limitations on cultural rights, and the 
proportionality-based balance between protecting the rights of individuals to engage in 
cultural practices and the concomitant rights of other individuals not to have their rights 
infringed by those cultural practices, are an area of great potential for scholarship, they are 
not the focus of this thesis. Rather, the debate over the East Asian Challenge has mostly 
taken place on an understanding of the term ‘culture’ either as a referring to broad 
supranational trends (for instance, Asian values) or apparently national characteristics (for 
instance, ‘Chinese culture’), or both, and as an independent factor, conceptually distinct 
from human rights of any kind (particularly cultural rights), which has an impact on whether 
human rights are recognised and how those rights are interpreted and implemented once 
they are recognised. Culture has, in other words, been presented as a kind of independent 
variable, or a lens or filter through which human rights norms become internalised within 
the society: a set of values inherent in society which by their very nature affect the way in 
which human rights become realised within it.    
 Similarly, our focus is not what might be called the cultural aspect of sovereignty: the 
argument, implicit or explicit in much of the Asian values discourse, which portrays human 
rights law in general as being culturally imperialist and a threat to the principle of non-
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intervention or domestic jurisdiction; in this paradigm, the fact that different societies have 
different values is a justification for the principle of domestic jurisdiction itself. Many 
spokespeople for East Asian States have given statements to this effect, particularly in the 
political forums of the United Nations. Here, for instance, is a statement by Dato 
Hishamuddin Tun Hussein, the Malaysian representative at the Commission on Human 
Rights, speaking on a draft resolution calling for an international moratorium on the use of 
the death penalty: 
 
Although human rights had a universal dimension, their promotion was a matter that fell 
within the jurisdiction of individual States.  It was inadmissible that a country should try, 
through the decisions of the Commission or other United Nations bodies, to have the death 
penalty abolished or to impose its values and its legal system on another country.  At both the 
national and international levels, the protection of human rights should always take into 
account the combination of the historical, demographic, cultural, economic, social and political 
factors peculiar to the country in question, so that the principle of national sovereignty could 
be respected [emphasis added]. From that standpoint, draft resolution E/CN.4/1997/L.20 was 
not balanced, since it reflected only one point of view and failed to take into account the fact 
that various legal systems adopted by democratically elected Governments reflected the will of 
the people who were alone able to decide whether or not capital punishment should be 
imposed for the most serious crimes in a given context.  A single concept could not be applied 
on a global scale. 
 
… The sponsors of the draft resolution were trying to railroad the members of the 
Commission, and had not had the courtesy of engaging in the necessary consultations in order 
to draw up a text based on consensus as demanded by current trends. 
 
For those reasons, it was proposed to replace the sixth paragraph of the preamble, which 
reflected only the opinion of the Human Rights Committee, by a reference to article 6, 
paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which did not prohibit 
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the death penalty.247 
 
In this statement, we can identify several different elements. The first of these is the 
assertion that, although in principle human rights are in some respect universal, their 
promotion falls under the jurisdiction of individual States. The second is the notion that a 
State or group of States should not seek to impose a set of values on another State or group 
of States through manipulating a supranational body such as the Commission on Human 
Rights. (This comment concerned a CHR draft resolution, E/CN.4/1997/L.20, sponsored by a 
number of European States, calling for a worldwide moratorium on the use of the death 
penalty; similar draft resolutions, and similar arguments against them, were a feature at the 
CHR until its disbanding in 2005.) And the third is that human rights protection will differ 
from State to State depending on the “historical, demographic, cultural, economic, social 
and political factors” that are present, and the principle of national sovereignty requires this 
fundamental fact to be recognised. As we have seen, in the case of East Asia, that is 
generally argued to be a combination of traditional Asian values of collectivism and 
hierarchy, Confucian preference for virtue and ethics rather than legal rights, and so on. 
 A fourth element can be drawn out by examining, for example, the following 
comment, by Shen Guofang of China before the ECOSOC Committee: 
 
The major obstacles to the implementation of the follow-up to the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action could only be removed through dialogue and international cooperation. 
Countries with differing social systems, ideologies, cultural traditions and levels of 
development naturally had different emphases in their promotion and protection of human 
rights. The adoption of presumptuous and arrogant approaches or the politicization of the 
issue harmed the cause of the protection of those rights. China was happy to note that in 
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recent years more and more countries had conducted human rights dialogue on the basis of 
equality and mutual respect, a trend which the United Nations should seek to encourage.248 
 
 This theme – that the politicisation of human rights in international or United 
Nations bodies, whether at the instigation of States or those bodies themselves, is counter-
productive, and an emphasis on dialogue between equals is more appropriate – is a further 
element of the East Asian Challenge, supplementing the view that the attempted imposition 
of values by State(s) on others was a violation of national sovereignty and an unwelcome 
intrusion. Rather than seeking to use international forums to condemn responses to human 
rights in a given State, a conceptualisation of all States as respectful equals engaging in 
dialogue about how best to protect and promote universal human rights is the message. This 
line has been further developed through emphasising the notion that States should engage 
in “exchanges of views”249 to generate “constructive dialogue”250 rather than condemnation. 
 The common theme running through all these elements is, clearly, a defence of the 
primacy of national sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, essentially (although 
not stated explicitly here) as it derives from Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. This can be 
coupled with a supplementary reference to the right to (internal) self-determination, which, 
it is implied, supports the principle of domestic jurisdiction inasmuch as it enshrines the 
right of “all peoples [to] freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their 
political, economic, social and cultural development”251; that is (taking the orthodox view 
that the ‘self’ inheres within the existing territorial framework of nation-states252), it 
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protects the group rights of each society, or in effect, State, to determine its own legal 
system and its own response to human rights. (Whether this interpretation of the right to 
self-determination or, indeed, the principle of non-intervention is currently considered 
acceptable in mainstream legal opinion is of course doubtful253.) For instance, the Bangkok 
Declaration, in stating that “self-determination is a principle of international law and a 
universal right recognized by the United Nations for peoples under alien or colonial 
domination and foreign occupation, by virtue of which they can freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development [and] 
should not be used to undermine the territorial integrity, national sovereignty and political 
independence of States”254, seems to imply that the right to self-determination is conducive 
towards, rather than prohibitive of, a robust definition of national sovereignty and the 
principle of non-intervention. 
  It should be immediately clear that this discourse – even setting aside all other 
considerations – is not an important topic of discussion for our purposes, for the simple fact 
that it is a political, and not a legal, debate. Ultimately, indeed, it is a question of legitimacy: 
a debate which harks to the broader, compliance-related questions discussed by Koh255, 
Franck256, Chayes257, Goodman258, and so on, which are concerned with the reasons why 
States become parties to international treaties, and whether or not they comply with treaty 
obligations when they do. Fundamentally, that is, even if we view the arguments of East 
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Asian States in this regard as persuasive, they are without question firmly within the sphere 
of international politics, not law. They speak to concerns about partaking in the system of 
international human rights law itself – not to how the law itself should be given effect.  
 Moreover, the argument from non-intervention on the grounds of cultural difference 
is not persuasive even on its face. The notion that external scrutiny of human rights issues 
within States is inconsistent with Article 2(7) of the Charter is no longer one which has any 
persuasive force for a variety of reasons.259 And even Singapore and Malaysia, two of the 
most recalcitrant States when it comes to participating in international human rights 
treaties, are parties to the CEDAW and the CRC, while China and Indonesia are party to all of 
the major treaties, except for the ICCPR in the case of China (except insofar as it applies in 
Hong Kong). They have, therefore, by definition voluntarily entered into treaty arrangements 
with other States which, by their very nature, require such external scrutiny to take place. 
 If we are to take a legal perspective on the Asian values debates and on cultural 
relativism within international human rights law in general, then, these broader issues 
located in international politics, legitimacy and compliance are a red herring. For, not only 
are they irrelevant in relation to questions of law, they are also irrelevant when it comes to 
matters regarding scrutiny of legal obligations entered into by the States concerned. 
 It is clear, then, that our focus is neither on cultural rights, nor on this outmoded 
view of domestic jurisdiction, but on something else: on culture as an independent variable 
– a social value or set of social values – which may or may not affect how international 
human rights obligations are given effect, and to what extent.  
 This, it will be seen, effectively reduces to a question of interpretation: are 
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international human rights treaties interpreted so as to admit of culture as a factor affecting 
the implementation of human rights obligations, and to what extent? 
 
B. The Matter of Interpretation 
 
i) Why interpretation? 
 
Cultural factors are, of course, relevant when international human rights law is formulated – 
i.e. in the drafting of treaties – when it is interpreted, and also when it is implemented. We 
have already made clear that interpretation of human rights treaties is the most appropriate 
angle for our analysis, but why the formation and implementation stages are passed over 
must now be explained. 
 First, when it comes to the formation of treaty law, it is clear from examining the 
travaux préparatoires of the major covenants that issues surrounding socio-cultural mores 
and values were of some considerable importance and controversy during the drafting 
processes for those treaties. For example, during the drafting of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), state representatives often differed over, for instance, what the 
rights of children to freedom of expression, education, or freedom of religion should 
substantively contain. An extreme example is the right of children born out of wedlock to 
the same rights as those born in lawful wedlock: though this putative right was discussed at 
some length by Working Groups in 1986260 and 1988261, it was ultimately withdrawn and 
scrapped, because “although the principle of recognising children born out of wedlock was a 
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good one, there were many countries in which it had not been incorporated in the 
legislation and customs and culture were in contradiction with it”.262  
 In other cases the result was less fatal to the discussion, but State representatives 
were nevertheless eager to use cultural mores as reasons for preferring one wording or 
other in the final text. Bangladesh’s permanent representative on a number of occasions 
made statements to the effect that Islamic culture demanded a distinct understanding of the 
role of children’s rights (arguing, for instance, that with regard to the right to education “a 
clause [had] to be introduced to safeguard the autonomy and privacy of the Islamic family 
from encroachment and impingement by externally applied standards”263, and that the right 
to freedom of religion “appears to run counter to the traditions of the major religious 
systems of the world and in particular Islam”264). From a different perspective, the Holy See 
advocated a particular interpretation of the right to life, arguing that a “conceived child was 
entitled to rights”, not merely a born one.265 
Depending on how liberal and broad a reading of the term ‘culture’ the reader takes, 
especially with regard to supposed differences between ‘East’ and ‘West’ surrounding the 
relative importance of consensus versus the freedoms of expression and assembly, one 
might also interpret the debates over these rights in the CRC as incorporating some 
elements of the cultural defence of sovereignty – for broadly speaking a split between 
Western States and others can be discerned in the importance attached to those freedoms. 
Where the United States, Sweden, Canada and others seemed in favour of a very expansive 
right of children to have freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly266, the 
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Chinese delegate argued that those freedoms “could not be enjoyed by children in the same 
way as they are enjoyed by adults because the intellect of a child was not as developed as 
that of an adult”.267 In this and in other areas, ‘culture’ was not used explicitly, but seems an 
ever-present background motif that suggests it would be ripe for textual analysis. 
 Since, then, the formation of law is such fertile ground for examining how cultural 
factors have affected the development of the law, it seems a level that is ripe for our 
analysis. However, there are a number of reasons to why this is not preferred. 
 The first is that, by and large, it seems safe to say that the corpus of human rights 
treaties is now fixed, and there is unlikely to be another major covenant or convention in the 
short or medium term future. This means that, while an examination of this stage might be 
illuminative, its importance in indicating how the issue evolves and continues to evolve is 
perhaps somewhat diminished.  
 The second reason is that, while it is of course true that the decisions of interpretive 
bodies such as the United Nations treaty bodies, courts, and so on are not direct sources of 
law-making, it is also the case that at a certain point in the decisions of such bodies we find 
formation and interpretation becoming intertwined: the very act of interpretation itself, 
indeed, comes to constitute formation of the law in an indirect sense. This is because, in any 
current understanding of how international human rights treaties are interpreted, that 
process has to be viewed as ‘evolutive’ in character268, resulting in the understanding of 
terms and provisions being refined and changed over time through, primarily, subsequent 
practice under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and the 
doctrine of dynamic interpretation. Much more will be said on this point during the course 
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of the thesis, but for the moment it suffices for our purposes to note that, in practical terms, 
the distinction between law formation and interpretation is in some sense arbitrary in the 
context of human rights, given the importance of viewing human rights treaties as ‘living 
instruments’.269 While the standard traditional view, in other words, is that “doctrine and 
jurisprudence no doubt do not create law; but they assist in determining rules which 
exist”270, a modern understanding of the human rights treaty must incorporate an 
interpretive role for interpretive bodies that is in effect law-making.271 This means that 
concentrating on treaty interpretation will also likely result, ultimately, in conclusions which 
will apply more generally in the formative dimension also. 
 However, another level at which to direct our analysis presents itself: what we might 
call the ‘implementative’ dimension. By this is meant the point at which international norms 
are incorporated (or otherwise) into the domestic law of States, what shape this 
incorporation takes, and how effectively it is done; and, from the opposite perspective, how 
States can be held accountable for failures to implement their legal obligations.  
 There are several different perspectives we might take in reference to this matter, if 
we are interested in the role played by cultural values in the realisation of human rights law 
in domestic legal systems. The first would be to undertake a practical assessment of the 
impact of ratification of human rights treaties or recognition of international human rights 
norms on domestic law, as for instance Heyns and Viljoen did in 2002 in conjunction with the 
OCHR.272 This study examined 20 States from around the world, giving an overview of the 
level of awareness of the treaties within their judiciaries, their constitutional recognition of 
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treaty norms (if any), examples of legislative reform, judicial decisions in which any human 
rights treaties were cited, use by NGOs, and other ‘limiting and enhancing’ factors. Other 
authors have given thorough single-country analyses of how international human rights 
treaties are enforced and implemented.273 Anthony Woodiwiss’s Globalisation, Human 
Rights, and Labour Law in Pacific Asia274 also fits into this category. Amongst other things, 
such a study could analyse the extent to which international human rights norms find 
interpenetration and actual practical enforcement within domestic law in a given State or 
States, in light of the prevailing cultural values and traditions within those societies. Such a 
study might shed light on the extent to which cultural values, at the societal level, have any 
practical impact in terms of municipal law and ‘facts on the ground’, as opposed to their 
political or rhetorical importance. 
A second potential line of inquiry which presents itself with respect to the 
implementation domain is to examine the kind of (legal and extra-legal) factors which cause 
those States which most readily or forcefully present cultural values as being a relevant 
consideration in their compliance with and/or implementation of human rights treaty 
provisions, so as to form a basis of comparison with States which are less likely to do so. 
Such a methodologically empirical analysis would perhaps indicate to what extent it is 
possible to discuss the foundations for the Asian values discourse, or other cultural relativist 
critiques at the national level, sensibly and accurately. 
Thirdly, we might focus more empirically on the ultimate realisation of international 
human rights standards in the domestic sphere, and assess the extent to which cultural 
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values affect that realisation or form a barrier to it. For instance, we might draw a 
comparison between how far States such as China, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, 
which have drawn on culture most readily, as opposed to States with similar levels of 
development that have tended not to rely on it, so as to discover what actual effect it has in 
terms of human rights goals.275 
The implementation level, then, is rich in possibilities for analysis. It is not, however, 
the level at which this particular analysis will be pitched, for the following reasons. 
First, it will not have escaped the reader’s notice that the kind of study briefly 
detailed above would be complex, and involve a long, protracted examination of the legal 
systems of many different States, not to mention other extra-legal, societal factors. Simply 
put, a comparative study akin to that conducted by Heyns and Viljoen, or Anthony 
Woodiwiss, would not be particularly feasible in a thesis of this kind (or, at least, if it were 
carried out, it would not be feasible to conduct it in sufficient depth). 
Second, there are in fact good reasons to be dubious about the effectiveness of the 
kind of study outlined above. Without the ability to generate neutral ‘control’ variants of 
States which are subject to study (because by definition, such a State cannot exist) it is 
impossible to prevent at least some level of confounding or omission of variables – a 
problem inherent in all socio-legal studies, if not often remarked on.276 What is meant by 
this is that, quite simply, without an adequate scientific control, it is always a danger that the 
researcher confuses correlation with causation, thus failing to properly identify exactly what 
the reasons are for a given set of circumstances being the way they are. Thus, for instance, 
to take a very simple example, when Heyns and Viljoen conclude that “when one compares 
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the world as it is with what it would have been without the [core human rights] treaties, 
treaties have made a huge difference”277, they are in fact making a meaningless statement: 
they do not know how, and in fact cannot know, the human rights records of the 20 States 
which they studied would have looked without the human rights treaties, because there is 
no counter-factual; there is no scientific control. While perhaps the ratification of the human 
rights treaties is correlated with some level of improvement in human rights standards, it is 
impossible to know how the outcome for those 20 States could have been different with a 
different set of variables: causation is not clear, and the conclusion is at best of no value and 
at worst actually pernicious. 
Similarly, the problem of omitted-variable bias is ever-present in such studies, since 
by definition not every variable can be studied. Human societies are complex, and the 
factors which affect the level of rights protection available at law and elsewhere are many 
and varied – so much so that one must question how far it is possible for a researcher or 
scholar to identify which are relevant and which are not. Thus, for instance, when Oeter 
attributes the German system’s neglect of international human rights standards on the 
political activities of foreign citizens to “intrinsic inwardness of the intellectual perspective of 
ordinary lawyers”278 and “part of the political game, proposing radical measures that 
mobilise voters”279, he may well be correct, yet a host of other legal, political, and societal 
factors may in actual fact be of more importance – and there is no readily apparent method 
by which to ascertain precisely which are the most important. Oeter may thus be ignoring 
factors of vital consequence – a problem which this thesis would be similarly affected by, if it 
focused itself on the implementation level. (Omitted-variable bias is problematic enough in 
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actual scientific research, let alone in the kind of socio-legal analysis which would be 
required if one were to approach the cultural defence from the angle of implementation.) 
So there are genuine reasons to be sceptical about the results and conclusions of the 
kind of studies that were mentioned above. But there is also a crucial, third reason to avoid 
a study of this nature, and it is simply this: the premise of this thesis, as established in the 
first chapter, is that international law itself has been critically neglected within the 
scholarship on cultural relativism and universalism. And while, of course, the law would not 
be absent from an analysis taking an implementation perspective, it would certainly be 
diluted by a focus skewed towards results, rather than actual law. That is to say, as soon as 
implementation and enforcement become the core subject of analysis, immediately the 
examination becomes oriented towards the outcome of legal regimes, rather than the legal 
regimes themselves.  
The unsuitability of approaching the issue from an implementational or foundational 
perspective means that, almost by definition, our focus is interpretation. What is meant by 
this, and what the consequences are for the structure of the thesis, shall now be briefly 
discussed. 
 
ii) The Focus on Interpretation 
 
What is meant by the ‘interpretive’ dimension? If the ‘formation stage’ refers to the 
processes through which international law is created, and the ‘implementation stage’ 
regards enforcement, then by definition interpretation is what happens in between: it is 
everything relating to how different courts, tribunals, lawyers and State parties determine 
what obligations, rules and principles arise from international treaties once they have been 
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formed – it is the filter through which created law becomes enforced.  
Different approaches to interpretation have been advanced, whether objective 
(emphasising the actual words used280), subjective (primarily focusing on the intentions of 
the parties in adopting the treaty281) or teleological (taking into consideration the object and 
purpose of the treaty282). Since a certain emphasis on one of these approaches as opposed 
to others can result in rather different outcomes, and since the jurisprudence of different 
international institutions is rather varying283, this means that the issue of ‘how to interpret 
treaties’ has never been settled. It has thus been called “one of the most enduring 
problems”284 in international law, reflecting its complexity and ambiguity, and in the arena of 
international human rights law it is perhaps at its most intractable. This is because 
international human rights law is almost unique in terms of treaty interpretation; unlike in 
other arenas, where treaties are created between States under a general principle of 
reciprocity, human rights covenants are created to establish obligations between States 
which are intended to apply towards all individuals under their jurisdiction, not those other 
States. This means that the monitoring committees set up under the treaties play a greater 
role than the arbitrational one given to other treaty bodies or committees in international 
law in interpreting provisions, for their role is not merely to settle differences of opinion 
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between States, but to hold States to account for failing to implement the standards they 
have undertaken to adopt. The crucial point, of course, is that unlike in a bilateral treaty, 
where States enter a reciprocal relationship with the ultimate sanction of termination as an 
incentive to abide by the treaty’s provisions, for international human rights treaties the 
potential for termination as a sanction for breach is non-existent. This necessarily forces the 
monitoring committees into a somewhat adversarial role towards State parties, and 
generally ensures that argument over interpretation of provisions is often the norm rather 
than the exception. Since the nature of the opinions of the monitoring committees with 
respect to interpretation is fundamentally unclear285, matters are further complicated. 
This is one of the reasons why the interpretive domain is of such interest for a study 
such as this one, as it presents a stark insight into one of the perennial problems with the 
way in which international human rights law actually functions. It provides a lens through 
which can be examined the way in which an apparently irreconcilable set of circumstances 
(States interpreting the law in absence of apparent consequences, in opposition to an 
external body with different ‘authoritative’ interpretations) are either resolved, or not. And 
naturally, since our aim is to examine the way in which the law deals with ‘culture’ or cultural 
values as a factor which may or may not be of consideration in the manner in which human 
rights treaty provisions are given effect, this makes the interpretive domain crucial: we 
would expect that, quite naturally, culture would here constitute one of the major factors in 
how the reconciliation between State and treaty-body interpretations occurs in some 
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contexts.  
A second reason why the level of interpretation is preferred is more prosaic: it allows 
us to take a primarily law-centred perspective on the issues, rather than one of politics or 
international relations. That is (as will be recalled), one of the crucial bases for this entire 
thesis, and one of the major reasons for its existence, is that hitherto the analysis of national 
culture and human rights law has been characterised by a lack of rigor in the legal 
dimension – being political, sociological, or philosophical in tone. Since the law has been 
downplayed, this thesis has the specific and particular aim of focusing on it. Given that this is 
the case, it should be obvious why the arena of interpretation is key – it is the place at which 
international human rights law takes its greatest concern with actual points of law. Where 
law formation at the international stage is intimately connected with international politics 
and international relations, and where implementation is bound up in socio-economics, 
domestic politics, and societal issues, the interpretation stage is more ‘purely’ concerned 
with the law itself. That is to say, while of course the interpretation of international human 
rights treaties and treaty obligations is hardly a matter of ‘black letter’ law, it is nevertheless 
the area in which points of law are at their most important: it is where international human 
rights law is at its most ‘legalistic’, if such a statement can be sensibly made. 
Thus, the best and most appropriate level at which to pitch our approach is in the 
interpretive domain. Or, to constitute the issue more specifically: how are international 
human rights treaty provisions interpreted so as to permit cultural values to be taken into 
account in their implementation, if they are interpreted in such a fashion at all? In other 
words, while we accept that cultural diversity may not be invoked by States to limit the 
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scope of the human rights treaty obligations they have voluntarily entered into286, we must 
turn to the question of what it means to say that a given cultural value is limiting the scope 
of a treaty obligation, and where the line of permissibility lies. And that exercise is, by 
definition, interpretive. 
 
C. Conclusion 
 
Let us now briefly summarise what has been established in this chapter.   
First, we have established that our definition of ‘culture’ is generally not definitive 
nor detailed, but instrumental. We will take it prima facie as it appears in relevant 
documents, and assume that it encompasses a relatively wide range of phenomena, 
including religion.  
Second, we have elaborated on the focus of our study and distinguished it from any 
discussion on cultural rights, which in this context are best viewed as a red herring. The crux 
of the matter, and what this thesis grapples with, is the role that cultural values at the 
societal level play as an independent factor influencing how human rights norms are 
implemented or interpreted, not the cultural rights of individuals. It is important to maintain 
the conceptual differentiation between these two rather distinct concepts. 
And thirdly, we have briefly surveyed a number of potential different analytical 
approaches to addressing our focus. The formation of law – i.e., the creation of treaty law – 
while interesting, has been dismissed as a focal point, as has implementation/enforcement. 
Instead, we shall use the interpretive dimension as the lens through which our analysis will 
proceed. What this means shall be explored in the next chapter. 
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III. Culture and the Interpretive Domain 
 
Introduction 
 
We have established, in the first two chapters, our basic aim and the best analytical 
approach to reach it. That is, we are attempting to assess the position of ‘cultural 
interpretation’ of rights in international human rights law from a strictly legal perspective, 
and our analytical approach is to examine how the terms of the major human rights treaties 
are interpreted to take cultural or social values into account, if at all.  
 It is important, then, to discuss treaty interpretation itself in more detailed terms – 
for as we have already stated, it is hardly an uncomplicated or uncontroversial matter in its 
own right.287 Thus, this third chapter on the thesis is devoted to exploring the general 
principles of interpretation and various scholarly approaches to the matter, with the aim of 
answering some of the questions which will naturally arise during the remainder of the 
thesis: what is the nature of the interpretations of State Parties and human rights treaty 
bodies, how authoritative are they, and what role does subsequent practice play in the 
evolutive nature of human rights treaty law? Does the unique nature of international human 
rights treaties, which create obligations between States Parties erga omnes for the benefit 
not of each other, but for individuals under their jurisdiction, require a different interpretive 
approach? 
 Procedurally, of course, we will conclude that for our purposes an empirical rather 
than a normative perspective is of more value. That is to say, in keeping with the general 
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theme of this thesis, we shall take more of an interest in how the ‘interpreters’ (State parties 
and treaty bodies) view their own roles than in the suggestions advanced by scholars and 
their broader theoretical perspectives. While not taking the apparent views of the actual 
‘interpreters’ merely at face value, we will bear in mind that those views have a practical 
existence and consequence of their own.  
 Ultimately, we shall see that the interpretation of human rights treaties is a complex 
matter that concerns in particular the issue of subsequent practice under Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This issue, indeed, is unavoidable if we have any 
intention of discovering to what extent culture is a permissible factor in how treaty 
provisions are implemented. What this ‘subsequent practice’ is, and how we shall go about 
analysing it, will be set out towards the end of this chapter. 
 
A. General Principles of Interpretation: Preliminary Overview 
 
We have already described, in very discursive terms, some different approaches to treaty 
interpretation – objective, subjective and teleological288 – and briefly discussed the special 
nature of human rights treaties in regard to the matter. We shall now examine some of these 
issues in more detail, beginning with preliminary comments on the interpretation of treaties 
in general public international law. Our aim is not to offer definitive answers about rules of 
interpretation, but merely to set the stage for our discussion of the specifics of 
interpretation vis-à-vis human rights treaties.  
 It is, of course, impossible to discuss the issue without first examining the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Articles 31 and 32 set forth the basic principles 
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governing interpretation, and bear reproducing in full: 
 
Article 31  
General rule of interpretation  
 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.  
 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty;  
 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion 
of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.  
 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions;  
 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation;  
 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.  
 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.  
 
Article 32  
Supplementary means of interpretation  
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
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resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31:  
 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 
It is relatively uncontroversial to state that Articles 31 and 32 reflect or codify customary 
norms on the interpretation of treaties, as this has been affirmed on a number of occasions 
by the ICJ (in for example the Genocide Convention (Bosnia v Serbia)289 case, the 
Indonesia/Malaysia290case, and in LaGrand (Germany v United States of America)291), the 
Dispute Settlement Panel of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (in for example the United 
States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna panel292), and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (in 
for example The Rhine Chlorides Arbitration293). And in practice, “the rules set forth in the 
Convention are invariably relied upon even when … States are not parties to it”294.  
 Of course, while this is more-or-less agreed, in practice what the terms of these 
Articles mean is slightly less clear, and in fact there is some level of inconsistency in the 
views of the relevant bodies, particularly the ICJ and the International Law Commission (ILC). 
On certain occasions the ICJ has taken a relatively objective, text-based approach, stating 
that “the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of 
a treaty is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the 
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context in which they occur”295 and that “interpretation must be based above all on the text 
of the treaty”296, while on others it has adopted a more teleological standard, governed by 
the principle of effectiveness297 (i.e. that treaties should be interpreted in light of the effect 
sought by the States parties who created them).  The International Law Commission, 
meanwhile, seems to have tried to take a more holistic approach, incorporating elements 
that could be described as objective (emphasising “the primacy of the text”298), subjective 
(noting that “interpretation of documents is to some extent an art, not an exact science”299), 
and teleological (emphasising the “the objects and purposes of the treaty as a means of 
interpretation”300).  
This slight inconsistency, or lack of clarity, partly reflects the fact that the rules 
contained in the VCLT are not exhaustive, but merely represent an approximation of general 
principles.301 This is in some respects a result of a lack of clarity existing before the VCLT was 
created; Jans Klabber notes that amongst earlier scholars – Prudhomme, Satow, Hyde, 
Grotius and Westlake – there was very little agreement on whether there should even be 
rules on interpretation (Hyde had written, “the formation of rules of interpretation can 
hardly serve a useful purpose”302), let alone what those rules might be.303 But it also seems 
to have been a conscious, or at least subconscious, choice to design Articles 31 and 32 in 
such a way; it allows the process of interpretation to be “adjusted to suit the needs of 
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specific treaties or situations”304, and results in what the ILC has called the ‘crucible’ 
approach to interpretation: “[a]ll various elements, as they are present in any given case, 
would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the legally relevant 
interpretation”305, rather than a system resulting in “an irrebuttable interpretation in every 
case”.306 None of the various different rules or elements contained in these Articles should 
be taken independently, then, but as a unified whole.  
Though this approach has its advantages, of course, it also has its disadvantages: it is 
even argued that the generality of the rules will arouse more controversy than they might 
resolve.307 Certainly, it has not precluded a wide variety of scholarly views on interpretation 
from arising, particularly in recent years. We shall now briefly examine some of the literature 
on interpretation, as it will inform our later discussion of the interpretation of human rights 
law and the role of the treaty bodies. 
The views of Koskenniemi, of course, are in many ways the starting point for any 
modern scholarly analysis of the interpretation of international law. Naturally, he took a 
sceptical view: 
 
[R]ules are not automatically applicable. They need interpretation and interpretation seems 
subjective. This is not merely a ‘practice’ difficulty of interpretation. The doctrine of sovereign 
equality makes it impossible to decide between competing interpretations…there is no other 
basis to make the choice than…either by referring to a theory of justice or to the identities of 
the State involved: one interpretation is better either because it is more just, or because it is 
produced by this and not that State. And the former solution is utopian, the latter violates 
sovereign equality. Both seem purely political.308 
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That is, there are two approaches to interpretation, but both are, ultimately, denying of law. 
The first – the ‘pure fact’ approach, assumes that sovereignty is the “starting point” of 
international law309, as a natural consequence of the Lotus principle: that sovereignty is 
unlimited unless it is restricted by law, or, to put it in Koskenniemi’s words, “the essence of 
the law is not to allocate competences but to establish duties as exceptions to the initial 
liberty”.310 This means that restrictions on sovereignty can only be restricted in the light of 
clear evidence, cannot be made by analogy, and cannot be interpreted restrictively.311 In the 
case of ambiguity, then, sovereignty cannot be infringed upon. This, for Koskenniemi, must-
needs prevent the law from being truly binding, because it results in the assumption that, if 
there are no clear obligations, the initial (sovereign) liberty of the State must be given 
normative effect.312 And “if norms have no natural meaning but require interpretation and if 
the interpretative rule calls simply for respect to liberty, then hard cases can only be decided 
by letting the State do what it wishes”.313 
 On the other hand, the constructivist approach – appealing to the ‘spirit of the 
system’ - might allow the avoidance of this unpalatable consequence of ‘pure fact’.314 By 
looking beyond fact to the goals and values underpinning the system, and interpreting in a 
way that harmonizes with those goals and values – that is, by coming at the matter from the 
perspective that “it is not sovereignty which determines the extent of a State’s legal rights, 
liberties and competences – it is the latter which determine the extent of its sovereignty”315, 
interpreters might still find a place for law.  
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 But this approach cannot be consistent, for Koskenniemi, as it is ultimately “just 
another version of the utopian position”: it still denies law, and reduces it to politics.316 The 
more that words and concepts such as reasonableness, equity, proportionality and so on, 
find their way into the frame, the less and less law looks like law, and the more it comes to 
resemble simply a group of subjective values. And in the absence of objectivity, there is no 
basis whatsoever to force a recalcitrant State to abide by the rules; the only conceivable 
argument is that the rules are binding because other States say so, but “this fails to explain 
why a State should be bound by other States’ subjective values”.317 It simply looks as if 
political views are being imposed by some States on others. 
 Ultimately, both of these approaches become inconsistent and self-defeating: 
 
Lawyers commonly argue about the limits of sovereignty as if they assumed the existence of 
objective values. They ground their propositions on equity, “peace and stability”, economic 
efficiency, vital interests etc. They assume that liberties can be limited objectively, by recourse 
to such ideas. But they remain at a loss in respect of the justification of such objectivities and 
ultimately justify them by subjective acceptance – behind which looms the metavalue of 
liberty. And lawyers argue about sovereignty as the need to honour the State’s subjective 
consent, domestic jurisdiction or self-determination. To justify this, they appeal to the law 
which, they assume, contains these within itself and thus remains anterior to them.318 
 
This means that, for Koskenniemi, in the final analysis, modern law has simply developed 
“strategies of evasion” for pretending that there are justifications for decisions when there 
are none, and relying on interpretations that cannot actually be justified319; in actual fact 
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such strategies are ‘indefensible’ because they always reduce to politics.320 This brings us 
back to the initial problem he raised: that “rules are needed. But rules are not automatically 
applicable. They need interpretation and interpretation seems subjective…[and] the doctrine 
of sovereign equality makes it impossible to decide between competing interpretations”.321 
Linderfalk discusses the scholarship on the matter as existing on a spectrum between 
those viewing interpretation as a political exercise (“Koskenniemi’s radical legal scepticism”) 
and those viewing it as governed entirely by rules of law (“the one-right-answer thesis”).322 
Rather neatly, this of course mirrors the dichotomy at the heart of Koskenniemi’s classic 
critique of international law. But Linderfalk’s conclusion is that, in the final analysis, neither 
such approach actually reflects the legal reality. Ultimately, he argues: 
 
[T]he regime laid down in Vienna Convention Articles 31-33 amounts to a system of rules, but 
the system would still have to be described as to some extent open-textured. The rules 
provide a framework for the interpretation process; but within this framework, the political 
judgment of each individual applier is still allowed to play a part (although, of course, not the 
leading part suggested by radical legal scepticism).323 
 
He bases this assertion on a thorough survey encompassing first-order and second-order 
rules of interpretation324, the use of ‘ordinary language’325, use of context326, use of object 
and purpose327, and use of supplementary means of interpretation328, which ultimately 
results in a lengthy list of first-order rules which he believes govern the interpretation of 
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treaties in international law, as an extension of what is contained in the VCLT.329 These rules 
range from the basic (such as Rule no. 1: “If it can be shown that in a treaty provision, there 
is an expression whose form corresponds to an expression of conventional language, then 
the provision shall be understood in accordance with the rules of that language.”) to the 
complex (such as Rule no. 34: “If it can be shown that a treaty provision permits an act or a 
state-of-affairs, which – from the point of view of the parties – can be considered less 
tolerable than another generically identical act or state-of-affairs, then the provision shall be 
understood to permit this second act or state-of- affairs, too.”)330, and are designed to 
establish a model that “in general terms” describes the content of the current rules331, while 
also bearing in mind the fact that value judgments are required at all stages of the process – 
making the approach not simply rule-based, but a combination of rules and political 
judgment.332 
 Linderfalk’s work is perhaps the only one of its kind, inasmuch as it attempts to 
establish in highly detailed terms the unspoken rules which develop from the apparent 
current approach to interpretation exhibited within the system. But by its own (implicit and 
explicit) admission, the framework of rules he elaborates are not definitive or exhaustive, 
because of the extent to which value judgments play a role. That is, although detailed, his 
rules to a degree merely transpose the problem to a different, less abstract level; it may very 
well be the case that “if, by using any ratification work of a treaty, a concordance can be 
shown to exist, as between the parties to said treaty, and with regard to the norm content of 
an interpreted treaty provision, then the provision shall be understood in such a way that it 
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logically agrees with the concordance”333, but how ratification works might show that a 
concordance exists with regard to norm contents is still left to the question of art rather than 
science, and, by Linderfalk’s own admission, still a point at which political judgment plays a 
role. One wonders, therefore, whether such approaches do not simply serve a reiterative 
function, playing out an old debate in a new form. 
 It is this which leads Jans Klabbers to conclude, like the forebears he cites334, that an 
exercise in elaborating rules of interpretation such as that undertaken by Linderfalk is in part 
a mistake, for although at least some guidelines are necessary, “at the end of the 
day…interpretation is still a human activity, depending on the efforts of human beings, their 
intellectual capacities, their sensibilities, and, perhaps most of all, their sense of virtue”.335 
Ultimately, that is, in his view much of what governs, and ought to govern, treaty 
interpretation is politics: “at best one can hope for political debate, open and without 
obstacles between participants on an equal footing. This calls for rules on how to conduct 
the debate, of course, but rules of interpretation cannot play that role, for their main 
function is to stifle today’s debate in the name of yesterday’s (seeming) agreement.”336 
Rather than mechanistic “virtuoso” techniques, the prevailing theme should be the principle 
that treaties shall be performed in good faith.337 
 Klabbers’ argument perhaps arises naturally from the facts; it seems indisputable, as 
we have already noted, that even an elaborate 44-entry list of rules such as Linderfalk’s must 
nevertheless recognise the (fortunate or unfortunate) reality that human judgment will have 
to play an important role in the process of interpretation at some stage. Yet, nevertheless, it 
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contains a fundamental inconsistency of its own: on the one hand, interpretation according 
to Klabbers should be a matter of virtue and good faith, but on the other, he explicitly 
recognises that “what matters is not so much how to interpret, but who has the power to do 
so”338 and cites with approval Powell’s appreciation for the “primacy of the political”.339 His 
position therefore seems to embody the very essence of Koskenniemi’s apology/utopia 
dichotomy: is treaty interpretation an apologia for realpolitik (what matters is not the rules 
on interpretation, but who does the interpreting) or is it a false utopian ideal (if only 
interpretation could be achieved virtuously)? This leaves his conclusions to be ultimately 
unsatisfying. 
In this respect, Klabbers, and Koskenniemi both have something rather similar to say 
about interpretation: that it is ultimately an act of politics, not an act of law. Linderfalk 
attempts to tease out a set of rules on which interpretation is based, but ultimately resorts 
to an implicit admission that this is not possible, leaving us with an approach that is 
thorough and detailed but ultimately somewhat dissatisfactory, seeming to merely reframe 
the terms of the debate at a different level of detail.  
Orakhelashvili goes further than Linderfalk in resisting the ‘politics-not-law’ position, 
arguing that the process of interpretation is subject to fixed rules, which are not French’s 
“working assumptions”340 but genuine rules which do not allow freedom of choice between 
interpretive methods.341 He provides what is, ultimately, a consequentialist argument: “If 
interpretation were to be identified with politics, all difference between law and pure 
politics would fall to the ground. This requires rejecting the option of purely political 
                                                     
338
Ibid. 
339
Ibid., citing H. J. Powell, Constitutional Conscience: The Moral Dimension of Judicial Decision (University of 
Chicago Press, 2008). 
340
 I. French, “Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules” 55 ICLQ (2006) 281. 
341
 A. Olekhashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law (OUP, 2008), p. 309. 
 96 
 
interpretation. Interpretation is thus a legal activity.”342 What is more, it necessarily follows 
that interpretation must be free from the influence of non-law, because that is the essence 
of what a treaty ultimately is:  
 
In the international arena, nearly all State attitudes are inherently political, guided by 
whether and to what extent the original agreement suits the political interest of the relevant 
State at the time of interpretation. If these attitudes are accorded decisive importance, the 
outcome very often will be the absence of legal regulation which may be conducive to the 
political interests of certain States, but not reflective of what was originally agreed in the 
relevant instrument, and hence incompatible with the basic principle of the observance of 
international obligations. States may agree on political grounds on interpreting or even 
reinterpreting the relevant instrument (just as they agree on concluding agreements), but 
this (re)interpretation would take place because the States in question so agreed, not 
because it is a political phenomenon. 
 
As Visscher observes, the security afforded by the treaty to States-parties is measured by its 
capability to resist the pressure that can be exercised on it by the intervening 
transformations relating to interests and force. This confirms that the process of 
interpretation aimed at clarifying the content of law has to be seen as independent of the 
influence of non-law.343 
 
Indeed, for Orakhelashvili this not only has to be the case, it also is the case: 
currently, international law “admits of no doubting of the thesis that the process of 
interpretation should be conducted in accordance with fixed rules arranged in hierarchical 
order. Whether one or another rule reflects the consent of the State, subjective intention or 
objective agreement is not a matter that influences the interpretative process. The relevant 
rules of interpretation apply because the Vienna Convention so establishes, independently 
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of what an academic or political assessment would make of them.”344 This, in his view, is the 
approach which courts have taken345, and they base their decisions on the textual scope of 
the relevant clauses they are interpreting, not external values346. Thus: 
 
Nearly all attempts to upset the sequence of interpretation methods and especially the 
primacy of plain meaning are motivated either by dissatisfaction with the positivist 
background of international law as based on agreement between States, by desire to 
subordinate law to political factors, or to evade the operation of treaties as lex specialis.347 
 
 In the final analysis, however, even Orakhelashvili is driven towards subjectivity and 
external values of a kind, as he finds himself drawing from the principle of effectiveness – 
“construing the original consent and agreement of States-parties effectively and not as 
unreal or illusory”348 – very broadly as a basis for the entire undertaking of treaty 
interpretation. In doing so, he seems to ignore the fundamental subjectivity at the heart of 
the principle of effectiveness, which is not structured by rules (what, after all, is 
“effectiveness”, and how is it adjudicated?), and falls prey to this very subjectivity, as review 
essays have noted: 
 
The author seems to oscillate between benign visions of principled interpretation relying on 
effectiveness (in human rights) and interpretation run askew driven by policy interests (in 
investment arbitration). It appears that whether, and how, the principle of effectiveness should 
be applied is often in the eye of the beholder.349 
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It also must be said that Orakhelashvili seems to require Hume’s guillotine to separate his 
proposition that since law and politics ought to be separate, then interpretation is a legal 
activity. It hardly needs explaining that this is not a particularly convincing position to hold. 
The most persuasive accounts are those which, like Richard Gardiner’s Treaty 
Interpretation, avoid answering questions such as those which Linderfalk, Orakhelashvili, 
Koskenniemi and so on seek to, but which take the more pragmatic and empirical position 
that answers to questions such as how rules are applied to treaties, how the VCLT rules 
should be weighed against each other, how conflicts between them should be resolved, and 
so on, cannot in fact be answered at all, and nor can a properly thorough and convincing 
theoretical analysis be given.350 Instead, Gardiner simply takes each of the VCLT rules in 
isolation, on the assumption that there is no hierarchy between them351, and examines them 
as dynamic principles guiding interpretation, which continually evolve during practice. In 
other words, his approach begins not with theory but with practice: “The core of [his book] 
is an account of the rules, with guidance for their practical application from examples of how 
they have actually been applied so as to provide precedent (in a loose sense) and 
analogy.”352 
 This means, primarily, examining case law to discover how the rules have actually 
been interpreted and applied, and how they have developed over time, while playing down 
the notion of final ‘correct’ answers and avoiding the temptation to be definitive. It is an 
approach which does not deny ‘art’, but rather aims to understand the rules which govern 
the art.353 No doubt this neglects the important issue of value judgments and politics, and 
no doubt it also lacks objectivity and absolute clarity. But its approach is persuasive: we can 
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see that, while the practice of international courts might merely boil down to Koskenniemi’s 
‘strategies of evasion’ – ways of avoiding the problem of there being no real justification for 
their interpretations – the fact of the matter is that the practice of these courts does exist 
and does have real-world meaning and content, strategy of evasion or not. And moreover, 
the practice appears to have some level of predictability: by examining what kinds of 
arguments have been used in the past, and what arguments have not been persuasive, we 
can begin to make presumptions about the way the law will be interpreted in future and the 
way the rules will be applied. But at the same time, by acknowledging that there is no 
hierarchy of rules, and embracing the ‘crucible’ approach, Gardiner avoids the accusations 
that his account is overtly and implausibly mechanistic.      
 Gardiner’s method also seems admirably empirical, in the spirit in which this thesis is 
also intended. It seeks first to look at the facts, rather than examine them through the lens 
of theory. This is precisely our goal, as described in Chapter One. It is thus the basic principle 
on which we understand the general rules of interpretation in public international law: as a 
crucible in which “all the various elements, as they [are] present in any given case, [are] 
thrown into the crucible, and their interaction [gives] the legally relevant interpretation”.354 
And in emphasising interaction, it fits neatly with what many scholars have written – 
persuasively – about the nature of intention and meaning in treaties themselves: that the 
interpretation process is not about discovering latent meaning within the text, but about 
constructing a meaning through the process itself.355 
 Our general understanding of the interpretive process is simply that there is no 
specific hierarchy or strict set of rules: it is an art, with guidelines. How it is conducted, and 
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its results, are based on the processes by which it is carried out, and the way the interpreters 
themselves use the various elements in the ‘crucible’. What this means, as we shall see, is a 
discussion of how the interpreters of human rights treaties have argued human rights to be 
subject to a set of its own special regimes356, which revolve around so-called programmatic 
interpretation and the use, in particular, of the notion of subsequent practice in the Vienna 
Convention.  
  
B. The Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties and the Role of the Treaty Bodies 
 
The interpretation of human rights treaties creates a number of problems that can be 
considered additional to the general concerns associated with interpretation. First, the 
articles of human rights covenants are, in general, indeterminate and ambiguous in their 
language. This is a matter which has already been noted, and is often argued to be the great 
saving grace of the international human rights system and perhaps even essential to it357, 
but the fact remains that ambiguity is not a friend of easy interpretation. Secondly, the VCLT 
seems built on a number of assumptions that do not apply in the case of human rights 
treaties – primarily that international law is only a matter of reciprocal obligations between 
States. Thirdly, the issue of ‘subsequent practice’, which appears in Article 31.3(b) of the 
VCLT, has to be viewed as of crucial importance in the process of interpretation, much more 
so than it might be in other forms of international treaty. And fourthly, the principle of 
effectiveness is a thorny area, because there is a strong argument that human rights treaties 
were not created to enshrine a particular agreement to be ‘given effect’, but rather have to 
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be understood as a constantly changing, dynamic set of goals.358 All of these problems seem 
to suggest that human rights law is a special regime under international law, requiring 
different rules and methods of interpretation. We will now briefly examine each of them, 
and ask what the consequences are for our analysis of culture in the interpretation of treaty 
terms. 
 
i) The Problem of Ambiguity 
 
It is indisputable that almost all of the terms in all of the major international human rights 
are amorphous in their scope and indeterminate in content. This is true even of the most 
traditional civil rights, such as the right to a fair trial, which has at least eight potentially 
different interpretations in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).359 For the 
rights to health, housing, education, water, and so on, it is infinitely more so – to take the 
example of the right to health as found in the ICESCR, the number of questions that can be 
raised about its nature include: 
 
What is the meaning of the highest attainable standard of health, what is the meaning of 
health, does it extend to the social determinants of health, what obligations flow from the 
requirement that States recognise the right to health, are the measures required to fulfil these 
obligations universal or do they differ between States, what is the minimum core of the right 
to health, to what extent should States be responsible for ensuring the health of an individual 
in the home, workplace and general community, to what extent must States prevent threats to 
an individual’s health from non-state actors, is privatisation of health care services compatible 
with the right to health, is the right to health justiciable, and to what extent must intellectual 
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property rules be designed to maximise access to medicine and medical services?360 
 
Of course, it has been argued that this ambiguity is, in fact, a great virtue. To refer back to 
Chapter One and our summary of Jack Donnelly’s position, it would seem that ambiguity 
fosters agreement around norms: at the level of the Universal Declaration, where rights are 
at their most ambiguous, there is practically no disagreement over their nature.361 And if 
rights had been less nebulous, more concrete and specific, it may well have been impossible 
to have generated the consensus necessary for the major human rights treaties to have been 
drafted.362 
 Nevertheless, it also poses problems of its own. First, from a practical point of view, 
no matter whether or not it allows consensus to form around norms at the conceptual level, 
it obviously makes agreement more difficult when it comes to points of law. (Again, this 
brings us back to the discussion of Donnelly’s position in Chapter One.363) This is a problem 
merely at face value, because if agreement on the exact nature of a State’s legal obligations 
is difficult to achieve then it hardly suggests that the system can function effectively as law – 
the benefits of viewing the system through a lens of agonistic pluralism notwithstanding.364 
Secondly, speaking in general terms, States are probably more likely to abide by their 
legal obligations if they agree about what they are, while at the same time being more likely 
to interpret their own obligations in a meretricious fashion if the ambit is there. (Chayes and 
Chayes, for instance, describe the behaviour of States in cases where there is a “zone of 
ambiguity, within which it is difficult to say with precision what is permitted and what 
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forbidden”365; the more general and broad the language of treaty terms, the wider is the 
range of permissible interpretations.366) This problem, it is sometimes suggested, cuts in two 
directions, as ambiguity in treaty terms can tempt adjudicators to “indulge personal moral 
convictions”367 as they are less bound by restrictive legal texts and precedents.368Waldron’s 
problem of “results-drive jurisprudence”369 would seem to be acute, then, in relation to 
human rights law, and the treaty bodies are indeed criticised from time to time on such a 
basis – most notably the CESCR, which has been accused of “revisionism”370 and “reading 
into a legal text a content which simply is not there”371 in its “deconstruct[tion] into an all-
encompassing concept containing several novel rights” of the right to an adequate standard 
of living.372 
 These problems are all made apparent in the somewhat infamous dialogue between 
the Human Rights Committee and the USA which emerged after that country’s submission of 
its second and third periodic reports.373 Here, the issue of detention and interrogation of 
terrorist suspects was raised, and a dispute developed over whether Article 2(1) of the 
ICCPR required a State to protect the rights of all individuals within its territory and its 
jurisdiction, or within its territory and/or its jurisdiction, and over whether Article 7 of the 
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Covenant contained a non-refoulement obligation.374 Here, ultimately, an impasse was the 
only result, as the US representatives found the Committee’s interpretations “difficult to 
accept”375, stated that they did not agree with its jurisprudence376, and stressed their 
government’s “sovereign right to decide which obligations to assume under international 
treaty law”377. The Committee, for its part, “note[d] with concern the restrictive 
interpretation made by the State party of its obligations under the Covenant”378, which was 
not in conformity with its own. This episode neatly illustrates the interpretive problems 
which can arise due to the problems outlined above.  
 
ii) The Problem of the Vienna Convention and International Human Rights Law 
 
The Vienna Convention is said to have resolved some traditional controversies surrounding 
interpretation. Foremost among these is that it effectively did away with the distinction 
between law-making treaties and contract treaties, or traité-lois versus traité-contrats. 
There is no necessity to go into the details of this distinction, but it is important to note that, 
to some authors at least, this distinction has not disappeared but remains pertinent – and, 
indeed, the VCLT did not resolve it but merely ignored it, and effectively subsumed the 
different types of treaty into traité-contrats.379 This means that its rules are not particularly 
suitable for treaties which would be best viewed as traité-lois.  These authors point out that 
there is something unique about human rights treaties (and also, perhaps environmental 
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treaties) in that they go beyond reciprocal binary obligations between States, as they have 
third-party beneficiaries, large numbers of parties, autonomous monitoring mechanisms, 
and “an aspiration to establish objectively binding normative international standards”.380 
This means that the VCLT rules as they stand are not particularly suitable: they permit States 
to change the ‘rules of the game’ as they see fit, and do not seek to promote normativity, 
rather representing elements of realpolitik.  
 This, it is argued, suggests that human rights treaties are sui generis in nature and 
ought to operate under rules separate from the existing ‘standard’ rules of public 
international law, as lex specialis.381 These rules might allow, for instance, monitoring bodies 
to give binding interpretations, assess the permissibility of reservations, or prevent States 
from modifying the relevant treaties.382 This is not merely a suggestion advanced by 
scholars, but an approach which has found traction among interpretive bodies themselves. 
The Human Rights Committee, for instance, has described the VCLT rules regarding 
reservations as “inappropriate” with regard to human rights treaties383, while the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has consistently emphasised the “special character” of the 
ECHR as a “treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”.384 
 The notion that international human rights law has a special character gains further 
support from the International Law Commission, in its notion of the special or self-contained 
regime: a group of rules and principles concerned with a particular subject matter, applied 
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as lex specialis.385 Here, human rights law would fit into the ILC’s third category of special 
regime – “all the rules and principles that regulate a certain problem area…collected 
together”.386 The effects of international human rights law being such a special regime are as 
follows: 
 
 Its significance derives from its norms expressing a “unified object and purpose”. 
This means that their interpretation and application should “reflect that object and 
purpose”.387 
 It may derogate from general law under the same conditions as lex specialis 
generally (i.e. depending on context).388 
 General law will be applied when matters arise that are not regulated by it, or where 
it fails.389 
 
This would suggest that international human rights law treaties can be interpreted in a 
special way, reflecting their object and purpose, and potentially in a manner different to that 
of other treaties.  
 Two further questions now arise. The first is, what actually is the special character of 
human rights law? And the second is, what is the special way in which it ought to be 
interpreted? The issue of ‘object and purpose’ leads us on to two other important concepts: 
the issue of ‘subsequent practice’ and programmatic interpretation, which both have a 
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special relationship with the notion that international human rights law is a special regime. 
 
iii) Subsequent Practice, Programmatic Interpretation, and the Role of the Treaty Bodies 
 
Those in favour of a special approach to human rights treaty interpretation generally rely on 
Article 31.3(b) of the VCLT, which contains a reference to “any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation”. The interpretation of this Article itself, which does not make clear how the 
parties would indicate their agreement, is not a simple task, but the travaux préparatoires 
would suggest that in the case of a multilateral treaty, only tacit approval of a practice by 
States parties would be necessary to indicate that it constitutes “subsequent practice” under 
Article 31.3(b).390 This would, by definition, indicate that only formal objection to a given 
practice by States parties would be enough to prevent it from being construed as 
“subsequent practice”, almost reversing the burden of proof.  
 This is coupled with an emphasis on the reference to the “object and purpose” of a 
treaty found in Article 31(1) of the VCLT. Since, it is argued, human rights treaties are set up 
to establish objective obligations for States parties to protect the human rights of individuals 
in their jurisdiction, rather than to establish reciprocal rights, there is a requirement to 
envision them as ‘living instruments’ which are interpreted dynamically and in context, 
rather than statically, so as to continue to achieve their object and purpose of protecting the 
rights of individuals. In other words, in continually changing international and social 
environments, human rights treaties will need to be continually reinterpreted to reflect 
reality and apply flexibly to changing situations. Moreover, States cannot be relied upon to 
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interpret the terms of human rights treaties inter se, because of this special nature: the 
States parties would obviously have every incentive to interpret them restrictively and not, 
in fact, in line with their object and purpose at all. 
 The European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights have been notably active 
in promoting this ‘programmatic approach’ to human rights treaty interpretation.  The 
ECtHR in particular has emphasised the Convention is a “living instrument…which must be 
interpreted in light of present-day conditions” rather than in light of general principles at the 
time of conclusion.391 Examples are plentiful, including Loizidou v Turkey, in which the Court 
argued that: 
 
[T]he [notion that the] Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light 
of present-day conditions is firmly rooted in the Court’s case-law…Such an approach, in the 
Court’s view, is not confined to the substantive provisions of the Convention, but also applies 
to those provisions, such as Articles 25 and 46…which govern the operation of the 
Convention’s enforcement machinery. It follows that these provisions cannot be interpreted 
solely in accordance with the intentions of their authors as expressed more than forty years 
ago392 
 
Marckx v Belgium: 
 
It is true that, at the time when the Convention of 4 November 1950 was drafted, it was 
regarded as permissible and normal in many European countries to draw a distinction in this 
area between the “illegitimate” and the “legitimate” family. However, the Court recalls that 
this Convention must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions... In the instant 
case, the Court cannot but be struck by the fact that the domestic law of the great majority of 
the member States of the Council of Europe has evolved and is continuing to evolve, in 
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company with the relevant international instruments, towards full juridical recognition of the 
maxim mater semper certaest393 
 
and ZarbAdami v Malta: 
 
[S]ince the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the 
Court must however have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and 
respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved394 
 
 Indeed, in the ECHR context, the legitimacy of this approach by now “cannot be 
contested”395, although the extent of its scope is something that remains controversial.396 
 However, the concept of dynamic or programmatic interpretation is not limited to 
these regional human rights instruments. The ILC expressed the opinion, for example, that 
under Article 31.3 (c) of the VCLT, “rules of international law subsequent to the treaty to be 
interpreted may be taken in to account particularly where the concepts used in the treaty 
are open or evolving”, such as in cases where “the concept is one which implies taking into 
account subsequent technical, economic or legal developments [or] sets up an obligation for 
further progressive development for the parties [or] has a very general nature or is 
expressed in such general terms that it must take into account changing circumstances”.397 
All three of these are fitting descriptors for most if not all the terms of the major 
international human rights treaties, and have a basis not just under the auspices of human 
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rights but in general law also.398 
 Thus, an approach viewing the practice of the treaty bodies as constituting 
subsequent practice, recognising that international human rights treaties are not static but 
were created for a particular object and purpose, would not be unfounded either in law or 
reality. This approach would view final views on individual complaints, concluding 
observations on State party reports, and general comments, as being, if not binding, then 
indicative and authoritative indications of subsequent practice and thus to be taken account 
of in the application of the relevant treaties insofar as States Parties tacitly endorse it.399 If 
we discover that the practice of the treaty bodies permits State Parties to interpret their 
treaty obligations through a cultural lens, or not, with the apparent tacit endorsement of 
those States Parties, then we could say with some level of accuracy “what the law permits”. 
 Of course, this assertion requires a number of caveats to be stated. First, as the ILC 
itself has argued that while special or self-contained regimes such as international human 
rights law may “take better account of the particularities of the subject-matter to which they 
relate [than general law does]”400, they never exist in isolation, because general law is both 
the “normative background” and the failsafe if the special regime fails to function 
effectively.401 The special regime can only receive legally binding force by reference to 
                                                     
398
 The ILC cites, for instance, Case concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), ICJ 
Reports 1997, paragraph 112, stating that terms of a treaty to the effect that, for instance, the parties must 
“ensure compliance with the obligations for the protection of nature arising in connection with the 
construction and operation of the System of Locks” were “not static, and open to adapt to emerging norms of 
international law…”, and the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa, ICJ Reports, 1971, paragraph 53, stating that interpretation of a 
treaty cannot “remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law”. 
399
 M. Scheinin, supra note 285, p. 33. See also M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its Development (1995), page 91. 
400
 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 
paragraph 191. 
401
Ibid., paragraph 192. 
 111 
 
general rules and principles of international law.402 Of course, the practice of the treaty 
bodies is itself not legally binding, and does not seek to be, but nonetheless it must function 
against the normative background provided by general law. This, effectively, is another way 
of saying that, as Mechlem points out in her critique of the monitoring practice, human 
rights treaty bodies ought to follow by the same rules of interpretation as States (i.e. the 
VCLT), since they in effect take the place of States in the process.403 This obviously does not 
prevent the treaty bodies from delivering any opinion they see fit, but it does suggest that 
there are limits on how far the treaty bodies can develop their own interpretations while 
retaining a perception of legitimacy and a sense of being part of the system of international 
law as a whole.  
 Following on from this point, in international human rights law there is a particular 
urgency to view interpretation as being as much an act of persuasion as determining 
meaning.404 This is because, with States holding the primary legal responsibility to 
implement their own obligations in the treaties to which they are party, they are the central 
actors within the system: put crudely, it is the activities of States parties which largely decide 
whether human rights will be protected or violated.405  And since there is no real mechanism 
by which States can be forced to participate in the protection of human rights, except 
arguably with regard to gross violations, persuasion has to play a crucial role.406 If there is 
uncertainty about the meaning of a particular treaty term, in other words, again to put it 
simply, States must be persuaded to adopt a certain meaning, or else they will auto-interpret 
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– which is naturally unacceptable if the human rights system is to function as it is supposed 
to.407 For international human rights, then, persuasion is crucial. 
 In order for this persuasion to be effective, it must be “rational and legitimate as far 
as legal issues are concerned”, in Mechlem’s view.408 This is because, although of course the 
human rights treaty bodies are not courts, their findings are by their own words 
‘authoritative’: when delivered, they indicate with some authority what States’ legal 
obligations are. As Alston puts it, for instance, with regard to General Comments, the 
practice of the treaty bodies can be viewed as “an expert committee [distilling] its 
considered views on an issue which arises out of the provisions of the treaty whose 
implementation it supervises and presents those views in the context of a formal statement 
of its understanding to which it attaches major importance”.409 The important, authoritative 
nature of the practice, therefore, requires constraint by, and respect for, legal rules of 
interpretation and the “normative background” of general law – at least, insofar as it wishes 
to retain some level of authority and persuasiveness.  
 This suggests that, although concluding observations, findings on individual 
complaints, general comments and so on can be viewed as part of a dynamic and 
programmatic approach to interpretation as part of the ‘subsequent practice’ with regard to 
the major human rights treaties, at the same time this body of work risks putting at risk its 
own practical value if it ceases to link itself to the “normative background” of general law. 
And since this “normative background” includes all of the stipulations of Articles 31 and 32 
of the VCLT (given that they are generally assumed to constitute norms of customary 
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international law), there remains a requirement for the practice of the treaty bodies to 
adhere to the requirement to interpret States’ obligations in line with not only the object 
and purpose of the treaties but also the ordinary meaning of the their terms. So while we 
should not expect their interpretations to be “narrowly literal”410, to use Zemanek’s phrase, 
we should also, from both a legal and a practical point of view, be dubious about any 
attempt to stray too far from the ordinary meaning of the text of the respective treaties. 
  
iv) Consequences for the Thesis 
 
What are the consequences of the above in terms of our study? We have established, 
effectively, two things. Firstly, we are persuaded by Gardiner’s emphasis on the actors 
involved – the interpreters – and how they combined various elements in practice. Our 
concern is not to approach the interpretation of human rights treaties from a theoretical 
perspective, that is, and in particular we shall be at pains to use exactly what Koskenniemi 
calls a ‘strategy of avoidance’, dealing with the law as it comes to us, prima facie.  
Secondly, we bear in mind a number of facts that have arisen from our brief analysis of 
the background to the interpretive practice of the different human rights treaty bodies: 
 
 Terms in human rights treaties tend to be ambiguous, and consequently there is 
likely to be some level of conflict between States, who have the ambit to interpret 
vague terms restrictively, and treaty bodies, who will take a purposive approach. 
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 Broadly speaking the notion that human rights treaties are a special regime is not 
particularly controversial. Whether this means that they require special and different 
rules of interpretation is not absolutely clear or agreed on, but irrespective of this, a 
dynamic and programmatic approach to the interpretation of human rights treaties 
must be viewed as standard across international human rights bodies. 
 It would not be problematic to view the practice of the treaty monitoring 
mechanisms, in the form of final views on individual complaints, concluding 
observations, general comments and so forth, as constituting ‘subsequent practice’ 
under Article 31.3(c) of the VCLT. However, both this subsequent practice and the 
programmatic approach takes place against a “normative background” provided by 
general international law: straying from the ordinary meaning of the terms of the 
treaties causes both practical and legal problems.  
 
What this means, in effect, is that our approach must strike a balance between the 
undeniable need to recognise the importance of programmatic interpretation with the 
necessity of recognising the “normative background” against which it rests. That is, our aim 
is to attempt to understand, from a legally empirical perspective, to what extent 
international human rights law permits socio-cultural values as a consideration in the 
manner in which provisions are implemented by a given State Party. And since this is our 
aim, we need to be as accurate as possible about the legal value of the sources we will be 
examining. This means neither adopting the kind of restrictive interpretations that might be 
offered by strict adherence to the text, nor a lex ferenda approach relying on “sloppy 
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humanitarian argument”411, but treading a realistic middle-ground between the two. This 
may, in fact, require accepting a certain level of ambiguity and a lack of clear answers – 
something that should be expected, given that the rules underlying the ‘art’ of 
interpretation themselves are so open-textured.412 Certainly, it will require a level of 
agnosticism about theory. But this should not be mistaken for a lack of descriptive or factual 
accuracy, given that the facts themselves are not concrete, and given that there is nothing 
scientific about the law itself in this area. 
  
Our focus, in any event, is the interpretation of States’ legal obligations both on the part of 
States’ parties and the treaty bodies, and the extent to which the elements cited in Article 
31.2 and 31.3 of the VCLT –  primarily ‘subsequent practice’  (in the form of the practice of 
the treaty bodies) – and so on provide a reference for this, as a way of assessing whether or 
not national or societal cultural values are taken account of to any extent in determining 
what States’ obligations are and how they might be implemented. We shall now briefly 
describe exactly what these elements might consist of with respect to international human 
rights law, what the sources of the ‘subsequent practice’ are, what their relative value and 
importance are, and how they might provide an indication of what we are looking for. 
 
C. The Work of the Treaty Bodies as Subsequent Practice Establishing the Agreement of 
Parties Regarding Interpretation 
 
Examining the work of the treaty bodies is important from two perspectives: it allows us to 
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see the interpretations of both the treaty bodies and States parties themselves. That is, it 
not only enables us to see what the ‘subsequent practice’, which we have already 
established is a crucial factor in understanding how international human rights treaties are 
interpreted and ought to be interpreted, is, but it also serves as a window onto what States 
think – and States remain at the core of the international legal system, as the only actors 
who can create legal obligations. The reason why it allows us to do this is very simple:  the 
practice of the treaty bodies almost always – with the exception of General Comments – 
manifests itself as a dialogue between the treaty bodies themselves and States parties.  
 Of course, treaty bodies do not only interact with States parties, and States parties 
do not only interact with treaty bodies. There is, it must be said, a considerable amount of 
literature on the notion of ‘interpretive communities’413 and their role in the interpretation 
and implementation of international human rights law, by which is meant the “institutional 
setting” within which sets of assumptions and beliefs coalesce into accepted facts.414 For 
international human rights law, these interpretive communities consist of a variety of actors, 
all of which have diverse opinions and understandings but all of whom comprise what 
Simma calls the “worldwide social consciousness” of international law.415 These interpretive 
communities are always in the background, informing the views of both States and treaty 
bodies alike, because they provide the general framework and context in which 
interpretations are made. They are important not only in forming views and opinions, but 
also in achieving implementation, because if there is consensus around a particular 
interpretation within and between interpretive communities (including treaty bodies, NGOs, 
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policy makers, practitioners, etc.) there is considered to be a much greater likelihood that 
States will be persuaded by it.416 
 However, for the purposes of this thesis, we will leave this wider discourse 
surrounding interpretive communities in the background. As was stated in Chapter I with 
regard to the discussion surrounding verticalization and pluralism, there may be much to 
recommend the view that there is a shared "interpretive process" in treaty practice which 
"generate[s], elaborate[s] and refine[s] shared understandings and expectations"417, as a 
general description of how international norms take on their meaning. Yet as an analytical 
subject it is problematic, and to a degree undesirable. To begin with, at least in the initial 
conception, interpretive communities were primarily seen as important in the context of 
auto-interpretation: the argument was that, rather than States interpreting their own 
obligations as monoliths, it was rather disparate communities of professionals within the 
relevant State who engaged in the process418. This is, obviously, also an important point to 
consider when it comes to human rights treaty obligations, but it is equally obviously not the 
full story.  
Secondly, just as there are unavoidable problems with the study of verticalization and 
pluralism in international norm-creation in terms of what is possible to conclude (given the 
complexity of the subject matter), there are similar difficulties in achieving anything beyond 
the rather banal and obvious observation that a large array of individuals and groups have 
some level of influence, big or small, on the interpretation of treaty provisions. That 
conclusion is indisputably true, but not of particular value in advancing our understanding.  
But most critically, it must be questioned what difference it makes as a legal question 
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to establish to what extent interpretive communities take part in the process of 
interpretation. Certainly, each State party to a human rights treaty has an interpretive 
community which affects how it interprets its obligations. And equally certainly, each treaty 
body has an interpretive community which affects how it interprets individual States parties' 
obligations. Yet if our immediate point of analysis is interpretation itself, in large part it 
hardly matters what those interpretive communities are comprised of, and the extent of 
their influence, so long as we can establish what their effects are - i.e., what interpretations 
they give rise to. Our stance, in other words, is that while we acknowledge that a vast array 
of actors and influences affect the interpretations given by both States and treaty bodies, 
since our emphasis is on actual interpretations rather than the manner in which they are 
arrived at, the appropriate focal point is what we can identify as being of actual formal legal 
consequence , and that is relatively simple: the views of States Parties, which are binding, 
and the views of the treaty bodies, which are indicative of ‘subsequent practice’ insofar as 
States Parties tacitly (or expressly) endorse them. This is, on its face, our area. 
 We shall now briefly describe the various forms of practice, and assess their 
importance and worth as indicators of subsequent practice. 
 
i) The Reporting Process and Concluding Observations 
 
The bulk of the work which the treaty bodies perform is the hearing and analysis of reports 
delivered by States through the reports process, and the giving of concluding observations 
on those reports. It is important to note, of course, that this is not primarily interpretive in 
function – it is, quite simply, an investigation into whether the given State is in compliance 
with the obligations it has undertaken by ratifying the corresponding Covenant. 
 119 
 
Nevertheless, the terms of the Covenants imply that the process involves interpretation, 
simply by dint of the very terminological ambiguity which we have already discussed: the 
reports are supposed to be “on the measures [the States parties] have adopted which give 
effect to the rights recognised [in the Covenant] and on the progress made in the enjoyment 
of those rights”419, but given that what the rights recognised in the Covenant are, and how 
they are to be enjoyed, are to some extent nebulous, the assessments conducted by the 
monitoring bodies will always have to be to some extent interpretive by their very nature. 
That is, they will always have to constitute some form of judgment regarding what the 
precise nature of States’ obligations are, and whether the measures they have undertaken 
fulfil those obligations. This makes the process a jurisprudence of a kind, indicating how the 
treaty bodies interpret the terms of their respective Covenants with respect to each 
individual State and its context – though, of course, the interpretation is merely 
‘authoritative’ rather than binding.420 
 There are numerous practical problems with the reporting process that will be well 
known to the reader – among them delinquent reports, failure by States parties to provide 
follow-up information, the generality of the bodies’ pronouncements, the problem of 
overlapping, lack of quality, lack of independence or expertise of Committee members, and 
the lack of time devoted to each report421 – but it is not particularly necessary or useful to 
analyse these problems in this thesis. They regard implementation. Purely from a legal 
perspective, our interest is in what the reporting process reveals about interpretation and 
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interpretation alone, and what function and value it has as law.422 
 That concluding observations are non-binding, and only have authoritative status, 
has already been established. What does this actually mean? Former members of the HRC 
have written at some length about the ‘special status’ of concluding observations423 nothing 
that: 
 
The absence of specific provisions on the legally binding nature of the findings…does not mean 
that such findings are merely ‘recommendations’. The treaty obligations themselves 
are…legally binding, and the international expert body established by the treaty is the most 
authoritative interpreter of the treaty in question. Therefore, a finding by a UN human rights 
treaty body may be understood as an indication of the State party being under a legal 
obligation to remedy the situation.424 
 
And: 
 
Whenever a State has submitted to an international procedure, it must participate in that 
procedure bona fide until its very end…As in the case of recommendations of the General 
Assembly, those parties, and in particular the respondent State, have to examine the views 
addressed to them carefully, with due respect to their author. Generally there exists a 
presumption in favour of substantive correctness of such views, [and] [n]o better expertise as 
to the scope and meaning of any of the human rights treaties can be found than in the expert 
bodies set up to monitor their observance by States.425 
 
Dimitrijevic notes simply that “a statement of an authoritative body performing an 
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important supervisory function cannot remain without consequences.”426 
 Of course, former members of the HRC have both a vested (undoubtedly 
subconscious) interest in emphasising the importance of their own work, and a natural 
tendency to view it as having a certain level of legal weight. The picture must be viewed as 
somewhat more mixed than it comes as presented by these authors. Nonetheless, the 
understanding of concluding observations being at least indicative of States’ legal obligations 
is present in more neutral fora. The ICJ chose to view remarks made in the HRC’s concluding 
observations on reports submitted by Israel as authoritative interpretations of Israel’s 
obligations in its advisory opinion on the construction of the security wall427, while the 
International Law Association’s Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice 
thought that “it appears arguable that in interpreting [human rights treaties]…relevant 
subsequent practice might be broader than subsequent State practice and include the 
considered views of the treaty bodies adopted in the performance of the functions 
conferred on them by the States parties.”428 
 O’Flaherty leaves us with the conclusion that concluding observations have no 
binding status for States, but that they have authority (“albeit ill-specified”) which is “most 
apparent where they…purport to interpret treaty provisions” but less clear where they 
“provide general advice on strategies for enhanced implementation of a treaty and when 
they opine on matters which…have little or nothing to do with the actual treaty obligations 
of the State Party”429 (as when, for instance, they recommend that States parties 
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incorporate treaty provisions in a monist fashion430). This seems a satisfactory summation, 
and the distinction between direct interpretations of treaty provisions versus general advice 
on the implementation of a treaty will be borne in mind.  
 
ii) General Comments 
 
If the reports procedures and the giving of concluding observations are primarily concerned 
with implementation and deal with interpretive issues simply as a result, general comments 
are more directly concerned with interpretation itself. In the words of Opsahl, they are the 
primary opportunity for the treaty bodies to “[apply] the Covenant, [discuss] interpretations, 
and [draw] conclusions, in the manner of a quasi-legislative body”.431 By their nature, then, 
their focus and value is in elaborating in some authoritative manner on the nature of 
obligations both specific and general – which is to say, interpreting treaty terms. 
 The legal importance of general comments is, however, of some debate. As Alston 
notes, there are a large variety of different incentives for different actors to portray the 
significance of general comments in different ways.432 The ILA’s valuable report on the work 
of the treaty bodies shows that national courts exhibit a considerable variety of views on the 
matter.433 In the US, New Zealand and Switzerland, for example, general comments have 
been described as “major source[s] for interpretation of the ICCPR”434, “essential points of 
reference for the interpretation of national constitutions and legislation and the 
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development of the common law”435, and “of importance for the interpretation and 
jurisprudential development” of the treaties, if not directly binding436. However, they have 
also been described as having “moral authority but nothing more than that”437 and only of 
account “as opinions on the level of facts”438, stressing their non-binding nature. Moreover, 
as the ILA interim report notes, there has been very little scholarly analysis of the legal basis 
of general comments (and, indeed, all of the work of the treaty bodies) – specifically, 
whether they constitute subsequent practice in the interpretation of the treaties – and their 
persuasive or authoritative nature seems to derive largely from the expertise and reputation 
of the different bodies’ membership.439 This chimes with Opsahl’s view that general 
comments “carry some practical authority because they represent an important body of 
experience in considering matters from the angle of the Covenant”.440 
 In practice, this means that in some jurisdictions general comments have been seen 
as an important source of “interpretive guidance” despite their non-binding nature.441 It 
must be said, of course, that as a general rule the jurisdictions where this occurs tend to be 
those whose level of incorporation of international human rights norms into domestic law is 
relatively strong. The ILA’s interim report442, and the following final report443, contain 
exhaustive lists of cases in which general comments have been considered by domestic 
courts, and the national courts and tribunals referred to are those of New Zealand, Hong 
Kong, Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Malawi, Japan, the USA, the 
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Netherlands, India, Canada, Australia, Hungary, Latvia, Norway, Poland, and Mauritius. The 
conclusion must therefore be that, for the vast majority of States Parties to the human rights 
treaties, domestic courts do not consider general comments to be of enough influence or 
importance to be relevant. Nevertheless, this hardly constitutes a reason to dismiss general 
comments as having no authority as interpretations of the treaties: it should come as no 
surprise that in certain jurisdictions international human rights law is not referenced in court 
proceedings, for a variety of obvious reasons. And when international courts and tribunals 
are examined, it becomes clear that general comments are of some influence, or at least 
have some legal weight: they have been referred to on occasion by the European Court of 
Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the ICJ, as guides for interpretation.444 
 As with concluding observations, of course, many criticisms can be levelled against 
general comments from a practical or advocatory point of view. Their implications are 
sometimes “insufficiently considered”445; they contain “considerable inconsistencies and 
discrepancies”446; and their conclusions are sometimes too controversial to be accepted by 
States Parties.447 But given our perspective, a critical analysis of individual general comments 
as texts is not particularly important: it suffices to note that there are reasonable indications 
that general comments can have legal value and weight beyond simply being statements of 
opinion – though they are not binding and do not purport to be, nor are they insignificant or 
mere recommendations. They inhabit the space between binding authority and hortatory 
statement, carefully considered by some States Parties and in some jurisdictions, and by 
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some international courts.  
 
iii) Responses to Individual Communications 
 
The area in which the treaty bodies most resemble courts issuing binding decisions is, of 
course, the individual complaints procedures found in the treaties or under the relevant 
optional protocols (where they exist). They are especially interesting in terms of 
interpretation, because they are essentially a form of jurisprudence, undertaking to address 
the specific legal obligations of States Parties; this means that unlike concluding 
observations (which have to be viewed primarily as recommendations, even if by necessity 
their function is quasi-interpretive) and general comments (which by their nature are 
general and hortatory whilst retaining interpretive functions), the views on individual 
complaints represent a method for deliberating on, and refining, the meaning of treaty 
terms in actual practice. 
 The legal status of views on individual communications is, in common with the other 
forms of treaty-body work, controversial. Certainly, there are opinions to the effect that 
views are legally binding, on the grounds that under the relevant treaties or optional 
protocols States have voluntarily submitted themselves to the competence of the committee 
concerned and its decisions on communications. For instance, Martin Scheinin argues:  
 
[I]t would be wrong to categorise the [Human Rights Committee’s] views as mere 
‘recommendations’. They are the end result of a quasi-judicial adversarial international body 
established and elected by the States Parties for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of 
the Covenant and monitoring compliance with them. It would be incompatible with these 
preconditions of the procedure if a State that voluntarily has subjected itself to such a 
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procedure, would, after first being one of the two parties in a case, then after receiving the 
Committee’s views, simply replace the Committee’s position with its own interpretation as to 
whether there has been a violation of the Covenant or not… [T]he presumption should be that 
the Committee’s views …are treated as the authoritative interpretation of the Covenant under 
international law.448 
 
The Human Rights Committee itself also, it is said449, seems to take the view that its own 
decisions are binding in effect, in stating that “by becoming a State party to the Optional 
Protocol, the State party has recognised the competence of the Committee to determine 
whether there has been a violation of the Covenant or not”450. This at least suggest that the 
Human Rights Committee sees its views as, if not binding in the sense that they force States 
to comply, at least binding in the sense of finding States Parties to be in compliance with the 
treaty or not – as if States Parties have effectively ceded that power to the Committee in lieu 
of themselves. Fausto Pocar supports this interpretation, arguing that Article 2(3) of the 
ICCPR provides that where a violation of a right under the Covenant takes place the State 
has an obligation to provide a remedy, and thus where the HRC finds a violation then, in 
effect, the relevant State is legally obliged to remedy it.451 
 On the other hand, it is more commonplace among commentators to suggest that, in 
fact, views on individual complaints are “not formally binding” or words to that effect.452 
And certain of the relevant treaty terms do not suggest in themselves that views are to be 
considered legally binding: the Optional Protocols to CEDAW, and the ICESCR, for instance, 
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merely oblige States to “give due consideration” to the views of the Committee.453 
 It certainly seems to be the case that courts in most States Parties interpret views in 
a restrictive light when it comes to giving effect to them in individual cases arising from their 
own jurisdictions. The classic example is Kavanagh v Governor of Mountjoy Prison454, in 
which the claimant, after making an individual communication to the HRC and successfully 
receiving a view that his rights under the Covenant had been violated455, attempted to have 
his conviction reopened. This was rejected by the Irish Supreme Court, who took the view 
that treaties did not form part of domestic law, and that ratification of the First Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR did not create an enforceable obligation for the State to give effect to 
the HRC’s views.456 Courts in Spain have similarly ruled that decisions of the HRC did not 
constitute new facts that would permit the reopening of criminal proceedings.457 
 Moreover, it is often argued that it would be a mistake to portray the views of the 
treaty bodies as being akin to actual court judgments. None of the committees give 
particularly detailed justifications for their reasoning and conclusions, and they do not have 
the kind of resources available in fact-finding and investigation that genuine courts do. Many 
members are of non-legal backgrounds and are not trained as judges.458 And the 
proceedings do not resemble those of a court – there are no oral hearings, for instance. This 
has led Steiner, among others, to argue that the treaty bodies cannot realistically serve the 
functions that courts proper do, nor do justice to the individual cases coming before them, 
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but can elucidate, interpret, and explain the Covenant.459 Their function, in other words, is 
not to act as a court does in resolving disputes and acting as a deterrent or vindicating the 
rule of law. Rather, their role is precisely to clarify the treaty under their respective 
‘jurisdiction’. Views on individual complaints, then, are best seen as tools for interpreting the 
treaties (as well, of course, as seeking redress for individuals whose rights have in fact been 
violated).  
 It might be more accurate, then, to conclude as the ILA has done that views are not 
formally binding on States in the same way that a judgment of the ECtHR might be, but 
States are nonetheless not free to disregard them simply because they disagree.460 And this 
lends them “considerable persuasive force” in domestic legal settings.461 This can be seen in 
the case law of several jurisdictions, too numerous to detail here at length462, but 
exemplified by the Privy Council’s thoughts on the matter in Tangiora v Wellington District 
Legal Services Committee: 
 
It is true that [the HRC’s] views are not binding on the State Party concerned, which is free to 
criticise them and may refuse to implement them. Nevertheless…a State Party may find it hard 
to reject such findings when they are based on orderly proceedings during which the State 
Party has had a proper opportunity to present its case. The views of [the HRC] acquire 
authority from the standing of its members and their judicial qualities of impartiality, 
objectivity and restraint… [W]hen it reaches a final view that a State Party is in breach of its 
obligations under the Covenant, it makes a definitive and final ruling which is determinative of 
an issue that has been referred to it.463 
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Of course, this means that ultimately much of what is said about the views on individual 
complaints is similar to that which was said about general comments: the views inhabit the 
space between binding law and recommendation: they are persuasive authority, with all the 
ambiguities that term suggests. This may result in a situation in which, as Davidson suggests, 
“there is an obligation to provide a remedy under [a given human rights treaty] that is 
independent of any legally binding determination of a breach”, which he views as “extremely 
troublesome to say the least”.464 However, troublesome or otherwise, it appears to 
accurately reflect reality. 
 
iv) Assessment: Which Area to Focus on? 
 
Clearly, all of the different means by which the treaty bodies express their views – 
Concluding Observations on State Reports, General Comments, and Final Views on individual 
communications – are potentially capable of constituting or indicating subsequent practice 
establishing the agreement of the parties, if the parties do in fact agree. This is because all 
are, to some extent, interpretive in function, and authoritative in character. We must now 
briefly consider to what degree they are useful areas of analysis in this regard. 
 Final views on individual communications must, it seems, be treated with the most 
caution, simply by assessing them at face value: none of the major treaties includes 
provisions for individual communications, all of which must take place through Optional 
Protocols to which not all Parties to the relevant treaties are signatories. For instance, there 
are 167 parties to the ICCPR but only 114 to its Optional Protocol; the corresponding figures 
                                                     
464
 J. Davidson ”Intention and Effect: The Legal Status of the Final Views of the Human Rights Committee” 2001 
New Zealand Law Review 125, p. 133. 
 130 
 
for CEDAW are 187 to 104.465 It seems doubtful, then, simply based on this fact, that final 
views given by treaty bodies could be deemed to be constitutive of subsequent practice 
establishing the agreement of the parties: not all States Parties to the treaty concerned have 
consented to be bound by the process by which such views are given, so it would be 
controversial to say the least to deem interpretive practice in the form of such views to 
indicate the formation of subsequent practice. By definition, it would be unusual if an 
interpretation of a treaty provision, given in the context of a process in which certain parties 
to the treaty itself do not participate, came to be seen as potentially establishing the 
agreement of those parties.  
 Certainly, General Comments do not have this same problem for our purposes. And 
superficially General Comments would appear to be most suitable as a focus for our 
discussion. They are by their nature given universally across all parties to the respective 
treaty, and must be considered to apply to all States Parties: thus, provided those States 
Parties do not disagree with their content, there is potential to view them as being 
potentially constitutive of subsequent practice establishing their agreement.  
 However, General Comments are given relatively infrequently – most of the treaty 
bodies have issued between 20 and 30 – and we would not expect all of that number to be 
relevant to the focus of our analysis, which is, of course, somewhat specific in nature. This 
restricts the amount of material that can be analysed. Moreover, State delegates sometimes 
comment on the content of General Comments in the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly when the treaty bodies make their annual reports, but they are not directly 
involved in the decision-making process; while this would not necessarily preclude us from 
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considering General Comments as being constitutive of subsequent practice, it does make 
them less comprehensive guides, which lack the level of detail which a participatory process 
like the reporting procedure would provide. 
 The reporting procedure, indeed, does not suffer from any of the difficulties which 
General Comments and final views would if they were the focus of a search for subsequent 
practice. They are given frequently and universally (if in a State-specific manner) across all of 
the parties to the relevant treaty, and they are given in a relatively detailed and careful 
fashion, in a process which provides plentiful material giving insight into the decision-making 
of the treaty bodies themselves and also the State Parties (thanks to the summary records of 
the constructive dialogue and the responses to the lists of issues, which are often 
comprehensive and detailed). What is more, since they are given on a cyclical and repetitive 
basis, they provide us with a view of the interpretation of treaty provisions over time, giving 
an insight into programmatic interpretation that General Comments usually do not. And 
finally, the reactions of State Parties to Concluding Observations are generally direct and 
easily discernible: they are present in the dialogue itself. 
 This means that, of all the formats in which treaty bodies give their views on the 
interpretation of treaty provisions, it is the reporting procedure which we must consider 
most suitable for an analysis such as this, and which will be our main subject matter. How 
this will be done is set out in more detail in Chapter IV. 
 
v) Summary: The Practice of the Treaty Bodies as ‘Subsequent Practice’ 
 
We have established, then, that human rights treaties, because of their special character, 
and also because of their broadness and ambiguity, require distinctive rules of 
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interpretation. However, we have also established that, as a point of law, even if we accept 
the view that concluding observations, general comments, and/or final views on individual 
communications do constitute subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the 
parties regarding interpretation, it is only insofar as States are supportive of, or at least 
acquiescent with, the opinions of the treaty bodies expressed within them. That is, it would 
be more accurate to describe ‘subsequent practice [establishing] the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation’ in the context of human rights treaties as the 
interpretive dimension of the treaty bodies’ work taken together with the responses of 
States Parties. Thus, although the views of the treaty bodies expressed in these different 
formats are both authoritative and interpretive to varying degrees, the role of States Parties 
themselves remains critical - for they are, it hardly need repeating, free to reject those 
interpretations.  
 Moreover, even though the different types of practice of the treaty bodies are to be 
considered authoritative, they must nonetheless still be conducted against the general 
‘normative background’ of international law, which means that their programmatic 
interpretations must still be given in a context supported by, in particular, the Vienna 
Convention.  
 This means that a simple inspection of the views offered by treaty bodies in any of 
the forms discussed above would be inadequate for our purposes: they would have to be 
discussed in light of State Party responses. States are as much a part of the interpretive 
process as the treaty bodies themselves, even if, as happens in practice, they give the treaty 
bodies the initiative in offering interpretations through their practice.  
 How this kind of analysis might proceed is detailed in the next Chapter. What is clear 
is that examining the issue is of crucial importance for our main aim of discovering to what 
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extent international human rights law incorporates a notion of cultural values as a factor 
affecting how treaty obligations are given effect in domestic law. Since the terms of the 
treaties are vague, it is not only unclear through a mere textual analysis whether this is the 
case or not, but impossible to make clear. And moreover, since the treaty bodies are 
authoritative but not final arbiters of meaning, a more thorough and probing approach to 
their interpretive work is required. Our discussion must move beyond both the text and the 
views of the treaty bodies to the broader understanding of ‘interpretation’ which has been 
set out above, considering particularly the issue of subsequent practice as represented by 
the interpretive work of the treaty bodies in their monitoring practice regarding State 
reports and the responses of States Parties to it.  
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IV. Subsequent Practice in the Human Rights Context 
 
Introduction 
 
We have now narrowed our focus to the point at which we can begin to analyse our 
question in concrete terms. To review, we have established our question: to what extent 
does international human rights law accept that cultural or societal factors affect how treaty 
obligations are implemented or internalized? We have also established that this question is 
fundamentally one of interpretation. And we have considered how international human 
rights treaties are interpreted in a general sense, noting that the argument for the kind of 
‘evolutive’ or programmatic interpretations given in the human rights context tends to rely, 
in legal terms, on Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT, or subsequent practice establishing the 
agreement of the parties regarding interpretation. This has led us to the conclusion that an 
examination of the State reporting process would be the most fruitful way to answer our 
question, as a means to discern exactly what the subsequent practice is. We now turn to the 
more specific and technical question of how this can be analysed and assessed in detail. 
 Generally speaking, while it is fairly commonly argued that the work of the United 
Nations human rights treaty bodies (“the treaty bodies”) can be constitutive of subsequent 
practice in some sense466, there has not been a particularly detailed analysis in the literature 
of which the author is aware, and nor have the treaty bodies themselves offered a view on 
the matter. However, other international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, most notably the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) and the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement 
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Panels and Appellate Body, have done. We take the jurisprudence of these bodies as our 
starting point, using it to establish rules and principles for understanding what is constitutive 
of subsequent practice and what is not, and comparing them to the human rights context to 
illustrate how these rules and principles would apply to the State reporting process under 
the various international human rights treaties. We then turn to the question of alternatives, 
and consider the legal implications of failure to determine treaty body practice as 
constitutive of VCLT subsequent practice. 
 Finally, we move to consider procedural issues for the thesis’ substantive analysis: 
how the materials are selected, what the focus is (in particular which States and treaties are 
chosen as the subjects), what problems are inherent in the investigation, and what 
conclusions might emerge. 
 
A. Subsequent Practice Establishing the Agreement of the Parties and the State Reporting 
Process 
 
i) Subsequent Practice in International Tribunals – Some General Principles 
 
To begin with a recent and simple definition, incorporating the thoughts of Linderfalk and 
Orakhelashvili and the way the law has developed since the VCLT was drafted, Peters 
describes subsequent practice as: 
 
[C]onsistent, treaty-related actions and omissions of the parties to or organs established by 
the treaty on the international level, which reflect the common ideas of all the parties about 
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the interpretation of the treaty.467 
 
This definition provides us with a framework, but it raises a number of questions: 
 
 What actions and omissions count as “consistent, treaty-related actions and 
omissions”? 
 What is the relationship between “parties to” and “organs established by” 
the treaty in question? 
 How are the common ideas of all the parties reflected? 
 
These questions are difficult and complicated to answer in any context, and doubly so with 
regard to multilateral treaties such as the major human rights covenants. Moreover, the 
rules on how subsequent practice functions as a means of interpretation are not at all clear, 
mostly because international tribunals have dealt with the issue almost at random, as cases 
at hand have required, and because the area has only very recently become an issue for 
academic research.468 We shall, however, attempt to come to an understanding by reference 
to the jurisprudence of the ICJ and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement procedures in particular. 
 The ICJ’s approach, which is perhaps most commonly cited, has been particularly 
haphazard, though certain standards or principles can be discerned from its case law. The 
first is that, for actions to be constitutive of VCLT subsequent practice, intentionality is 
required. In Kasikili/Sedudu469 the presence of tribespeople, who were Namibian nationals, 
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on a river island, was argued by Namibia to be subsequent practice to a boundary treaty 
between Namibia and Botswana which established their agreement over its interpretation 
as including the island in Namibian territory. Botswana had never objected to the presence 
of the tribespeople on the island, and their usage of it had been consistent: practice thus 
indicated that there was agreement between the two parties to the treaty that Namibia had 
jurisdiction over the island. But the ICJ thought that there was a requirement for conduct to 
be linked to the belief that the conduct was undertaken as an interpretation of the treaty in 
question, in order to qualify as subsequent practice. Here, since there was no intentionality 
on the part of the tribespeople or either party that their ‘practice’ should be linked to the 
interpretation of the treaty, it could not be constitutive of subsequent practice. It was not 
relevant to the question of whether or not there was any agreement between the parties on 
the boundary treaty’s interpretation. 
 The second is that the consent or acquiescence of parties can, in the context of the 
constitutional instruments of international organizations, be deduced or implied. For 
example, in Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia470 the Court argued that the 
requirement of Article 27(3) of the UN Charter that decisions of the Security Council on non-
procedural matters must be made by the ‘affirmative’ vote of 9 of its members, plus the 
concurring votes of the permanent members, should be interpreted as if ‘concurring’ meant 
‘not objecting’ - because subsequent practice indicated as much. This was despite the fact 
that none of the Members of the General Assembly had participated in the practice in 
question (not being members of the Security Council) and had merely tacitly approved 
through silence or non-objection471. 
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 Another established principle would appear to be that subsequent practice can lead 
to interpretation that in fact modifies the meaning of the treaty text. In Certain Expenses472, 
President Winiarski stated (in his dissenting opinion) that “if a practice is introduced without 
opposition in the relations between the contracting parties, this may bring about, at the end 
of a certain period, a modification of a treaty rule”.473 This has been confirmed by other 
international tribunals, as in the Air Services474 and Ethiopia/Eritrea475 cases, and by the 
European Court of Human Rights, as for example in Ocalan476 and Soering477. The traditional 
view, at least espoused by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, is that it is for tribunals “to interpret 
treaties, not revise them”, but that there is a clear duty “to interpret them as revised, and to 
give effect to any revision arrived at by the parties”.478 Arato goes so far as to say that “in 
light of the proliferation of cases recognizing the possibility of modification on the basis of 
subsequent practice…the argument could even be made that the VCLT has been 
reinterpreted, on the basis of subsequent practice in its application, to mean that under 
Article 31(3)(b) interpretation can shade into modification by subsequent practice”.479 
 So much generally seems to be agreed. However, this hardly allows us to draw 
distinct conclusions as regards subsequent practice in the context of human rights treaties. It 
leaves many questions unanswered: how consistent must practice be? How many States are 
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required to engage in the practice? Are there any restrictions on the type of practice being 
participated in? How is intentionality demonstrated? Is silence a clear indication of 
acquiescence or approval? More crucially for our purposes, what is the role of the UN treaty 
bodies in constituting subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties? 
 Here, turning to the literature on subsequent practice in the context of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and its dispute settlement procedure would be instructive, as it is 
here that subsequent practice has been addressed more than in any other international 
judicial (or quasi-judicial) body.480 
There are, of course, some distinct differences between the dispute settlement panels 
(“the panels”) and the Appellate Body (“the AB”) and the UN human rights treaty bodies. 
The Articles in the major human rights covenants which establish the treaty bodies are 
generally terse and do not elaborate to any great extent on the role of the bodies 
themselves. (The ICCPR, for instance, merely describes the HRC’s role as to “study the 
reports submitted by the States Parties to the present Covenant [and] transmit its reports, 
and such general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties”.481) The 
WTO panels and AB, by contrast, operate under clearer guidelines - the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes482: 
 
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system.  The Members recognize that it serves to 
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify 
the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot 
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add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.483 
 
This has been further expanded on in the case law of the panels. Here, Articles 31 and 
32 of the VCLT have been understood to be the incorporation of the “customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law”, and thus “the wording [of the GATT] should be 
interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a 
whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account.”484 This has 
meant that subsequent practice has featured somewhat heavily in the decisions of panels 
and the AB, and has been examined in a far more detailed and rigorous fashion than that 
offered in the human rights context. Nevertheless, it can be argued that some of the 
principles developed in the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures can be applied to all 
multilateral treaties to a certain degree, and that elements of these are directly transferrable 
to human rights treaty interpretation. 
In the Japan – Alcoholic Beverages Panel decision, the Panel dealt specifically with a 
number of issues arising from subsequent practice of the parties to the GATT. The dispute 
regarded the taxation of alcohol in Japan, and in particular differential treatment in the 
Japanese tax code for vodka and shochu, and whether or not this constituted a violation of 
Article III:2 of the GATT. It was argued that previous adopted Panel reports had dealt with 
the question of “like products” and that those Panel reports were constitutive of subsequent 
practice. Firstly, the Panel “noted that other GATT and WTO panels have interpreted Article 
III and that panel reports adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES and the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body constitute subsequent practice in a specific case by virtue of the decision to 
                                                     
483
Ibid., Article 3.2. 
484
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages Panel, WT/DS8/R (July 11, 1996), para. 6.9. 
 141 
 
adopt them”485; and it further argued that “Article 1(b)(iv) of GATT 1994 provides 
institutional recognition that adopted panel reports constitute subsequent practice. Such 
reports are an integral part of GATT 1994, since they constitute ‘other decisions of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947’.”486 
This does not mean, however, that the entire contents of all adopted reports 
constitute subsequent practice. In an AB review of the Japan – Alcoholic Beverages dispute 
the AB disagreed partially with the Panel’s conclusion, deciding that the definition of 
subsequent practice offered by Sir Ian Sinclair suggested that there were further 
requirements for subsequent practice to be established than merely the adoption of a Panel 
report: 
 
Generally, in international law, the essence of subsequent practice in interpreting a treaty has 
been recognized as a ‘concordant, common and consistent’ sequence of acts or 
pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernible pattern implying the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation. An isolated act is generally not sufficient to establish 
subsequent practice; it is a sequence of acts establishing the agreement of the parties that is 
relevant.487 
 
 A single Panel report, in other words, could not be a “’concordant, common and 
consistent’ sequence of acts or pronouncements…sufficient to establish a…pattern”; it was 
not indicative by itself of consistent party conduct.488 
This, it is argued, did not deny that adopted Panel reports could ever constitute 
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subsequent practice – only that isolated Panel reports could not.489 However, the AB further 
restricted the extent to which Panel reports could constitute subsequent practice by 
stressing that “[it did] not believe that the CONTRACTING PARTIES, in deciding to adopt a 
panel report, intended that their decision would constitute a definitive interpretation of the 
relevant provisions of GATT 1947”, and nor did it “believe that this is contemplated under 
GATT 1994”.490 Taking this together with the decision in United States – Continued Dumping 
and Subsidy Offset Act 2000 (which found that previous arbitrations were not constitutive of 
‘subsequent practice’” 491), it can be concluded that even party conduct which is concordant, 
common and consistent might still not be adequate to establish subsequent practice.492 
This was compounded by the Panel’s decision in United States – Section 110(5) of the 
US Copyright Act493. Here, the US argued that the doctrine of ‘minor exceptions’, which is 
accepted explicitly in Article 10 of the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright 
Treaty (WCT), was incorporated into the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement since its inclusion within the WCT constituted subsequent 
agreement or practice under Article 31 of the VCLT. The US representatives argued that since 
99 members of the Berne Convention had adopted the WCT by consensus there was an 
indication that subsequent State practice suggested an interpretation of the TRIPS as 
incorporating the ‘minor exceptions’ doctrine; it implied general agreement that the 
doctrine should be applicable in the overall framework of multilateral copyright protection. 
The Panel rejected this view rather baldly, stating that subsequent developments in the area 
since TRIPS were “of rather limited relevance in the light of the general rules of 
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interpretation as embodied in the Vienna Convention”.494 Indeed, it seemed to take an 
extremely cautious approach to subsequent practice in general, preferring to follow the 
decision in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages AB and stating that it “did not wish to express a view 
on… ‘subsequent practice’ within the meaning of Article 31 (3) (b)” in relation to State 
practice in the TRIPS context.495 
Feldman criticises the approach taken by the Panel in United States – Copyright in 
particular as an “example of a tribunal avoiding application of subsequent practice to a 
dispute because how to apply it is hard to figure out”.496  He then discerns what appears to 
be an implicit framework for considering subsequent practice in the jurisprudence of the 
Dispute Settlement process  – what he calls a “two-step analysis” requiring demonstration of 
party consent at two different stages.497 Here, he draws from the more recent Chile – Price 
Band498 and US – Gambling499 Panel and AB reports. In the first of these, the AB addressed 
the issue of silence or tacit acceptance and seemed to dismiss it as irrelevant – it set the 
requirement as “a discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements implying an agreement”500 
and did not consider a failure to challenge Chile’s Price Band on the part of other WTO 
members a such a discernible pattern: this “effectively dismissed acquiescence, estoppel, 
and implied agreement by silence as incapable of establishing subsequent practice without 
more, [although] it did not remove the possibility of using them as corroborative 
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evidence”.501 
In the second, a case that is particularly relevant for the international human rights 
context, as we shall discuss below, Antigua claimed that the GATS Scheduling Guidelines 
adopted in 2001 constituted subsequent practice regarding the interpretation of the terms 
of the GATS. The AB disagreed, but its reasoning was especially instructive. The WTO Council 
for Trade in Services had adopted the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines, but it had explicitly stated 
that these guidelines were non-binding – there was no intent to agree to an authentic 
interpretation.502 By its nature, practice which itself indicates that it should not be binding 
cannot provide a binding interpretation. And here, the parties’ consent to the Guidelines 
was indeed based on the very fact that they were non-binding. This meant that, like Panel 
reports (as the AB had found in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages), such negotiations could not 
constitute practice, at least not by default. This case can be taken to signify, in Feldman’s 
opinion, how, in the context of large multilateral treaty regimes, there is a requirement to 
carefully examine the plethora of negotiations, reports, and other materials that are 
generated to discern whether or not they are in fact capable of signifying agreement.503 
The two-step model, then, is firstly that party conduct has to be demonstrated to be 
concordant, common and consistent (with mere silence being inadequate), and secondly 
that there must be intent to provide an authentic interpretation. If at either stage this 
cannot be demonstrated, the conduct cannot constitute subsequent practice. This would 
seem to follow certain of the principles established in the case law of the ICJ – especially 
with regard to intentionality, for which this WTO Dispute Settlement jurisprudence might be 
seen as a refinement. 
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However, Feldman is again critical of these two decisions and the nascent two-step 
model itself, taking the view that they leave the issue confused: they revolve around the 
character or nature of the conduct of Members, but leave aside a more important and basic 
question – what “concordant, common and consistent conduct” actually requires in order to 
imply agreement.504 
This has been further elaborated on by Panels and the AB in recent cases, beginning 
with US - Zeroing505, in which the EC claimed that since its interpretation of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement was supported by the practice of 105 other WTO Members it 
constituted a pattern of conduct sufficient to be classified as subsequent practice under the 
VCLT. The Panel decided otherwise, stating that even if all the Members the EC referred to 
did in fact apply the treaty provision at question in the same way, it would still “only mean 
that a considerable number of WTO Members have adopted an approach different from that 
of the United States”.506 
This would suggest – as we know507 – that any element of disagreement would obviate 
concordant, common, and consistent practice. In EC-Chicken Cuts508, the AB turned to the 
more complicated questions of how to establish agreement of silent parties, which States’ 
practice was most relevant, and what “concordant, common and consistent conduct” 
meant.509 The decision hinged on the interpretation of the word “salted” but, for our 
purposes, we need only focus on the crucial question: did the EC’s consistent practice of 
classifying frozen boneless chicken cuts as belonging under heading 2.10 of its tariff 
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schedule amount to subsequent practice under the VCLT Article 31, and did certain 
subsequent Commission Regulations amounting to a reclassification so that they fell under 
heading 2.07, result in less favourable treatment than that provided in the EC’s schedule in 
violation of the GATT?  In other words, was the EC’s consistent practice between 1996 and 
2000 of classifying the product a certain way subsequent practice establishing the 
agreement of WTO Members regarding the interpretation of the EC’s schedule, and was this 
reclassification thus in effect a violation of the schedule and hence the GATT? 
Firstly, the AB examined the issue of which States Parties’ practice was relevant. The 
Panel had considered whether or not all WTO Members needed to have engaged in a 
practice for it to constitute subsequent practice under the VCLT, and had concluded that, in 
fact, they did not.510 It was simply sufficient to demonstrate that the all the parties had 
accepted the relevant practice.511 The AB did not disagree, although it felt that in the context 
of a multilateral treaty it would be difficult to discern a concordant, consistent and common 
practice from a small number of States Parties. 
Secondly, the AB addressed the question of whether one State’s practice could amount 
to subsequent practice under the VCLT. Here, the Panel had decided that since it was the 
EC’s schedule which was being interpreted, and that the schedule was particular to the EC, 
this meant that it was only the EC’s classification practice which was relevant in determining 
the agreement of WTO members regarding the schedule.512 Furthermore, the EC was the 
only WTO Member which apparently imported the type of product in question.513 
 The AB overturned this, arguing instead that the EC’s schedule was based on the 
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Harmonized System and hence was not as unique as would be required if it were to be 
argued that only the EC’s practice was relevant.514 Despite the comparative importance of 
the EC’s practice in constituting subsequent practice regarding the interpretation of its own 
Schedule, the classification practice of all the other WTO Members was not irrelevant per 
se.515 Nevertheless, in rejecting the Panel’s findings the AB did not dismiss outright the 
notion that the consistent practice of a small number of States could constitute subsequent 
practice under the VCLT. In a multilateral treaty this would be difficult, but not impossible.516 
Thirdly, the AB examined the issue of silence or acquiescence. Here, it rejected the 
earlier conclusions drawn in Chile – Price Band, which as we have seen seemed to require 
overt acts or pronouncements indicating acceptance of a practice in order for it to be 
constitutive of subsequent practice. Rather, the AB agreed with the Panel in thinking that 
silence or lack of reaction could imply acceptance of practice as an authentic interpretation 
by a State Party and thus was not a barrier to the developing of VCLT subsequent practice.517 
It did, however, set out the following caveat: 
 
[W]e have misgivings about deducing, without further inquiry, agreement with a practice from 
a party’s “lack of reaction”. We do not exclude that, in specific situations, the “lack of reaction” 
or silence by a particular treaty party may, in the light of attendant circumstances, be 
understood as acceptance of the practice of other treaty parties.518 
 
Such situations, it went on, “may occur when a party that has not engaged in a practice has 
become or has been made aware of the practice of other parties (for example, by means of 
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notification or by virtue of participation in a forum where it is discussed), but does not react 
to it.”519 
 Feldman draws on this jurisprudence to suggest a “three step analysis” as a 
framework for examining subsequent practice, to replace the implicit two-step model 
suggested by the decisions in Chile – Prince Band AB and US – Gambling AB. He argues that 
international tribunals are currently “at risk of analysing subsequent practice by 
indiscriminately using Sinclair’s formulation that the practice must be concordant, common, 
and consistent, and must imply agreement”.520 This, he argues, is too strict, and a more 
flexible three-step analysis, drawing from EC – Chicken Cuts, is warranted – examining (1) 
the character of the practice, (2) the degree to which the practice is concordant, common 
and consistent, and (3) the extent to which the practice implies agreement.521 
 The first step is to ensure that the practice actually falls under Article 31(3)(b) of the 
VCLT – it cannot be, for instance, statements designed to demonstrate consensus for political 
purposes but which do not imply actual agreement: for instance, non-binding General 
Assembly Declarations.522 Feldman also includes treaty negotiation materials in the category 
of practice which would not indicate subsequent practice – such materials are not intended 
to be binding.523 
 The second step is then to ask whether the practice is concordant, common and 
consistent, analysed on a sliding scale. Here, Feldman argues, the number of parties and the 
length of time that they have conducted themselves consistently must be considered: the 
less concordant, common and consistent, the higher the burden should be to demonstrate 
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that the practice implies agreement, and vice versa.524 Whether or not the parties are the 
‘main actors’ in the area also needs to be taken into account.525 
 The third step is to assess if the practice implies agreement among the other parties 
(i.e. the non-participating ones). Here, the more time passes, and the more concordant, 
common and consistent the practice is, the more other States have the opportunity to 
object and the more their silence becomes “probative of agreement”.526 In Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua527 the ICJ ruled that since the United Nations had 
regularly placed Nicaragua on the list of States that had recognised the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court for years, there had been “every opportunity of accepting or 
rejecting” it, for example.528 In other words, it found that silence could demonstrate 
agreement if there had been sufficient opportunity to object. 
 This three-step analysis, Feldman argues, is more efficient than the implicit two-step 
model, because the latter is both inflexible and restrictive, resulting in excessive formality, 
and because it does not accurately reflect ICJ jurisprudence529. His approach is normative 
rather than descriptive, in the sense that it is a recommended framework on which 
international tribunals ought to operate and not an accurate reflection of the general 
perspective taken in all areas – in the WTO context, for instance, it seems that the three-step 
analysis is not actually yet fully applied.530 But as a reflection of the standards which appear 
to have developed through the jurisprudence of international tribunals, it appears accurate. 
 How might we use the jurisprudence of the WTO on subsequent practice, particularly 
                                                     
524
Ibid., p. 697. 
525
Ibid., p. 698. 
526
Ibid. 
527
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
1984 ICJ 395, p. 408. 
528
Ibid. 
529
A. Feldman, supra note 480, pp. 700-701. 
530
WTO law textbooks (Matsushita), for instance, do not deal with the implications of EC- Chicken Cuts in great 
depth. 
 150 
 
with regard to Feldman’s proposed three-step analysis, and taking into account the 
background of ICJ case law, to generate an analytical approach towards the state reports 
procedures under the major international human rights treaties? 
 
ii) The Application of ICJ and WTO DSP Jurisprudence in the International Human Rights 
Context 
 
a) Differences of Approach 
 
There is one major function which the treaty bodies and the dispute settlement system have 
in common: to clarify the provisions of the respective agreements with which they are 
concerned. This role is expressly stated for the dispute settlement in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding531, whereas among the treaty bodies it is implicit532, but it is clearly common 
ground between the two. This means that much of what can be said about treaty 
interpretation in dispute settlement jurisprudence can be said about the work of the treaty 
bodies, and vice-versa. In particular, some of the controversy in both systems about the 
interpretive role of the respective organs has a similar tone, and has been reconciled in a 
similar fashion. As with the interpretations offered by the treaty bodies, the WTO dispute 
settlement system has had to confront certain difficulties regarding the legal nature of the 
interpretations it offers: Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement provides that the exclusive 
authority to adopt interpretations of the Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
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rests in the Ministerial Conference and the General Council (i.e. the States Parties), just as 
the ultimate authority to offer binding interpretations of the major human rights treaties is 
generally argued to reside in the States Parties.533 As with the treaty bodies, the WTO 
dispute settlement AB has sought to play down this problem – in its case by reasoning that 
Article IX:2 is “not dispositive” for resolving certain issues, and stating that it “fail[ed] to see 
how the express authorization in the WTO Agreement for Members to adopt interpretations 
of WTO provisions…would impinge upon recourse to subsequent practice as a tool of treaty 
interpretation under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention”.534 
However, it is important to acknowledge that the WTO Dispute Settlement system is 
based around detailed procedural rules, and has an appellate procedure, a follow-up 
arbitration process for implementation, and sanctions for non-compliance: in this respect it 
far more closely resembles an actual court than do any of the UN human rights treaty 
bodies535. This arises, of course, from the fact that it is contentious: it is designed to resolve 
disputes between States, which is not the case in the UN human rights system.  This is all the 
more true of the ICJ. Additionally, the WTO DSP and the ICJ have the role of a tribunal – they 
resolve questions of law in an adversarial process. This contrasts with the role of the treaty 
bodies, which instead have the responsibility to monitor, advise, assess, and participate in 
the practice themselves. This contrast of emphasis causes differences to arise between both 
the form and function of the UN treaty bodies and the WTO DSP mechanisms which mean 
that, if we are to come up with a satisfactory way to apply the concept of VCLT subsequent 
practice in the human rights context, we must utilise it somewhat differently to the manner 
in which the WTO DSP has developed it. 
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 The first and perhaps most important of these differences is that the WTO DSP 
panels and appellate body do not, in themselves, create practice – as was emphasised in the 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages AB536. However, this is not, and cannot, be true in the human 
rights context, as we have seen: in any understanding of how subsequent practice functions 
in regard to the interpretation of human rights treaties, it is largely the interpretive work of 
the treaty bodies themselves which is itself the practice (or, what we might refer to as 
“interpretive practice”). This creates a difference of emphasis in the roles of the treaty 
bodies compared with the WTO DSP: whereas the WTO DSP examines the practice of States 
Parties in its search for commonality, concordancy and consistency, and agreement, and 
then decides on whether there is VCLT subsequent practice to guide interpretation, the 
human rights treaty bodies instead create interpretive practice which, if it is common, 
concordant and consistent, and has the agreement of the States Parties, we could say is 
constitutive of subsequent practice.  
 The International Law Association expressed this view in its final report on the 
impact of the treaty monitoring bodies537, and we can again here draw a contrast with the 
WTO AB, whose reasoning in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages was that the contracting parties to 
GATT 1947 had not intended that the adoption of panel reports should constitute definitive 
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interpretations and that this was not contemplated in GATT 1994.538 The treaty bodies, it 
might sensibly be argued, have had powers conferred upon them by the States Parties to 
undertake interpretation and monitor compliance, and hence it is in fact contemplated in 
each treaty that concluding observations/comments should constitute definitive 
interpretations. This would suggest that, in contrast to WTO DSU Panel reports, concluding 
observations/comments do come under the umbrella of a broader definition of ‘subsequent 
practice’ if the other criteria are met. 
Here, the issue of ‘traditions of interpretation’ also becomes relevant. Peters raises the 
possibility, in a 2011 paper, that the way in which the rules of Article 31 (3) (b) operate can 
be influenced by the established practice of an international organization through Article 5 
of the VCLT, which states that the Convention applies to any treaty adopted within an 
international organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization,539 
which are further described as “in particular, the constituent instruments, decisions and 
resolutions adopted in accordance with them, and established practice of the 
organization”.540 In other words, when the VCLT is applied to the constituent instruments of 
an international organization, it has to – because of Article 5 – be applied subject to the 
rules of that organization.541 This means that it could, in fact, be modified or even preceded 
by the rules of the organization, and thus that the established practice of the organization 
could change how the rules contained in the VCLT operate in relation to it. 
Since Article 31 (3) (b) is one of those rules like any other, Peters argues, it can be 
influenced “via Article 5 VCLT to the effect that the requirement of an agreement of the 
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parties is…softened”.542 That is, established practice of a given international organization 
under Article 5 of the VCLT can be that the practice of its own constituent organs deserves 
more weight in interpretation than that of the parties, and can operate independently of 
them, meaning that the way in which Article 31(3)(b) operates is altered. The ‘tradition of 
interpretation’ of the organization, in other words, can also have an effect on what is 
constitutive of subsequent practice. 
It is not a great leap to arrive at the conclusion that the tradition of interpretation of 
the United Nations in relation to the major human rights treaties gives more weight to the 
‘organ practice’ of the treaty bodies than it does to that of individual State Parties, at least 
within the actual act of interpretation. (The obvious caveat remaining that the reaction of 
the parties to the treaty bodies' interpretations also has critical importance.) If this were the 
case, it could convincingly be argued that the practice of the treaty bodies in formulating 
concluding observations/comments is itself formative of subsequent practice establishing 
the agreement of the parties, in light of the established practice of the United Nations with 
regard to human rights treaties, and the ‘tradition of interpretation’ surrounding it (provided 
the States parties do not signal clear disagreement). 
 This, it follows, means that what States Parties do in regard to implementing treaty 
provisions is far less relevant than what they say: our primary interest in the States Parties is 
confirming their agreement or disagreement with the interpretive practice of the treaty 
bodies, not examining their own actual practice. This contrasts with the approach taken by 
the WTO DSP and the ICJ, whose primary focus is what States do as well as say, as an 
attempt to discern whether States’ actions are common, concordant and consistent. 
 A further consideration on this point is that there is always likely to be a lag between 
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a given State Party acknowledging that it has a certain obligation under a human rights 
treaty, and it putting that obligation into effect, for good practical reasons – no matter which 
State, one would never expect it to be instantaneously possible even to merely change a 
piece of internal legislation, let alone address extra-legal issues or the behaviour of 
private/third parties, even where it agrees with the treaty body in question. To take a simple 
hypothetical scenario: in the United Kingdom the minimum age for marriage is 16; were one 
of the treaty bodies, such as the CEDAW or CRC Committee, to recommend that this be 
raised to 18, the government of the United Kingdom would still be required to go through 
the relevant procedure for changing the legislation even if it chose to conform with the 
relevant Committee’s recommendation, which would be a lengthy and somewhat complex 
process. Yet this would surely not require us to consider there to be no agreement on the 
part of the UK with the interpretive practice of that Committee until the necessary 
legislation had come into effect. 
 This means that, when we conduct our analysis and search for agreement or implied 
agreement under Step 3, the relevant locus in terms of establishing subsequent practice is 
not necessarily what States Parties do. More relevant, and more useful, is surely the 
question of whether they can be said to agree with the interpretive practice of the treaty 
bodies. Put simply, it is not in general State practice, but rather States' reactions to the 
interpretive practice of the treaty body in terms of what their delegates represent as their 
governments’ views, which is most important when attempting to establish whether there is 
agreement or disagreement.    
 This is not necessarily the view taken by the International Law Association, which in 
its 2004 report on the findings of human rights treaty bodies expressed the view that 
pronouncements by courts and their application of treaty body interpretations might also be 
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relevant in establishing the agreement requirement for subsequent practice, as well as the 
organs of whichever State was concerned, including their courts and legislature.543 However, 
even the ILA was unclear on this point, emphasising this would only be true “if it is accepted 
that national court decisions are relevant practice for the purpose of Article 31”544. And 
there are good reasons not to prefer such an approach. The first of these is that – as we have 
already noted – human rights treaties have a special character in international law, being 
created for the protection of individuals under the jurisdiction of the States Parties and not 
in order to create a contractual relationship between States. Or, to put it more bluntly, the 
purpose of a State ratifying a human rights treaty (in the ideal sense, setting aside 
realpolitik) is to ensure that the rights of individuals under its jurisdiction are protected – 
and this means, often, protecting the rights of those individuals from the very organs of the 
State which it is supposed are to influence the development of subsequent practice. It would 
be somewhat perverse to imagine that organs of State whose own practice directly affects 
the rights of individuals of that State should affect that very development. It would, aside 
from the troubling relocation of legal authority which it implies, in effect render the entire 
notion of the development of subsequent practice into a tautology: if the standard required 
all of the State Parties and all of their relevant constituent organs to agree with the 
interpretation given by the treaty body,  the doctrine of subsequent practice in the human 
rights context would surely lose all meaning – it would simply be another way of saying that 
a given right has achieved universal protection.   
A second reason is that it is not altogether clear from the VCLT rules themselves that 
domestic courts and tribunals and other organs of State are necessarily relevant actors. 
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Article 7 of the VCTL, which lists the categories of person with the authority “for expressing 
the consent of the State to be bound”, considers those to be either persons who 
“appropriate full powers”, or those for whom “it appears from the practice of the States 
concerned or from other circumstances that their intention was to consider that person as 
representing the State for such purposes and to dispense with full powers”.545 Georg Nolte 
expressed the view that this was “obviously too narrow when it comes to determining the 
range of state organs or other actors that are capable of contributing to relevant subsequent 
practice or agreement”546, yet he does not express a clear view on which state organs or 
other actors would be capable – only stating that the actors listed in the rules on State 
responsibility547 would be too broad.   
This problem, of the disconnect between the activities of the State at the 
international level and those of low-ranking domestic State organs, is one which has arisen 
at international tribunals, as in the UNESCO officials residing in France548 case. Here, the 
question arose in the context of contradictory declarations given by authorities competent 
to express the position of the French State, and those given by the French tax authorities: 
while UNESCO argued that the practice of a State consisted of the “acts, attitudes and 
conduct of all of its organs”549, France argued that “in relation to subsequent practice...only 
the positions of authorities competent to enter into commitments on behalf of the State 
should be taken into account”.550 The Tribunal gave a somewhat lengthy consideration of the 
issue, and while it decided that it was not the case that only the positions of authorities 
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competent to enter into commitments on behalf of the State should be taken into account, it 
came to the conclusion that “where there is a difference between the conduct of the 
administration and that of the authorities competent to express the position of a State, 
precedence should be given to the latter”551; it chose to give greater weight to the conduct 
of the authorities competent to speak for France than the internal organs of the French 
state.552 It seems, then, that there is some justification and precedent for understanding 
'agreement' in the context of subsequent practice in the interpretation of human rights 
treaties as, in general, meaning the agreement of authorities competent to express the 
position of the relevant State Party – which would include, presumably, the delegates to the 
treaty bodies. Acts of other organs, domestic courts and so on might be relevant, but they 
would not be considered conclusive where they conflicted with the stated views of those 
delegates. 
The second difference between the human rights treaty bodies and the WTO DS 
Panels and AB is that the “interpretive practice” in the human rights context tends not to be 
specific to single treaty provisions, but to encompass several. This is especially true in the 
human rights treaties which have a particular focus, most notably the CEDAW and CRC, 
where Articles tend to overlap. For instance, in the CEDAW, most of the substantive rights (to 
health, to education, etc.) are linked both conceptually and practically to other more general 
rights provided for in the Convention, particularly Articles 2 and 3. Indeed, it is somewhat 
difficult to imagine how, for instance, Article 12 of the Convention, providing for the 
elimination of discrimination in the giving of healthcare, cannot be read alongside, and in an 
interrelated manner with, Article 2, enshrining the protection from discrimination based on 
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sex, and likely also Article 3, which requires States Parties to take all appropriate measures 
to ensure the full development and advancement of women on a basis of equality with men. 
This means that the interpretations given by the treaty bodies are, by necessity, not 
always tightly or explicitly linked to a single Article or provision of the Convention, but given 
in a more holistic fashion, as for example the CEDAW Committee’s views given on violence 
against women in its General Recommendation No. 19553, in which States Parties are 
described as having various obligations to eliminate violence against women under Articles 
1, 2, 2(f), 3, 5, 6, 10 (c), 11, 12, 14, and 16 (5). Indeed, it is also not uncommon to find treaty 
bodies describing a State Party’s obligations “under the Convention”, or requiring a State 
Party to bring its laws “in line with the Convention” – something which is not imaginable in 
the WTO context. This also means that, interpretive practice and, hence, subsequent 
practice establishing the agreement of the parties, will not map directly on a practice-to-
provision basis to terms in the relevant treaty, but will have to be viewed in a similarly 
holistic and provision-spanning fashion to the manner in which the treaty itself operates in 
practice. While, as we shall see, this is not true of the interpretive practice with regard to 
every obligation of a State Party, it is true of many if not most. 
 These differences mean that a somewhat broader and more nuanced approach is 
required to the proposed 3 Step analysis if it is to apply with any relevance to the question 
of subsequent practice in the interpretation of human rights treaties. Most particularly, what 
is meant by commonality, concordancy, and consistency, and what is meant by “agreement”, 
must be viewed in a different manner to the way in which they operate in the context of the 
WTO’s DSP. This shall need to be borne in mind when we discuss in more detail how the 
requirements for each part of the 3 Step analysis function. 
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b) Applying the 3 Step Analysis in the State Reporting Procedures 
 
Our aim, restated, is to assess whether and to what extent the provisions of the major 
human rights treaties are interpreted to allow for differing levels and methods of 
implementation in light of the cultural characteristics of the State/society in question. We 
must now turn to the question of how subsequent practice can be used to indicate this 
within the context of the State reports procedures, and it is suggested that, despite the 
differences identified above, Feldman’s three-step analysis is an appropriate way of 
assessing this. 
 The first step in the analysis requires proving that the practice actually falls under 
Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT. Here, caution must be taken, as it is probably the case that not 
all of the documentation at all stages of the reports procedures do actually meet this 
requirement. In order for us to examine the issue carefully, we now need to explore in some 
depth what each of the different stages in the reports procedure represents in legal terms. 
The reports procedure is composed of a number of stages: the submission of the 
report; the drawing up of the list of issues and the State Party response; the Constructive 
Dialogue; and the Concluding Observations, as we have seen.  Of these, the State Report and 
the Concluding Observations must be seen as being potentially of authentically interpretive 
character. The relevant treaty body’s Concluding Observations must be considered to be its 
own authoritative interpretation of the given State Party’s obligations, as well as having their 
more obvious recommendatory function. By definition, they involve the treaty body offering 
interpretation of treaty articles which, binding or otherwise554, are nonetheless clearly 
intended to be interpretive in the VCLT sense. 
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The State Reports themselves are more complex, but must also be considered to be 
partially interpretive. On the one hand, we might consider the State Report to be, as near as 
is possible in the context, the State Party’s own auto-interpretation of its obligations. 
However, in actual fact, this generally takes place in light of the authoritative interpretations 
given by the relevant treaty body in previous sessions involving the State Party, unless the 
report is the initial one: a large part of any given report is supposed to be taken up by the 
State Party’s responses to issues raised by the relevant body at the last session. That is, the 
report describes what the State Party has done to implement its treaty obligations in the 
period in question, incorporating its own understanding but conducted in view of the 
interpretations given by the treaty body and filtered through its own interpretations; in any 
case, it is at least partially authentically interpretive. 
 However, it could be convincingly argued that the List of Issues, Response to List of 
Issues, and the Constructive Dialogue, are not in fact intended to be either authoritative or 
interpretive – analogously to the kind of guidelines which the AB reasoned in US – Gambling 
were not indicative of subsequent practice for the reason that they were not intended to be 
binding nor implying agreement.555 The List of Issues and the State Party response, and the 
Constructive Dialogue, are clearly not intended to have either a binding function or to imply 
agreement. The lists of issues vary in format slightly between the different committees, but 
in general they are used for clarification or to request more information, or to give States 
Parties an indication of the kinds of themes that will be addressed.556 The responses, 
similarly, provide information rather than imply agreement. Likewise, the constructive 
dialogue, by its very nature, could rather be said to imply disagreement, or at best 
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negotiation –it allows for further clarification, for elaboration, and, in some cases, for 
dispute. It certainly falls at the first hurdle of the three-step analysis inasmuch as it could 
constitute subsequent practice (although it will, of course, be relevant in terms of 
determining whether the State Party agrees with the interpretation of the treaty body, 
which is important for Step 3). 
 It seems more likely that the lists of issue, replies, and constructive dialogue might 
come under Article 32 of the VCLT, which lists supplementary means of interpretation, at 
least insofar as parts of them are illustrative or clarifying of how the State Party views its 
own obligations. This was, indeed, what the AB decided in US – Gambling with regard to the 
Scheduling Guidelines, with the approval of both the United States and Antigua.557 This 
allowed it, ultimately, to hold that the United States’ GATS schedule did include specific 
commitments on gambling, despite the absence of subsequent practice indicating that it 
was interpreted to be so.558  
 Thus, the requirement for Step 1 is that the practice is authentically interpretive, for 
which we have already described the crucial probative factor: that the practice is intended to 
be interpretive. The term “authentic” is used in the sense that it is a synonym for “genuine”, 
“duly executed”, or “reliable”559. In other words, when something is referred to as being 
“authentically interpretive”, we mean that it is a genuine and formal interpretation of a 
treaty provision made in a formal context, rather than a clarification, statement of opinion, 
or piece of argumentation. We described the implications of this in somewhat general terms 
in the analysis above: the list of issues and reply to the list of issues, and the constructive 
dialogue, in any given State Party’s reporting cycle, are not generally intended to be 
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interpretive; rather, only interpretive practice contained in Concluding 
Comments/Observations and General Comments/Recommendations can be viewed as such. 
 However, nor should we view everything contained in every Concluding Observation 
or General Recommendation as being authentically interpretive on this basis alone. 
Notwithstanding the fact that we must take a much broader and more holistic approach to 
the interpretation of human rights treaty terms, acknowledging the fact that by necessity 
those terms are often conceptually and practically intertwined with one another, it is also 
the case that some practice which seems on its face to be interpretive is in fact too 
unspecific and vague to be viewed as having the intentionality required to be an authentic 
interpretation. 
 For example, treaty bodies regularly make statements in their Concluding 
Observations which ought better to be viewed as being of exhortative, rather than 
interpretive, intent. For instance, when the Children’s Rights Committee recommends that 
the United Kingdom “Intensify its efforts to render appropriate assistance to parents and 
legal guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities”560 under Articles 5, 
18 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 9-11, 19-21, 25, 27 (paragraph 4), and 39 of the Convention; or 
when the CEDAW Committee recommends that India “be proactive and to take all necessary 
measures and initiatives to ensure that the rule of law is upheld and justice is delivered”561, 
it is difficult to view such comments as being interpretive of the State Party’s obligations 
except in the most aspirational and abstract sense: what “appropriate assistance” is, and 
what “necessary measures and initiatives” are, and how they are supposed to be 
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implemented, is left unclear and – consequently – open to further interpretation. 
(Presumably, following the standard VCLT approach, by moving onto examining 
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32, which in our case would mean the 
constructive dialogue, list of issues and response, and also the travaux préparatoires. Due to 
space constraints, these supplementary means of interpretation will not be examined in 
depth in these instances of “exhortative interpretation”, but there is clearly some potential 
for further research in that respect.) Moreover, as a consequence, the less concrete and 
focused an apparent instance of interpretation is, the less possible it is to discern the actual 
intent – and, hence, the less apparent intentionality becomes.   
 This means that there might be, effectively, a specificity bar for establishing 
authenticity: for interpretive practice to be authentically interpretive, it must have a certain 
degree of clarity and detail in order to establish both intentionality and genuine interpretive 
character. This does not mean, of course, that exhortative comments or recommendations in 
Concluding Observations are of no value or usefulness; it merely precludes them from being 
considered as satisfying Step 1 of our 3 Step test for establishing VCLT subsequent practice 
exists. 
The second and third steps in the three-step analysis are to assess how concordant, 
common and consistent the practice is, and whether it implies agreement on the part of the 
other parties. Here, the practice must clearly be assessed on a case-by-case basis. However, 
some general points can be made about how this can be done in the context of the state 
reporting procedure.  
The first point to address regarding Step 2 is that, if we accept this view of the role of 
the practice of the treaty bodies in the context of concluding observations  – i.e., that it can 
be potentially constitutive of subsequent practice – the requirements for establishing 
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whether it is concordant, common and consistent, are complex. This is because concluding 
observations are not universal to all of the States Parties, only applying to the State Party in 
question, and dealing with that State Party’s individual circumstances and specific 
obligations alone. Thus, we are faced with two different possibilities: in deciding on whether 
the practice is concordant, common and consistent, is it necessary to consider only whether 
the practice is concordant, common and consistent in relation to the specific State Party 
concerned, or in relation to all of the States Parties as a whole? For example, if a concluding 
observation offering an interpretation on how the obligation set forth in Article 11 of the 
CRC is to be implemented in Singapore is given in a common and consistent fashion over the 
course of the reporting history of that State, would it then be established to be constitutive 
of subsequent practice with regard to the interpretation of Singapore’s treaty obligation 
under that Article of the CRC? Or is it necessary to establish that concluding observations 
regarding that Article are read in a concordant, common and consistent pattern across all 
States Parties to the CRC in order for them to constitute subsequent practice across all States 
Parties? To put the matter in more simple terms: are the States Parties treated 
individualistically or as a collective when it comes to the question of how concordant, 
common and consistent the practice of the treaty bodies is? 
In EC – Chicken Cuts AB, it was considered that the practice of one State was probably 
not sufficient, even if it fulfilled the other requirements, to constitute subsequent practice; 
the practice of other WTO Members was not irrelevant despite the arguably ‘unique’ nature 
of the State and the practice in question.562 While the AB did not dismiss outright the notion 
that consistent practice concerning one or a small number of States could be constitutive of 
subsequent practice in the context of a large multilateral treaty, it did express the view that 
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this would be “difficult”.563 This would seem to indicate that the practice should be taken 
‘collectively’. Earlier jurisprudence cited by the AB from EC – Computer Equipment AB564 
would further support this: 
 
The purpose of treaty interpretation is to establish the common intention of the parties to the 
treaty.  To establish this intention, the prior practice of only one of the parties may be relevant, 
but it is clearly of more limited value than the practice of all parties.565 
 
This, the AB in EC – Computer Equipment had argued, was because the Schedule of a single 
party to GATT 1994 represented a common agreement among all members. Although the 
commitment was unique in the sense that each State Party had a different Schedule, there 
was a common interest on the part of all Members in each other’s commitments and hence, 
even while the practice of the Member in question would be of greatest import, the practice 
of the other Parties could not be considered irrelevant.566  
 The EC – Computer Equipment decision related to Article 32 of the VCLT and 
supplementary means of interpretation, but the same reasoning can be fruitfully applied to 
the issue of subsequent practice and Concluding Observations on State Reports. Here, while 
there is not as direct a relationship between the States Parties to international human rights 
treaties as there is between WTO Members, it remains the case that international human 
rights treaty obligations are owed by all States Parties to each other – they have a common 
interest, by definition. The jurisprudence of the WTO AB, then, would suggest that common, 
consistent and concordant interpretive practice in relation to the reporting history of one of 
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the States Parties to a human rights treaty would be of greatest import inasmuch as the 
interpretation of its own obligations was concerned, but that the practice relating to the 
other States Parties in the same area could not be ignored or discounted. We must also bear 
in mind, however, that, although the WTO AB overturned the Panel in EC – Chicken Cuts 
when it had ruled that the practice of one party could be constitutive of subsequent practice 
provided it was the only State concerned with the issue at hand, the ICJ did recognise the 
special importance of the practice of one individual State where the obligation was 
incumbent on that State alone in Legal Status of South-West Africa567, and hence we might 
view the interpretive practice of a treaty body with regard to one State Party alone as being 
constitutive of subsequent practice where the issue pertained to that State alone. 
 Strictly speaking, then, even if we accept the view espoused here that the 
interpretive practice of the treaty bodies can be formative of subsequent practice if the 
other preconditions are met, the interpretations must be applied as universally as possible 
across all States Parties: they are not bespoke for those States Parties individually. When a 
treaty body offers a view on what Singapore’s obligations are under Article 11 of the CRC, in 
other words, it is not creating interpretive practice regarding the meaning of Singapore’s 
obligations (despite the specificity of its comments) – it is creating interpretive practice 
regarding the meaning of Article 11 of the CRC in general. This must then fit into the 
requirements for commonality, concordancy and consistency, therefore, and have the 
implied agreement of all of the States Parties, in order for subsequent practice to be 
deemed to have developed.  
 Regarding the consistency, commonality and concordancy requirements themselves, 
Sinclair’s view was that a “discernible pattern” had to be present implying the agreement of 
                                                     
567
Supra note 398. 
 168 
 
the States Parties to a treaty, and that “isolated acts” were not sufficient.568 In Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages AB, as we have seen, the AB considered that one adopted report would 
not be enough to establish a pattern and hence the adoption of a Panel report was not 
indicative of party conduct to the extent that it could be constitutive of subsequent practice. 
This reasoning is difficult to argue with. It is undoubtedly the case, then, that one 
observation offered in a single Concluding Observation would not be sufficient to constitute 
subsequent practice. A discernible pattern would require repeated observations over a 
period of time, across a number of States Parties – though, of course, what is deemed a 
sufficient period of time will vary. It might be suggested that since the EC’s consistent 
classification practice during the years 1996 to 2000 was not considered insufficient for 
discerning a pattern by the AB in EC – Chicken Cuts (though ultimately it was discounted as 
constitutive of subsequent practice under the VCLT for other reasons), the period of time 
required is not particularly great. In the recent Costa Rica v Nicaragua569 ICJ decision, Judge 
Skotnikov implied that around 10 years of practice was sufficient to change the meaning of a 
term in a treaty.570 
Other requirements suggested by the common meaning of the terms also suggest 
themselves. “Commonality” suggests that the interpretive practice does not exist in isolation 
from that for other State Parties: the treaty body has rendered similar interpretations to 
other State Parties, or in the form of a General Recommendation. And “concordancy” 
suggests that, when interpretive practice exists in relation to another State Party on the 
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same element of the treaty, or in a General Recommendation, it is given in the same or 
similar fashion, set in context, and does not, for instance, imply a significantly different 
obligation for the one State Party from the other with all other things being equal. So, for 
instance, when the CEDAW Committee interprets Nigeria to have the obligation under the 
CEDAW to eliminate the practice of female genital mutilation, we should say that this 
interpretive practice is common, concordant and consistent if we can identify instances of 
interpretive practice on the subject of female genital mutilation regarding other States 
Parties (the practice is common), if we can establish that the interpretive practice for those 
other States Parties is that they have the obligation under the Convention to eliminate 
female genital mutilation, all other things being equal (the practice is concordant), and if we 
can establish that the interpretive practice regarding Nigeria and/or the other relevant 
States Parties is given in the same or similar fashion over a number of reporting cycles (the 
practice is consistent).  
 Give the holistic nature of human rights treaty interpretation, and given the fact that 
there is considerable overlap and inter-relation between provisions even in the same treaty, 
and given the fact, especially, that reporting cycles are not particularly frequent, it is 
arguable that these requirements of commonality, concordancy and consistency should 
perhaps be viewed as guidelines rather than absolutes, with some level of flexibility 
permitted. However, that flexibility should certainly not extend to viewing even a single 
instance of contradictory interpretive practice as permissible while retaining concordancy, 
for obvious reasons. 
The final point to consider, for Step 3, is the extent to which silence can imply 
agreement. As we have seen, the jurisprudence of the WTO DSP has fluctuated on this point, 
as in Chile – Price Band AB a mere failure to challenge Chile’s Price Band on the part of the 
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WTO Members was not deemed to be indicative of agreement, whereas in EC – Chicken Cuts 
the AB accepted that silence or lack of reaction could in fact imply acceptance. Here, the 
AB’s wording in EC – Chicken Cuts is especially instructive: 
 
[W]e have misgivings about deducing, without further inquiry, agreement with a practice from 
a party’s “lack of reaction”. We do not exclude that, in specific situations, the “lack of reaction” 
or silence by a particular treaty party may, in the light of attendant circumstances, be 
understood as acceptance of the practice of other treaty parties… [Such situations] may occur 
when a party that has not engaged in a practice has become or has been made aware of the 
practice of other parties (for example, by means of notification or by virtue of participation in a 
forum where it is discussed), but does not react to it.571 (Emphasis added.) 
 
 This, clearly, has relevance for the State Reporting procedures and Concluding 
Observations (and the other activities of the treaty bodies, such as General Comments). 
Concluding Observations are made public almost immediately after formal adoption in all 
instances with slight variations between the treaty bodies572, and are included in all the 
sessional/annual reports which appear in the respective body’s submission to the General 
Assembly; all the treaties also provide a mechanism whereby States Parties may submit 
comments on the Concluding Observations, which are also made public. This would imply 
that States Parties which are not engaged in a particular element of the practice (i.e. all of 
the States Parties except for the one whose Report is being examined) are all made aware of 
the practice of the other parties by the means suggested by the AB in EC – Chicken Cuts. This 
in turn would suggest that “lack of reaction” in the context of Concluding Observations 
would imply agreement – the third of Feldman’s three steps. The AB in EC - Chicken Cuts did, 
of course, express reluctance about assuming agreement on the basis of silence or a lack of 
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reaction, but it bears noting that the sources which the AB itself relied upon (primarily 
Anzilotti’s Corso di Diretto Internazionale573 and Cot’s Revue Generale de Droit International 
Public574) all stressed that, while it could not be held that silence or failure to express a view 
would directly indicate acceptance in all cases, nor would the converse be true: it would 
depend on the facts or circumstances of the case. Given that the facts of the interpretation 
of human rights treaty provisions are as they are described above (taking place in a special 
regime which has individuals rather than States as its subjects; being given primarily by an 
independent monitoring body rather than by the States Parties themselves; being given with 
the object and purpose of the treaty specifically in mind), it could convincingly be argued 
that the circumstances of most cases of interpretive practice in the human rights context are 
such that only overt rejection of interpretive practice would be enough for agreement not to 
be implied. 
 How much rejection would be necessary? The jurisprudence of the WTO dispute 
settlement procedure indicates that any instance of outright disagreement would prevent 
the crystallisation of subsequent practice under the VCLT, and this is in keeping with the 
general view that where any difference of opinion exists regarding interpretative practice, it 
“may not be relied upon as a supplementary means of interpretation”575 – it is “not 
necessary to show that each party has engaged in a practice, only that all have accepted it 
[emphasis added]”576.  
Unanimity was considered crucial by the International Law Commission when the 
Vienna Convention was drafted, and indeed the original text of Article 31(3)(b) spoke of 
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practice establishing “the understanding of all the parties [emphasis added]”; the omission 
of the word ‘all’ in the final version did not change that rule, but rather signified that the 
Commission considered the phrase “the understanding of the parties” to necessarily 
encompass the “parties as a whole” – it “omitted the word ‘all’ merely to avoid the possible 
misconception that every party must individually have engaged in the practice where it 
suffices that it should have accepted the practice.”577  
This means, at the very least, that any instance of disagreement on the part of one of the 
States Parties with a given interpretation by a treaty body would obviate the crystallisation 
of subsequent practice, as by definition the interpretation would not have the 
understanding or acceptance of all of the parties.  In the context of state reports 
procedures, implied agreement by silence should be so obvious as to be assumed in the case 
of States Parties’ views on the interpretive practice of the treaty bodies with regard to other 
States Parties. This is for the obvious reason that, although the possibility is open for States 
Parties to express their views on the Concluding Observations of treaty bodies regarding 
other States, in actual fact they never do so. (This, indeed, supports the notion that the 
‘regime practice’ for human rights treaty bodies is somewhat distinct.) This is, however, not 
true of General Comments, to which States Parties do occasionally express positive 
disagreement, usually in the Third Committee of the General Assembly. And it is, of course, 
not true of States Parties' reactions to the interpretive practice of the treaty bodies with 
regard to their own reports. Indeed, while we dispel the notion that statements made in the 
Lists of Issues provided by the treaty bodies, or in the constructive dialogue following 
submission of State Reports, can be ‘authentically interpretive’ under Step 1, they are the 
                                                     
577
 See EC – Chicken Cuts Panel, supra note 510, para. 7.521, quoting The Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission (1966) Vol. II, p. 222, para. 15. 
 173 
 
primary means by which we can discern agreement or disagreement with the interpretive 
practice of the treaty bodies on the part of delegates from State Parties. 
 This means that searching for disagreement is a difficult process that is beyond the 
capacity of this preliminary, illustrative study, because it would require a comprehensive and 
detailed survey of the reporting histories of all of the States Parties to the treaty in question 
to try to identify any examples of disagreement.  This means that, any conclusion that a 
given instance of interpretive practice meets the requirement for Step 3 in our analysis must 
be accompanied by the implied caveat: “Unless disagreement exists elsewhere”, which is to 
say, in the reporting history of other States Parties not studied in this analysis. 
 
iii) The Three-Step Analysis as a Framework for Investigating Subsequent Practice in the 
International Human Rights Context 
  
We have, then, the rudiments of a structure in which to address our question, through 
examination of the State Reports and Concluding Observations of the UN treaty bodies. The 
structure is based on Feldman’s three-step analysis, and requires us to confirm all of the 
following if we are to be satisfied that there is subsequent practice establishing the 
agreement of the parties on cultural factors affecting implementation: 
 
 That the given practice falls under Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT and is what we shall 
call ‘authentically interpretive’. The general assumption is that practice contained in 
the State Report and Concluding Observations will do so, although that instantiated 
in the list of issues, reply to list of issues, and constructive dialogue, will not. The 
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latter may, however, form part of the supplementary means of interpretation 
provided for in Article 32 of the VCLT. 
 That any part of the State Report and the Concluding Observations which gives an 
indication as to whether there is agreement that a cultural or societal factor has a 
role in how a treaty obligation is implemented or internalized, has to be 
demonstrated to be commonly, consistently, and concordantly interpreted in such a 
fashion in order for it to be constitutive of subsequent practice. 
 That, in general, silence on the part of other State Parties regarding such an 
interpretation is sufficient to imply agreement, and therefore active rejection must 
be present in order for it to be discounted as constitutive of subsequent practice. 
Active rejection is most likely to be found either in the State Reports themselves and 
particularly the summary records of the constructive dialogue.  
 
We must now briefly turn to the question of the consequence of rejection. If no 
subsequent practice can be argued to have been established – that is, if there is no 
agreement between the Parties - what is the result in terms of the law? 
 We have already suggested that Article 32 of the VCLT also has some relevance here, 
by noting that materials which do not otherwise fall under Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT may 
nevertheless be considered under Article 32. This was deemed to be the case in US – 
Gambling AB, in which, it will be recalled, the AB, after disagreeing with the Panel’s 
reasoning that the GATS 2001 Scheduling Guidelines constituted subsequent practice, 
decided that it was necessary to turn to the issue of supplementary means of interpretation 
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under Article 32 of the VCLT.578 This, indeed, ultimately led to it adopting the same 
conclusion as the Panel – albeit for different reasons. The way the AB used Article 32 of the 
VCLT is instructive, and bears analysing in some greater detail. 
 Supplementary means of interpretation arose in US – Gambling because the AB did 
not believe that merely examining the text, context, and object and purpose of subsector 
10.D of the United States’ Schedule was sufficient for it to establish whether “Sporting and 
other recreational services” included gambling, and the Scheduling Guidelines and the 
W/120 Services Sectoral Classification List were not (for reasons already set out) constitutive 
of subsequent practice. Given the lack of clarity as to the scope of the United States’ 
commitment on these bases, the AB thus decided that it was appropriate to consider 
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the VCLT – which included, in its 
view, W/120 and the Scheduling Guidelines.579 
 In the W/120, the entry for subsector 10.D, “Sporting and other recreational 
services”, corresponded to the Central Product Classification group number 964. (The CPC 
classification scheme was created by the United Nations Statistical Commission as an 
international standard, and is used in the international trade context for clarification and 
guidance.) CPC group number 964 is further broken down into two classes – Sporting 
services, and Other recreational services – the latter of which includes subclass 96492, 
which reads “Gambling and betting services”. This, it was taken by the AB, meant that the 
W/120 entry for subsector 10.D, “Sporting and recreational services”, which mapped directly 
to CPC group number 964, included gambling and betting services. 
While the United States did not use CPC codes in its Schedule, the 1993 Scheduling 
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Guidelines makes it clear that parties not using the CPC should give their own subsectoral 
classifications and definitions in a detailed fashion to avoid ambiguity580, and the United 
States had not done this, and moreover had appeared to seek to comply with the Scheduling 
Guidelines during the drafting of its GATS Schedule, stating that except where it was 
specifically noted otherwise, its sectoral commitments corresponded to those in the 
Secretariat’s Sectoral Classification List (W/120).581 Moreover, the wording it had used 
exactly reproduced those of the W/120 in all other respects.582 Taken together, this meant 
that the commitment made by the United States in subsector 10.D of its Schedule had to be 
read as corresponding to subsector 10.D of W/120 – which, in turn, corresponded to Class 
964 of the CPC, and, as a consequence, meant that it included gambling and betting services 
as a subclass.583 
 Thus, while these documents and materials did not constitute subsequent practice as 
the Panel had reasoned – due to the fact that they were explicitly not intended to be binding 
– they did constitute supplementary materials that could be used to establish the precise 
nature of the United States’ obligations. Ultimately, a “proper interpretation according to the 
principles codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention” lead to the same result 
that the Panel had reached.584 
 The use of supplementary means of interpretation is only to be used either to 
confirm an interpretation based on the Article 31 rules, or where the Article 31 rules do not 
provide a clear answer – and the AB strictly applied this standard in Chile – Price Band, when 
it decided that the Panel had erred in applying VCLT Article 32; here, a clear interpretation of 
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various terms (“variable import levies”, “ordinary customs duty” and “minimum import 
prices”) could be arrived at simply by discussing them in terms of their ordinary meaning, 
their context, and the object and purpose.585 But clearly, supplementary means of 
interpretation can be used in a wide variety of circumstances – not merely the preparatory 
works and the circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion – and can include documents and 
materials which are not intended to offer binding interpretations but are merely indicative. 
This would suggest that Lists of Issues and Replies, and statements made during the 
Constructive Dialogue in particular, could in certain circumstances be used to clarify the 
meaning of unclear treaty terms. This would allow us to incorporate such materials and 
documents in our analysis where the meaning of the text is not clear and where there is not 
enough concordant, common and consistent practice implying agreement to be constitutive 
of subsequent practice. This, clearly, is an area for further productive research and analysis. 
 
iv) 3 Step Flowchart 
 
This analysis of the WTO and ICJ case law on subsequent practice allows us to generate a 
framework or checklist for assessing the work of the UN treaty bodies. This would take the 
following form: 
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An interpretation of a treaty term is offered, to the effect that prevailing 
cultural or societal conditions either affect how that term is implemented, or 
do not.  
Is it an ‘authentic’ interpretation? 
Yes No 
Is it given commonly, 
concordantly, and consistently? 
Yes 
No 
Do the States Parties agree? 
Yes 
No 
There is subsequent practice establishing the 
agreement of the parties regarding that 
interpretation. 
May still be relevant as a supplementary 
means of interpretation. 
No 
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B. Procedural and Practical Considerations 
 
Before commencing with the substantive analysis in the next Chapter, there are now some 
further considerations to be made regarding its focus – which States Parties’ reports to 
consider? Under what treaties? And what kind of conclusions might this kind of analysis 
allow us to make? 
 
i) Which States? 
 
It is not possible, for reasons of space, to analyse the entirety of the reporting history of all 
States Parties to all the major human rights treaties. This means that it is important to 
identify a group of States which to be the focus for our analysis. The task here is to identify a 
sufficient number of States to be able to generalise, while avoiding identifying so many that 
there becomes too little space to discuss their reporting history in enough depth. The States 
should be those for whom cultural barriers have been cited most frequently as a factor 
affecting internalization or implementation of human rights norms. 
These States are Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The reasons for focusing on 
these three States should be relatively obvious – the most important being that these States 
are most closely associated with the East Asian Challenge which gave rise to this discourse in 
the first place. Singapore and Malaysia are politically and socially different in many respects, 
but they have expressed a similar sceptical approach to international human rights law 
(Singaporean politicians have been described as being “allergic” to human rights586 while 
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Malaysia has “continuously derogated” human rights since independence587) makes them 
natural fits for an analysis like this, which concerns itself primarily with international legal 
issues. Indonesia, meanwhile, has a long history of engagement with all of the major human 
rights treaties, but also is the largest Islamic State in the world by population; this allows us 
to address religious aspects of cultural relativism and human rights interpretation and 
implementation. 
 Focusing on these States seems appropriate for this very reason. Nevertheless, it may 
be questioned whether or not Middle Eastern or African States, which are sometimes the 
locus for cultural relativist arguments588, might also be important and relevant subjects of 
analysis. Certainly, taking a cursory view of many Middle Eastern and African Islamic States’ 
relationships with the major human rights treaties, we can see instances where reservations 
would indicate this to perhaps be the case, as for instance Pakistan and Djibouti’s initial 
reservations to the CRC, which held that “[p]rovisions of the Convention shall be interpreted 
in the light of the principles of Islamic laws and values” and “[the Government of Djibouti] 
shall not consider itself bound by any provisions or Articles that are incompatible with its 
religion and its traditional values”589, respectively (although these reservations were 
withdrawn by the governments concerned in 1997 and 2009). 
 There are three reasons for preferring a focus on East Asia rather than on Middle 
Eastern or African States. First, the fact remains that, for good or ill, it is the East Asian 
States, particularly Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which have attracted by far the most 
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scholarly and political attention when it comes to cultural relativist debates – largely 
because of the manner in which politicians from those countries have conducted themselves 
in public forums and because of the nature of their rhetoric, but also because, taken 
together, their political and economic significance in the world requires that the views of 
their representatives are treated extremely seriously. Without being side-tracked into 
political scientific analyses of international relations, of all the regions of the world outside 
of what is traditionally thought of as “the West”, it is these States which can most credibly 
stake a claim to a successful alternative paradigm of societal development, given their 
relative recent economic success. 
 Secondly, representatives, politicians, thinkers and scholars from these East Asian 
States have (increasingly) demonstrated a level of confidence in advancing self-consciously 
“non-Western”, anti-universalist positions. (One thinks in particular of Kishore Mahbubani’s 
The New Asian Hemisphere590.) Thus, it seems, the issues surrounding the ‘East Asian 
Challenge’ seem only likely to grow more acute and pertinent. The level of sureness and 
eloquence exhibited by government spokesmen, thinkers, and scholars, and the apparent 
genuine developmental success behind them, means that they require close and dedicated 
examination in their own right. 
 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly for our purposes, to a certain extent it seems 
likely that some generalisations can be made from the conclusions drawn from any close 
analysis of East Asian States’ interactions with the relevant treaty bodies, potentially 
allowing information gleaned from this analysis to be illustrative of general principles that 
would apply in regard to African, Middle Eastern, or indeed European or North American 
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States Parties. For instance, the relationship between Islam and human rights is crucial in 
any kind of analysis of the interpretations offered in regard to Middle Eastern States. Yet, to 
a certain extent, any examination of the way Malaysia and Indonesia have approached the 
reporting procedures under the human rights treaty bodies could be expected to raise 
similar questions in that regard, as both are predominantly Islamic societies with politicians 
who have at least partially embraced public religion as an element of the political structure 
of the State591. While it would be reductionist and naïve to claim that Islam’s role in public 
life is exactly the same throughout the Islamic world, it certainly seems that, at least as far as 
human rights treaty monitoring is concerned, the role and position of “Islamic values” can in 
some regard be generalised about from examining subsequent practice with respect to 
Malaysia and Indonesia. The same is surely true of many of the other issues raised in an 
examination focusing on East Asian States. 
  
ii) Which Treaty? 
 
Naturally, the documentation we can examine is restricted to that under the treaties which 
our States are party to. There are only two major treaties which Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia have all ratified: the CEDAW and the CRC. Due to space constraints, it is only 
possible to select one of these treaties as the context for our analysis.  For a number of 
reasons, the CEDAW has been selected, but in actual fact the interactions between 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia and the Committee on the Rights of the Child would also 
be a suitable focus, given that both treaties naturally cover areas in which one would expect 
societal norms and values to be of great importance. 
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 The CEDAW is partly preferred for the simple reasons that there is a greater volume 
of documentation to examine than under the CRC. Singapore has only partaken in two 
reporting cycles for the CRC as opposed to four for the CEDAW; Indonesia has partaken in 
four for both treaties; and Malaysia one for each. This means that there is slightly more 
material to examine and remark upon for CEDAW given our geographical focus. It is also 
preferred because, especially in the case of Indonesia, what we might call Islamic cultural 
values play a greater role in the arena of women's rights than in those of the child, affecting 
the laws on marriage, on work, on health, on violence against women, and discrimination in 
general to a much more significant degree than they do for the rights of the child. Thus, on 
balance, the CEDAW is the treaty under whose reporting procedures we prefer to examine 
the development of subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties regarding 
interpretation.  
 Does this focusing on the reporting histories of only three States Parties to the 
CEDAW pose a problem for our approach, given that, as we know, subsequent practice does 
not develop in relation to one State Party but broadly across all the States Parties? It will not 
have escaped the reader’s notice that there is something somewhat artificial about 
examining the reporting histories of three parties to the treaty to identify instances of 
interpretive practice in our area of interest and extrapolating upwards from those instances 
to attempt to identify commonality, concordancy and consistency and agreement: it is, 
indeed, something of a fiction. That is to say, the CEDAW Committee creates interpretive 
practice in all of its Concluding Observations to all States Parties. Strictly speaking, the 
correct way to conceptualising the process is that the Committee creates interpretive 
practice vis-à-vis all States Parties, which, if common, concordant and consistent, and agreed 
with, constitutes subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties on 
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interpretation. However, as we have established, since such an extensive survey is not 
possible in the current analysis, the fiction created by merely focusing on Singapore, 
Malaysia and Indonesia is a necessary one; while the impression is given that only the 
interpretive practice in relation to those States is authentic, in truth it is entirely a matter of 
perspective. We could equally focus on any three given States Parties to the Convention and 
conduct an exactly similar analysis. 
 
C. What the results allow 
 
Finally, we must address what the results of our survey will allow us to conclude. How clear 
and convincing can they be? There are a number of obstacles present which will prevent us 
from making absolute and definitive conclusions. 
 The first of these is the problem of the small sample size. Step 2 and 3 in the three-
step analysis, it will be recalled, require the practice concerned to be common, concordant 
and consistent and to have the agreement of all State Parties in order for it to be constitutive 
of subsequent practice. To properly assess whether this is the case, it is necessary for the 
entire practice to be surveyed – i.e., in the treaty body context, a given interpretation of an 
obligation must be demonstrated to be common, concordant and consistent across all States 
Parties to the relevant treaty, and no instances of outright disagreement must be present. 
Since this analysis only examines the reporting history of a small number of States under the 
CEDAW this is, therefore, impossible to assess comprehensively and conclusively. 
 Generally speaking, of course, the monitoring practice of a given treaty body is 
relatively uniform. It would be unusual, not to mention self-defeating, if contradictory 
recommendations were made to different States Parties regarding the same treaty Articles 
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by the same treaty body. Nevertheless, this should not mean that commonality and 
concordancy are assumed. Even if common, concordant and consistent practice can be 
identified with regard to all of the States Parties which this study focuses on, that is, it 
cannot be presumed that the practice is common, concordant and consistent with regard to 
all States Parties to the CEDAW. Some effort is made to survey the entirety of the Concluding 
Observations of the CEDAW Committee across all States Parties to attempt to determine 
commonality and concordancy, but a detailed analysis is not possible given space 
constraints. This is doubly true of agreement: a detailed analysis of the responses to lists of 
issues, summary records to constructive dialogue, and State Reports for all of the parties to 
the CEDAW to determine agreement or disagreement is not possible at this stage. This 
means that any conclusions about monitoring practice being constitutive of subsequent 
practice can only be tentative at this point: it may be the case that there is disagreement on 
the part of States Parties which it is not possible for us to identify at this stage, and hence it 
may be the case that our conclusions could in fact be obviated by a detailed analysis of State 
Party responses elsewhere.  
 The second issue is that the treaty bodies are not unified and take slightly different 
approaches and have different compositions – most notably this is true in the ICESCR 
context592, but there is variation across all the treaties. It is particularly notable that, for 
instance, almost all the members of the HRC have a legal background, whereas on CEDAW it 
is only around half593. It may be the case, then, that a situation arises in which it appears 
that our core question is answered differently depending on the treaty concerned. It might 
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be that, for the sake of argument, CEDAW is more admitting of cultural and societal factors 
affecting implementation than the HRC. It is important to be aware of this possibility and 
note that any tentative conclusions could be fragmentary across the different treaties. 
 This means that what follows is best seen as having a twofold value. In the first place 
the thesis establishes a framework in which to analyse cultural relativism from a legal 
perspective, by describing how to identify subsequent practice in the human rights 
monitoring context which establishes the agreement of the parties on how treaty provisions 
are interpreted so as to permit cultural values to affect implementation. After this, the thesis 
provides examples of how this framework can be used, and provides indicatory answers, in 
the form of the case studies which follow. The small sample size and information-gathering 
difficulties make it impossible to provide definitive conclusions, but nonetheless, they will 
serve to point towards those conclusions, and set up an analytical structure in which to find 
them. This analytical structure is one which can then be transferred to other broader 
contexts, examining other of the major human rights treaties and encompassing a more 
thorough and detailed survey of the interpretive practice with regard to all States Parties to 
those treaties.  
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V. Subsequent Practice in the Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties: An Analytical 
Framework 
 
We shall now move on to our illustrative analysis, as described in the preceding chapter. It 
will be recalled that our aim is primarily to illustrate how an approach to the cultural 
relativist question through examining subsequent practice would work in practice, and 
demonstrate how it can be used to provide a framework in which to answer some of the 
questions raised by the East Asian Challenge in particular. The aim, that is, is somewhat 
more modest than resolving once and for all the question of how societal or national cultural 
mores and traditions are permitted to affect the manner in which human rights treaty 
provisions are interpreted; rather, the aim is to provide a method for tackling the manner in 
which such questions might be resolved in future. 
 The procedure will involve analysing three selected case studies, which are, 
respectively, the reporting histories of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, under the 
Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
 The case studies will proceed as follows. First, the reporting histories of Singapore, 
Malaysia and Indonesia are surveyed. This involves making some general remarks about the 
reporting histories of those States under the CEDAW, establishing their general character 
and the core issues to be discussed. This is followed by an overview of their reporting 
histories, surveying primarily the Concluding Comments and State Reports – as the 
documents containing authentic interpretive practice – but also including, where necessary, 
the summary records of the constructive dialogue and the lists of issues and responses in 
order to discern agreement. The aim is not to catalogue the entirety of each Report and set 
of Concluding Comments, but to identify areas in which it might either explicitly or implicitly 
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be argued that socio-cultural factors ought to, or ought not to, affect how provisions of the 
Convention are implemented. The aim is not, of course, to attempt to identify socio-cultural 
issues in sophisticated terms from a sociological perspective: a layman’s approach, taking 
into consideration what the treaty bodies and States Parties seem to view as relevant, as 
well as the broader discourse surrounding Asian values, will suffice for the purpose of this 
illustrative analysis. That is, although it has been clearly established, in Chapter I of the 
thesis, that “Asian values” is a contested term, without consensus surrounding its meaning, 
it is not our aim to discover that meaning through an examination of the reports, nor to 
problematize the manner in which it is used either by the CEDAW Committee or the States 
Parties. Our aim, rather, is to attempt to understand how far anything that might be 
construed as an Asian value could be used as a justification for the manner and extent to 
which a treaty provision is implemented. This means we shall take as naïve and broad a view 
of Asian values as possible, including all of those factors mentioned in our précis of the 
literature provided in the first Chapter of the thesis. Then, once this overview has been 
completed, an examination of it is conducted in order to establish which instances of 
interpretive practice satisfy the Step 1 requirement for being authentically interpretive, and 
then to discuss what would be needed for them to meet the Step 2 and 3 requirements.  
 The discussion of the Step 2 and 3 requirements is necessarily limited, for reasons 
which have already been explained. However, to the extent possible, once authentic 
interpretive practice satisfying the Step 1 requirement has been identified, an attempt is 
made to establish whether it is given commonly, concordantly and consistently by reviewing 
the Concluding Observations given to the reports of other States Parties. And since there is 
also a great deal of interplay between General Recommendations and Concluding 
Observations when it comes to the issue of commonality, concordancy and consistency (that 
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is, if it transpires that the Committee gives a Concluding Observation that offers a different 
interpretation to that given in one of its General Recommendations, this would clearly 
prevent the interpretive practice meeting the Step 2 requirement – and vice versa), by 
necessity, General Recommendations will comprise part of this analysis. 
We are thereby able to make some tentative remarks in each instance about whether the 
authentic interpretations identified satisfy the standards set out within the WTO 
jurisprudence and by Sir Ian Sinclair. However, because of the nature of assessing fulfilment 
of the Step 3 requirement, this is not attempted except insofar as disagreement can be 
identified within the responses of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia alone.  
  Finally, after completion of the survey of the reporting histories of our three 
subject States, we shall make some remarks about various issues that arise from our 
illustrative analysis and that are tangential to it. 
 At this stage, it must also be reiterated that, irrespective of the results of this 
analysis, its purpose is not to evaluate the effectiveness or otherwise of the reporting 
procedure to treaty bodies in general, nor the CEDAW Committee in particular. The 
effectiveness of the reporting procedure in achieving greater compliance with human rights 
treaties and improving the lot of the citizens of States is an issue entirely separate to the 
legal question of to what extent treaty provisions are interpreted to permit implementation 
that is sensitive to Asian values or national/societal values and traditions. 
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A. Singapore 
 
i) General Remarks 
 
At face value, the reader will perhaps be surprised at the Singaporean Government’s relative 
lack of reference to Asian values, Confucianism, and other cruxes of its stance expressed 
towards human rights in United Nations political forums; quite unexpectedly, in large part 
cultural particularism is apparently absent from Singapore’s reports to the CEDAW. Indeed, 
at various stages the government presents itself as being largely in favour of the removal of 
prevailing cultural or societal mores which might impact negatively on women’s rights. In its 
Initial Report, for instance, it makes the statement that: 
 
The low representation of women in politics [and other male dominated occupations] is due 
mainly to stereotyped attitudes, cultural practices and values among woman members rather 
than to discriminatory laws or the lack of opportunities. Singapore recognises the existence of 
such long-standing societal attitudes and cultural practices which pose obstacles to a more 
active and higher participation rate of women in some fields. Singapore is seeking an 
improvement in the situation through long-term public education and awareness 
programmes.594 
 
And where the Government makes particularist arguments they tend to be based on 
economic, rather than cultural, circumstances. For instance, in its Third Periodic Report the 
government describes a number of economic challenges facing the country which might 
impact on its implementation of the Convention: 
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The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 plunged Southeast Asia, including Singapore, into an 
economic recession in 1998. Although growth resumed in 1999-2000, Singapore was hit by 
another recession in 2001. The synchronised downturns in the major developed economies as 
well as the global electronics industry led to a sharp deceleration in global growth. 
 
The economic malaise was further aggravated by the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 
September 2001 and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis... 
 
Further, globalisation and rapid technological advances are driving fundamental, long-term 
changes in commerce, industry and our daily lives...In the short term, the entry of Chine and 
India into the market will mean dislocation in many countries, as industries restructure and 
relocate, and trade patterns change. Some workers will lose their jobs, while other industries 
will need workers, but those with different skills... 
 
This restructuring is a major reason why Singapore is experiencing higher retrenchments and 
unemployment. The average unemployment rate has been rising steadily from 3.1% in 2000 to 
4.7% in 2003. 
 
Set against this economic backdrop, Singapore has to take decisive steps to strengthen itself in 
order to stay competitive and save jobs.595 
 
Nonetheless, there are some indications of an attempt to justify certain interpretations or 
implementations of the Convention through reference to cultural values – both explicit and 
implicit. Probably the most prominent example is the repeated assertion that Singaporean 
government and society place special importance on the family – which, it will be 
remembered, is one of the core Asian values.596 This is a running theme throughout 
Singapore’s reports. Thus, in its Initial Report: 
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As a pro-family society, Singapore attaches great importance to the institution of the family. 
Many policies in Singapore are designed specifically with the family in mind and these policies 
do affect and benefit women.597 
 
And: 
 
The Singapore government makes known its adherence to traditional Asian values, especially 
with regard to the importance of the family.598 
 
And: 
 
The [school] curriculum is a means to disseminate values cherished by society. These include 
values which can strengthen the family and promote the importance of sharing of roles and 
responsibilities by both male and female members of the family. The Civics and Moral 
Education syllabus includes components on the Family where issues such as Family Harmony 
and Communication, Roles in the Family and Responsible Parenthood are discussed. Students 
are taught moral concepts such as family unity, love, respect and care for elders, 
communicating and co-operating with family members, sharing household responsibilities and 
upholding the sanctity of marriage and the importance of parenthood.599 
 
Large sections of the Second Periodic Report are devoted to detailing pro-family measures 
the Singapore government has taken600, while in the Fourth Report further statement were 
made re-affirming Singapore’s commitment to strong family units: 
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Singapore subscribes to the philosophy that the family undergirds society and that closely knit 
and supportive families make for a cohesive nation. Therefore, many policies in Singapore are 
designed to promote the healthy development of families.601 
 
At the same time, the government expressed concern that the family’s important in 
Singaporean society might be being eroded: 
 
In general, Singaporeans continue to possess pro-family attitudes and values...However, there 
are a few emerging trends which are cause for some concern. The first is that more 
Singaporeans are choosing to remain single, and for those who marry, are doing so at a later 
age. Married couples are also delaying parenting.602 
 
 This concern about singlehood and divorce is an indication of how strongly the 
government views the importance of the family in Singaporean society. 
 This importance mostly manifests itself as a driver of policy and, more generally, a 
kind of philosophical underpinning to Singapore's implementation of the CEDAW rather than 
a factor presented as explicitly and directly affecting how and to what extent that 
implementation is carried out. Thus, for example, in its Fourth Report the government 
highlights its “many policies and programmes aimed at supporting family formation and 
development”603 under its section on its implementation of Article 16, such as: 
 
 Government agencies which provide dating and matchmaking services604 
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 Social Development Officers who “facilitate social interaction opportunities 
for singles at various touch-points, such as at government agencies, 
community organisations, and private firms”605 
 Financial support for parents, including through tax rebates, “child relief”, 
“baby bonuses”, and so on606 
 Incentives to marry, such as paid maternity leave for single mothers who 
marry the father of their child607 
 
 There are, however, two exceptions which shall be discussed in more detail below, 
regarding the status of the husband as the head of the household, and regarding marital 
immunity for rape. 
 As well as this focus on the family, with its standing as one of the pillars of 
Singapore’s interpretation of Asian values, the government also explicitly separates Islamic 
personal law as a distinct category where provisions of the CEDAW either do not apply or 
must be implemented differently than for the non-Islamic populace. While this is partially 
justified simply by dint of respect for Islamic cultural values, and thus in part appears to be 
an area which comes under the rubric of minority rights, it is also presented as being for the 
protection of a purportedly unique aspect of Singaporean society in general – its cultural 
pluralism – and hence part of the fabric of the national character. For instance, Article 12(3) 
(requirement for all persons to be equal before the law and free from discrimination does 
not invalidate personal law or restrictions relating to religion) and Article 152 (responsibility 
of the Government to protect interests of minority groups) of the Constitution of Singapore, 
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“require the respect of the freedom of minorities in the practice of their personal and 
religious laws [and] are necessary to maintain the delicate balance in a multi-cultural 
society”608; this can be contextualised in a tradition of Singaporean discourse which presents 
the country's ethnic and religious harmony as being somewhat precarious and in need of 
protection.609 
 Unlike the rhetoric surrounding the importance of the family unit, which is largely 
presented as a perspective on the CEDAW's implementation without any direct intimation 
that it is in any way incompatible with it, Islamic personal law is specifically delineated as an 
exception to CEDAW's application, or, at best, an area in which it is to implemented in a 
manner differently than in other areas of Singaporean law. At the time of ratification the 
government entered a reservation to Articles 2 and 16 to the effect that: 
 
In the context of Singapore's multiracial and multi-religious society and the need to respect 
the freedom of minorities to practice their religious and personal laws, the Republic of 
Singapore reserves the right not to apply the provisions of articles 2, paragraphs (a) to (f), and 
article 16, paragraphs 1(a), 1(c), 1(h), and article 16, paragraph 2, where compliance with 
these provisions would be contrary to their religious or personal laws. 
 
This, effectively, refers only to Islamic personal law, as is explained by the elaboration on the 
reservation provided by the government in Singapore's Initial Report: 
 
Article 2 and 16 require States Parties to take all appropriate means including legislation to 
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that constitute 
discrimination against women. Whilst Singapore has to large extent [sic] complied with this, 
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Article 12(3) and Article 152 of our Constitution require the respect of the freedom of 
minorities in the practice of their personal and religious laws. These provisions under our 
Constitution are necessary to maintain the delicate balance in a multi-cultural society. There 
are provisions under our Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) which may not be 
consistent with the CEDAW, for example, the right given to a Muslim man to marry up to 4 
wives and not vice versa. We consider it necessary to maintain our reservations to Article 2 
and 16 of the CEDAW in view of the need to respect the right of Muslim citizens to practice 
their personal and religious laws.610 
 
Of course, a distinction must be drawn between the issues to do with minority rights and 
personal law regimes which these reservations raise, and the like of which are common 
throughout the world - and on which there is a wealth of academic commentary - and the 
appeals to national or supra-national 'Asian' culture which are the focus of this thesis. Much 
was said on this point at an earlier stage in our analysis, but it is important to reiterate the 
point that, while there is some conceptual overlap between cultural particularism at the 
minority level and at the national or supra-national level, they are notionally distinct at least 
as far as this thesis is concerned, and thus our search for authentic interpretative practice 
regarding the role of culture in implementation will not analyse these exceptions for Islamic 
personal law or minority rights.    
 
 ii) Authentic Interpretations 
 
As has been established, subsequent practice in the context of human rights treaty 
interpretation is likely to be found primarily in the interpretive practice of the treaty bodies, 
combined with the States Reports procedures; thus, this study begins with an overview of 
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the reports made by Singapore and the Concluding Observations given by the CEDAW 
Committee in order to attempt to identify whether such interpretive practice exists and 
whether it satisfies our three-step analysis. This shall proceed by outlining and detailing the 
key themes from Singapore’s Initial and Second, Third, and Fourth Reports and the 
Concluding Observations on them, preceded by an examination aimed at identifying 
subsequent practice. 
 
Initial and Second Reports 
 
Singapore's Initial Report was submitted on January 18th, 2000, and its Second Report was 
submitted shortly afterwards, on May 3rd, 2001, so both Reports were considered together 
by the Committee.611 
 There was a considerable level of discourse in the first reporting cycle, and which 
would be a continual theme in Singapore's reporting history, surrounding what the 
Committee identified as the “major stumbling block” to progress towards equality for 
women in Singapore – namely, “Singapore’s adherence to what it had defined as Asian 
values, in particular the importance of the family unit and the notion of the man as head of 
household and primary provider.”612 On a number of occasions throughout the session this 
point was raised by various members of the Committee. Singapore was urged variously to 
“move towards genuine partnership and equality and do away with traditional and cultural 
stereotypes”613 and to “completely abandon the notion of the woman bearing the primary 
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responsibility within the family for raising children and performing household tasks”614 
(which, presumably, was deemed to be implied by the government’s emphasis on the man 
as the head of household and breadwinner); ratification of the CEDAW, it was argued, 
“implied a willingness to remove traditional and cultural barriers, such as the patriarchal 
concept of family and society”615 – which was signified by the government’s insistence on 
maintaining the traditional position of the father in the family. “Since traditional values 
discriminated against women,” another Committee member stated, “it was disquieting to 
note the absence of any efforts to counter the impact of traditional values and ensure a 
genuine sharing of duties. The stereotype of the woman as homemaker was reaffirmed 
throughout the report.”616 
 More specific comments than these rather generalised observations were also made. 
Singapore’s parental leave legislation was said to be geared only towards women (for 
instance, the government would pay up to eight weeks’ salary for maternity leave for the 
first three children a woman had617, but would only permit three days’ paid leave for 
married male civil servants618), which “upheld the breadwinner concept”619. The 
Chairperson, meanwhile, expressed concern about Singapore’s tax regime, which provided 
that wives would only be assessed separately from husbands for tax purposes if they opted 
to do so, otherwise deeming a married woman’s income to be that of her husband, which 
might mean that women had no legal capacity620. These remarks on the traditional view of 
the male as head of the household are, to a large extent, remarks which could be made 
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about any number of States that are party to the Convention and where stereotyped views 
of the family remain the dominant paradigm, but in Singapore’s case it is significant that 
those stereotyped views are justified by the State as part of its cultural, and indeed, legal 
framework. 
 For its part, Singapore expanded on the philosophical underpinnings to its views on 
the family and Singaporean culture later on in the 25th meeting: 
 
Various Committee members had expressed concern that Singapore’s emphasis on the family 
might reinforce gender stereotyping in the workplace and at home. However, the concept of 
family in Singaporean society was an all-inclusive one: everyone belonged to an extended 
family. Strong families were vital to the well-being of both men and women and 
responsibilities should be shared in all areas of family life. Moreover, Singapore was not a 
Chinese city. It was a multiracial, multicultural and multireligious country whose shared 
national values were: nation before community and society before self; the family as the basic 
unit of society; community support and respect for the individual; consensus, not conflict; and 
racial and religious harmony. Its five gender-neutral family values were love, care and concern; 
mutual respect; commitment; filial responsibility; and communication.621 
 
This seems to suggest that, rather than strictly adhering to traditional views of the male as 
head of household, Singapore took a more nuanced and considered approach to the issue. It 
is notable, after all, that it entered no reservations to the CEDAW regarding Articles 5 
(requiring States parties to modify the social and cultural patterns of men and women to 
eliminate prejudices and stereotypes) or 10 (requiring removal of stereotypes in education). 
And this is further borne out by some of its statements in the Summary Records and also in 
its Initial and Second Reports themselves, which do not indicate an absolutist stance on this 
point – rather indicating an attempt to reconcile the ‘traditional Asian family’ with 
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Convention commitments. 
 For instance, regarding the issue of taxation, the Singaporean representative to the 
Committee explained that the joint tax assessment was an opt-in procedure, and not a 
requirement – this was “consistent with the State’s philosophy that the family was the 
foundation of society”622, but not designed with a view of the male breadwinner in mind. In 
general, Singapore is described as a “nation in transition”, with older women finding 
fulfilment as homemakers while younger women were seeking equality with men in the 
workplace; support services “were not intended to reinforce women’s role as caregivers; 
rather, facilities such as before- and after-school care were a response to working women’s 
needs”.623 This indicates a somewhat subtler viewpoint than that implied by some of the 
Committee’s observations. This is further borne out by statements in the Initial Report on, 
for example, Article 6: “Family life education in Singapore has always stressed on both men 
and women sharing a common role in raising their children...What is often overlooked by 
many is that the role of the homemaker cannot be left to women only. To counter this, both 
boys and girls in school are given the opportunity to study Home Economics (traditionally a 
subject for girls) and technical subjects (traditionally for boys).”624 Nonetheless, at least 
insofar as Singaporean law is concerned, married men have an obligation to maintain their 
wife and children during marriage and after divorce, as provided by the Women's Charter 
1961. 
 This lead to further statements in the Concluding Observations of the Committee: 
 
While the Committee recognizes the importance of the family as the basic social unit, it 
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expresses concern that the concept of Asian values regarding the family, including that of the 
husband having the legal status of head of household, might be interpreted so as to 
perpetuate stereotyped gender roles in the family and reinforce discrimination against 
women.625 
 
And: 
 
The Committee urges the Government to ensure that laws, policies and programmes with 
regard to the family incorporate the principle of equality between women and men in all 
spheres, including the family, and the full realization of women is human rights.626 
  
Though further remarks were made on the need to eliminate gender stereotypes within 
Singapore based on other Articles of the Convention (for instance, recommending that 
efforts be made to reduce stereotyping in the workplace627), it is in this area – Asian values 
and the family, and the woman's role within it – in which we can see discourse surrounding 
national or supranational socio-cultural values and their impact on implementation of the 
Convention developing. 
 Finally, one more remark from the Summary Records bears recording – relating to 
the issue of caning. One member of the Committee – Mr. Melander – felt Singapore’s law 
regarding the use of corporal punishment was discriminatory towards men, as under Section 
231 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a sentence of caning can only be passed against adult 
males, and it could not be justified by reference to traditional Asian values. He spoke on this 
issue on the basis that the CEDAW was “one of the very few human rights instruments which 
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Singapore had ratified” and hence caning a relevant issue to raise628 - reasoning hardly like 
to be treated favourably by the government, but interesting for the purposes of this analysis. 
  
Third Periodic Report 
 
Singapore's Third Periodic Report629 was submitted on 22nd November 2004 and considered 
by the Committee at its 39th session, in 2007.630 
 The Committee continued to pursue its line on the family and Asian values: 
 
The Committee reiterates its concern about the persistence of patriarchal attitudes and deep-
rooted stereotypes regarding the roles and responsibilities of women and men within the 
family and society at large. These stereotypes present a significant obstacle to the 
implementation of the Convention, are a root cause of violence against women in the private 
and public spheres, put women in a disadvantaged position in a number of areas, including in 
the labour market, and limit their access to leadership positions in political and public life. 
 
The Committee recommends that the State party take measures to bring about changes in 
traditional patriarchal attitudes and in gender-role stereotyping...631 
 
 However, this area was not subject to the extensive discussions which it received 
during the 39th session. Probably, this can be attributed to a retreat from language linking 
traditional Asian values or Singaporean social mores with the importance of strong families 
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in the Report itself. The government, rather, adopted an approach that was much more 
ameliatory to the philosophy adopted by the Committee itself. For instance: 
 
Recognising that gender stereotypes are developed from childhood through people’s 
surroundings in family and society, efforts have to be made to ensure that unhealthy gender 
stereotypes are not perpetuated. The media plays an important part in shaping values. The 
Government can do its part to promote strong family structures and values while addressing 
gender stereotypes.632 
 
And: 
 
Family life education is promoted in Civics and Moral Education which is a compulsory subject 
in both primary and secondary schools. Students learn about the important role that each 
family member plays in building strong family relationships regardless of gender. They are also 
taught to appreciate that both parents have an equal responsibility in bringing up the children 
and looking after the interests of the family unit.633 
 
 Meanwhile, measures to support working mothers and promote a work-life balance 
are cited.634 Overall, the approach taken seems to be one in which a continued emphasis on 
pro-family policy and a vision of the family as the basis of Singaporean society is combined 
with a move to de-emphasise the traditional, more patriarchal outlook present in the Initial 
Report. 
 However, there were other issues relevant to our discussion that were raised during 
the meetings at the 39th session and which, while they were not mentioned in the 
Concluding Observations, would continue to be themes of the Committee's interactions with 
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Singapore in the coming Fourth Report. These include non-consensual sex in marriage, and 
homosexuality. 
 At the time of its Third Report, Singapore's Penal Code had an exemption from the 
definition of rape for a married man who engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with 
his wife – 'marital immunity': “Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not 
being under 13 years of age, is not rape.”635 This was noted by a member of the Committee: 
 
[Ms Patten] asked whether the Government was considering the enactment of legislation to 
criminalize marital rape. She had information that recently there had been an initiative to 
withdraw the marital immunity, but only in three specific situations where the wife was 
separated from her husband. She urged the Government to remove the immunity 
completely.636 
 
 The response from the Singaporean representatives was as follows: 
 
...Singapore recognized intimacy as a private matter between two consenting adults. In the 
case of non-consensual intercourse, it was up to the couple to resolve the issue privately 
within the context of the marriage. Although the Constitution currently provided that men 
who engaged in non -consensual intercourse had marital immunity, Singapore was gradually 
taking steps to amend the relevant provisions. The first step was to remove marital immunity 
in cases where the wife had filed for separation or a protection order. It was expected that the 
new provision would take effect within the next six months.637 
 
 This hints at the recurring theme of the primacy of the family, emphasising, 
effectively, the need to ensure the continuation of marriage where possible, though it does 
not state it explicitly; it is however, important to bear in mind in considering Singapore's 
                                                     
635
Penal Code of Singapore, Section 375, Exception. This provision was amended in 2008; detailed below. 
636
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 39
th
 Session, Summary Record 
of the 803
rd
 meeting, 1 August 2007, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.803(A), para. 25. 
637
Ibid., para. 71. 
 205 
 
Fourth Report. It is also, however, worth noting that here the Singaporean representatives 
also sought to use a straightforward majoritarian argument to explain the existence of 
marital immunity - “the majority of people still considered sexual issues to be private and 
did not wish marital rape to be included in the Penal Code”.638 This, in itself, can be linked by 
implication to the 'Asian value' of placing the wishes of the community or the rights of 
society (to use Lee Kuan Yew's term) above the rights of the individual: the wishes of the 
majority trump the individual women the law mitigates harshly against. 
 Committee members also sought to raise the issue of homosexuality during the 39th 
session: 
 
Ms Pimentel understood that the Government intended to repeal the law criminalizing 
sodomy between a man and a woman, but that there was no proposal to repeal the similar 
law concerning homosexual men. Indeed, religious pressure was building to extend the law to 
outlaw sexual conduct between women. Since a democratic and secular state should refrain 
from penalizing private sexual relations between consenting adults, she asked how the 
Singaporean Government proposed to tackle that issue and protect lesbian women. Noting 
that the Constitution currently guaranteed freedom from discrimination for single, married 
and divorced women, she asked how the Government intended to prevent discrimination 
against lesbian women in the workplace, in access to health services and in society in general. 
 
Setting aside the many legal issues raised by this remark, which will be analysed in more 
detail after this overview of the Reports and Concluding Observations, we shall turn to the 
Singaporean representatives' responses, which again made implicit reference to the Asian 
values arguments their government had used in the past: 
 
Singapore respected human rights [said Ms Yu-Foo Yee Shoon], but it was subjected to 
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contradictory pressures. It upheld morality and human rights very stringently, but in the 
context of what was best for the majority and for society. With regard to homosexuality, the 
majority was still quite conservative. Homosexuals were not discriminated against; they had 
the same right to employment, education or housing as everyone else.639 
 
 … 
 
Mr. Keok Tong San said that the provision criminalizing sodomy between men and women 
would not be repealed; however, the wording of the provision would be amended to refer to 
sexual assault by penetration, and the penalty for such acts would be increased. With respect 
to the criminalization of lesbianism, he said that Singapore did not wish homosexuality to 
enter mainstream society.640 
 
Here, the implication is relatively clear, and refers back to a statement made in the 25th 
session: “[Singapore] was a multiracial, multicultural and multireligious country whose 
shared national values were: nation before community and society before self...”641, which in 
turn harks back to one of the pillars of the Asian values – the primary of society and 'the 
community' over the individual, and the paternalistic State as guardian and facilitator of 
majoritarian concerns. Here, although there is no discrimination against homosexuals, 
nonetheless 'the majority' maintain conservative attitudes towards homosexuality and 
Singapore as a whole does not wish homosexuality to become mainstream, hence 
homosexual acts must be criminalised. 
  
Fourth Periodic Report 
 
Singapore's Fourth Periodic Report was submitted on April 3rd 2009 and considered by the 
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Committee at its 49th session.642 Several themes from previous Reports continued to be 
included, as did several newer issues. Firstly, patriarchal stereotyping remained a concern for 
the Committee: 
 
The Committee reiterates its concern about the persistence of patriarchal attitudes and deep-
rooted stereotypes regarding the roles and responsibilities of women and men within the 
family and society at large. In this regard, the Committee is particularly concerned that, 
despite the legal equality accorded to spouses, discriminatory traditional cultural attitudes that 
continue to utilize “the head of the household” concept, assigning this role to men, persist in 
the State party.643 
 
This Observation was made after Committee members had raised the issue in a pattern 
similar to that expressed in the discussion of Singapore's Initial and Second Reports. Ms Acar 
inquired about the National Family Council (a consultative body created in 2006 to 
“promot[e] support services and programmes to enable women to harmonise their work, 
personal and family responsibilities”644): 
 
The Committee had received information from alternative sources suggesting that the National 
Family Council still promoted the notion of men as heads of households. [Ms Acar] asked what 
measures the Government had taken to ensure that such entrenched cultural conceptions of 
men were being eliminated from the people’s mindset.645 
 
In reply, Ms Ong explained that: 
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[T]he Government of Singapore recognized that men and women had shared roles and 
responsibilities in a family. For statistical purposes, the head of household was defined as the 
person who was generally acknowledged as such by the other members of the household, 
usually either the oldest member, the person earning the main income, the owner/occupier of 
the house, or the person who managed household affairs. In the 2010 census, households had 
been able to decide for themselves who to designate as head — either the man or the woman 
— the term was gender-neutral in that respect. In addition, efforts had been made in recent 
years to introduce policies and programmes that supported the importance of role-sharing in 
the family.646 
 
 This implied that, since the oldest person in a household or the earner of the main 
income was usually a man, it would be likely that men would be designated by households 
themselves as heads, and thus had no relation to Government policy on the matter, which 
was gender neutral. This would, in itself, represent something of a change from Singapore's 
position in previous Reports which, it will be recalled, stressed the traditional cultural value 
of having the husband as the head of the household. In any case, Ms Acar was not satisfied 
with the answer, since her question, as she put it “had not been about the prevailing legal 
rules but rather about the prevalent values and attitudes in society and policies being 
implemented to change those attitudes”647. 
 Placed alongside this was a newer general concern with stereotyped attitudes 
towards female beauty: 
 
Additionally, the Committee is concerned by the pervasiveness of advertising for products and 
services to improve body image and conform to societal expectations, as well as at the lack of 
clear guidelines to non-medical practitioners, such as aesthetic clinics, beauty clinics and spas. 
It notes that such cultural overemphasis of women’s beauty and the lack of effective 
regulations on its commercial exploitation, including by the media, reinforces the image of 
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women as sex objects and constitutes serious obstacles to women’s enjoyment of their human 
rights and the fulfilment of the rights enshrined in the Convention.648 
 
This point had been raised, against by Ms Acar, during the 49th session: 
 
[The] backbone of the Convention was the obligation to modify discriminatory traditional 
cultural norms and stereotypes. In that regard, it was of concern that women in Singapore 
seemed so occupied with their physical appearance — the country’s beauty industry (including 
the use of surgery and pharmaceuticals) was booming, with the support of the media. Such a 
focus on appearance simply put a new face on the traditional stereotype of women as sex 
objects, and the trend should be examined critically, from the perspective of gender equality. 
She asked whether there had been any efforts to regulate the beauty industry, with particular 
regard to advertising and the media. The Committee would appreciate further information on 
any proactive measures the Government had taken to address gender stereotypes.649 
 
This point, both in the Concluding Observation and in the summary records of the 49th 
session, seems to indicate that the Committee was focusing on something it deemed unique 
in Singaporean culture which strongly emphasised women's physical appearance more than 
it might in other societies. It is notable, however, that the Singaporean representatives were 
somewhat dismissive of this line of criticism.650 
 As an addendum, the Committee also began to express an opinion on Singapore's 
laws on homosexuality in its Concluding Observations: 
 
The Committee further notes that despite the fact that the State party recognizes the principle 
of equality of all persons before the law, as enshrined in the Constitution, regardless of gender, 
sexual orientation and gender identity (CEDAW/C/SGP/Q/4/Add.1, para. 113), there is still 
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negative stereotyping of women belonging to this group [presumably this refers to lesbians].651 
 
 Again, as stated previously, this Observation raises a number of important legal questions, 
but for the purposes of this overview they will not be analysed here. For now it suffices to 
outline the reasoning behind the Committee's statement, and the State's response. 
 The reasoning itself was based on two notions – firstly that since Male homosexual 
activity was illegal in Singapore this might also result in an indirect impact on homosexual 
women's rights in the country, and secondly that the Committee had declared in its 28th 
General Recommendation that it deemed the prohibition of discrimination against women 
to include discrimination on the grounds of “gender orientation and gender identity”652 
(which presumably also forbade discrimination against women based on their sexual 
orientation). In particular, the Media Development Authorities' regulations, which prohibited 
positive depictions of lesbianism, were singled out as an example where change was 
required.653 It was considered by the Chair of the Committee that censorship of 
homosexuality in the media should be eliminated, since “the media had great power to 
reinforce prejudices”654. Other concerns were expressed about, for example, whether 
women's same-sex partnerships were recognised in public health policies655, or whether the 
government's requirement for public servants to consult all stakeholders when developing 
policies extended to “women of sexual minorities”.656 
 The Committee also recommended, in its Concluding Observations, that Singapore 
remove entirely its regulations on marital immunity and specifically criminalise marital 
                                                     
651
CEDAW, Concluding Observations on Singapore's Fourth Periodic Report, supra note 648, para. 21. 
652
CEDAW, 49
th
 Session, 993
rd
 meeting, supra note 645, para. 20. 
653
Ibid. 
654
Ibid., para. 57. 
655
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 49
th
 Session, Summary Record 
of the 994
th
 meeting, 17 October 2011, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.994, para. 35. 
656
Ibid., para. 15. 
 211 
 
rape.657 In the space between the Third and Fourth Reports, Singapore had made the 
expected changes in this regard, so that marital immunity in instances of non-consensual sex 
would be removed where the man and woman concerned were separated, a court 
injunction was in force, or similar.658 However, the government had not removed marital 
immunity entirely from the Penal Code, and had preferred a 'calibrated approach'. Explaining 
why, the Report stated: 
 
The previous law was lacking as a husband is given unconditional exemption from the offence 
of rape of his wife regardless of how unreasonably he may have conducted himself. However, 
the amendment recognised that a balance needs to be struck between the needs of women 
who require protection, and the general concerns about conjugal rights and the expression of 
intimacy in a marriage. Abolishing marital immunity entirely may change the whole 
complexion of marriage in our society. Hence, the Penal Code amendments afford the 
necessary protection for women whose marriages are, in practical terms, on the verge of a 
break-down or have broken down. These clearly signal that her consent to conjugal relations 
has been withdrawn.659 
 
 While the Report does not elaborate on what changing “the whole complexion of 
marriage” in Singapore society would entail, it seems relatively clear that it draws a 
connection between this issue and family unity and the divorce rate, since in the Report 
itself the section on marital immunity comes directly after a number of general statements 
expressing concern on the Government's part about the lowering birth rate, the average age 
of marriage and motherhood growing higher, and an increase in the divorce rates.660 It 
seems that the implication is that marital immunity is connected in part to preserving 
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marriage, and thus to the family-centric Asian values that the government has consistently 
emphasised. Similarly to the other areas where the Committee presented a challenge, the 
government defended its stance on majoritarian grounds: 
 
The present definition was the most that Singaporean society was currently prepared to 
accept. It was something that had been debated in society, and the Government intended to 
return to the issue, but for the time being that was as far as society was prepared to go.661 
 
This replicates the philosophical underpinning to Singapore's justification of its stance on 
homosexuality expressed at the 25th session, which presents a hierarchy of society over the 
individual, and the government as guardian of society as much as, or more so than, 
individual members. In the reply to the List of Issues on its Fourth Report, in which the issue 
of homosexuality was also raised, Singapore stated that it was “by and large a conservative 
society… [and] the Government strives to maintain a balance, to uphold a stable society with 
traditional, heterosexual family values, but with space for homosexuals to live their lives and 
contribute to society”.662 
 
iii) Analysis 
 
The above overview of Singapore's reporting history and the Concluding Observations given 
by the Committee gives us a number of different socio-cultural themes, many of which are 
linked and come under the umbrella of the broader them of the family and its place in the 
general corpus of Asian values. These are: 
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 Equal rights for men and women in determining nationality of children 
 Gender stereotyping, particularly the husband/father as breadwinner or head of 
household 
 Marital immunity 
 Homosexuality and discrimination against women members of 'sexual minorities' 
 Stereotyping of women as sex objects 
 
Each of these themes either directly or indirectly relates to national or supranational socio-
cultural values, by Singapore's own apparent interpretation. The reservation to Article 9 
regarding the nationality of children born overseas was entered with the aim of preserving 
the Asian tradition where the husband is the head of the household; while the Committee's 
continued focus on the issue of the 'breadwinner' concept, while surely reminiscent of lines 
taken with respect to many other – if not all – States parties, is tied directly to Singapore's 
own implicit and explicit connections between that concept and Asian values, particularly 
regarding the importance of the family unit. 
 The themes of marital immunity and homosexuality are somewhat less directly 
linked to national or supranational socio-cultural values, but the relationship is still apparent. 
Both are linked in large part to the majoritarian sentiment that is readily seen in the 
discourse of Singaporean government representatives throughout the past three decades, 
and which has always been linked with the notion that society is ranked above the individual 
in its importance in Asian societies. The line of interpretation, that in order to preserve 
certain aspects of Singaporean society the rights of some individuals need be restricted, is a 
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clear derivation from the type of statements made by Mahbubani or Lee Kuan Yew.663 
Marital immunity was also implicitly linked to the preservation of the family and reducing 
divorce rates in the Fourth Periodic Report, harking back to the notion of the family as a core 
Asian value. 
 Our aim is now to attempt to derive from these themes what authentic 
interpretations are contained in the Concluding Observations, before putting them through 
our three step test for subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties. 
 
Equality in the Nationality of Children 
 
The first theme is relatively easily dealt with: the interpretive practice of the Committee, 
requiring Singapore to remove the discrepancy between its treatment of the nationality of 
children born overseas to men with foreign spouses versus women with foreign spouses, is 
clearly authentically interpretive: the  Committee's position is that, under Article 9 (2) and 
Article 2 of the Convention, Singapore is obliged to ensure that there is absolute equality 
between men and women in passing nationality to their children, irrespective of socio-
cultural values and, in particular, the ‘Asian Value’ of the husband as the head of the 
household. This issue of course is germane to the discussion of reservations which takes 
place at the end of the Chapter. 
 Is the interpretive practice common, concordant and consistent? The reservation 
which Singapore entered was removed by the time of its Third Report and its nationality 
laws changed to bring them into line with the recommendations made in the Concluding 
Comments of the Committee, so the point is almost moot – we do not have many instances 
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so as to prove consistency - but it is certainly the case that the interpretive practice is not 
inconsistent insofar as the reporting history of Singapore is concerned. To establish whether 
it is also common and concordant would of course require an examination of how the 
Committee has interpreted such discriminatory nationality laws in all other jurisdictions: we 
do however find that the Committee has in fact given almost identical interpretations of 
Article 9 (2) in regard to the obligations of Algeria664, Jordan665, Egypt666, Guinea667, Sri 
Lanka668, Tunisia669, Morocco670 (in the case of Tunisia and Morocco, the interpretive practice 
involved the Committee congratulating the States concerned on changes to the nationality 
law giving women and men absolute equality in passing on nationality to their children), and 
Bangladesh671. While it is not possible here to examine the justifications given by all those 
States for maintaining laws preventing women from passing on nationality to children of 
foreign-born husbands, it is clearly the case that commonality, concordancy and consistency 
would be difficult to disprove. 
 Thus, we can at this stage suggest that there is authentic interpretive practice 
regarding Singapore's obligations under Article 9 (2), to the effect that maintaining the Asian 
tradition where husbands are heads of households has no impact on the implementation of 
those obligations insofar as it creates a distinction in the rules on nationality between 
children of Singaporean women and foreign husbands, and children of Singaporean men and 
foreign wives, who are born overseas. And we can also conclude that it is likely that  this 
interpretive practice is given commonly, concordantly and consistently. Is there also 
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agreement on the part of Singapore? The reservation which it entered was removed by the 
time of the Third Report, and Singapore’s nationality laws were changed to bring them into 
line with the recommendations made in the Concluding Observations of the Committee. 
This has remained the case ever since. Agreement, then, while not present at the time of the 
initial report, and while not made explicit, can certainly be said to be present from the 
Second Report onwards – at least as far as Singapore is concerned. Thus, we can 
provisionally conclude that there is subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the 
parties on the Committee's interpretation of Article 9 (2). 
 
Gender Stereotyping and the husband as breadwinner 
 
This area is more complex, as there are a number of different threads covering a number of 
different Articles of the Convention. In broad summary, the potentially authentic 
interpretations given in the Concluding Observations on this point are as follows: 
 
1) “While the Committee recognizes the importance of the family as the basic social 
unit, it expresses concern that the concept of Asian values regarding the family, including 
that of the husband having the legal status of head of household, might be interpreted so as 
to perpetuate stereotyped gender roles in the family and reinforce discrimination against 
women. The Committee urges the Government to ensure that laws, policies and 
programmes with regard to the family incorporate the principle of equality between women 
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and men in all spheres, including the family, and the full realization of women's human 
rights.”672 (Consideration of Initial and Second Periodic Reports) 
2) “The Committee reiterates its concern about the persistence of patriarchal attitudes 
and deep-rooted stereotypes regarding the roles and responsibilities of women and men 
within the family and society at large. These stereotypes present a significant obstacle to the 
implementation of the Convention, are a root cause of violence against women in the 
private and public spheres, put women in a disadvantaged position in a number of areas, 
including in the labour market, and limit their access to leadership positions in political and 
public life. The Committee recommends that the State party take measures to bring about 
changes in traditional patriarchal attitudes and in gender-role stereotyping. Such measures 
should include awareness-raising and public education campaigns, with a special focus in the 
curriculum on human rights education and women’s rights and children’s rights issues, in 
cooperation with a wide range of stakeholders, including the national machinery for the 
advancement of women, women’s organizations, trade unions, the National Employers 
Federation, the media, educational institutions and the People’s Association, with a view to 
eliminating stereotypes associated with traditional gender roles in the family and in society, 
in accordance with articles 2 (f) and 5 (a) of the Convention. It recommends that the State 
party expand its current awareness-raising efforts and training activities to leaders of 
political parties and senior managers in the private sector. The Committee calls upon the 
State party to ensure that all measures to enhance work/life balance are targeted at both 
women and men in the public and private sectors, so as to further support the equal sharing 
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of family and work responsibilities between women and men.”673 (Consideration of Third 
Periodic Report) 
3) “The Committee reiterates its concern about the persistence of patriarchal attitudes 
and deep-rooted stereotypes regarding the roles and responsibilities of women and men 
within the family and society at large. In this regard, the Committee is particularly concerned 
that, despite the legal equality accorded to spouses, discriminatory traditional cultural 
attitudes that continue to utilize 'the head of the household' concept, assigning this role to 
men, persist in the State party...The Committee calls upon the State party: 
 
 To put in place, without delay, a comprehensive strategy to modify or eliminate 
patriarchal attitudes and stereotypes that discriminate against women, including 
those based on sexual orientation and gender identity, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Convention. Such measures should include efforts, in collaboration 
with civil society, to educate and raise awareness of this subject, targeting women 
and men at all levels of society... [and] 
 To engage in pervasive, sustained and proactive efforts to combat and eliminate 
discriminatory cultural concepts, including “the head of the household”, that have a 
negative impact on the achievement of equality between women and men”674 
(Consideration of Fourth Periodic Report) 
 
These remarks are, in essence, restatements of the same interpretive 'line', in increasing 
detail and specificity. Can this interpretive line be viewed, in sum or in part, as being 
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authentically interpretive in the subsequent practice sense? 
 Some of these statements are relatively abstract, suggesting that they should, 
perhaps, be regarded as “exhortative practice” as discussed in Chapter IV, rather than 
authentic interpretations. However, in general, it is difficult to argue with the view that the 
Committee is offering an interpretation across these reports of Article 5 (a) and (b), to the 
effect that the requirement to “modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men 
and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all 
other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of 
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women” and to “ensure that family education 
includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition of the 
common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of their 
children” includes the requirement to eliminate the notions that the husband and/or father 
is the head of the household either legally or in stereotype, and that he is also the 
breadwinner or primary earner.   
 The Concluding Observations to the Third Report suggest a more specific 
interpretation. Here, clear and relatively detailed measures are listed as the means by which 
Singapore is to implement Article 5 of the Convention, and these, it is arguable, also fulfil the 
Step 1 requirement and qualify as authentic interpretive practice: 
 
The Committee recommends that the State party take measures to bring about changes in 
traditional patriarchal attitudes and in gender-role stereotyping. Such measures should include 
awareness-raising and public education campaigns, with a special focus in the curriculum on 
human rights education and women’s rights and children’s rights issues, in cooperation with a 
wide range of stakeholders, including the national machinery for the advancement of women, 
women’s organizations, trade unions, the National Employers Federation, the media, 
educational institutions and the People’s Association, with a view to eliminating stereotypes 
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associated with traditional gender roles in the family and in society, in accordance with articles 
2 (f) and 5 (a) of the Convention. 
 
Or, in other words, in order to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 (f) and Article 5 (a) of the 
Convention, Singapore ought to undertake awareness raising and public education 
campaigns “with a special focus in the curriculum on human rights education and women's 
rights and children's rights issues”, in cooperation with women's organisations, trade unions, 
the National Employers Federation, the media, educational institutions and the People's 
Association, with a view to eliminating traditional stereotypes and gender roles in the family 
and society, particularly the concept of the husband/father as the breadwinner. 
 The next step is to establish whether all of this interpretive practice is common, 
concordant and consistent. Concordancy, commonality and consistency are somewhat 
difficult to establish or refute, as we have already noted, given that this would require a 
comprehensive survey of the reporting history of the rest of the States Parties to the 
CEDAW, which is beyond the capacity of a thesis such as this. Nonetheless, a cursory survey 
of the Committee's Concluding Observations to other States Parties reveals that it has given 
similar views on the topic of the male breadwinner to Luxembourg675, Kyrgyzstan676, Fiji677 
and Indonesia (on which more will follow below). It has also made similar recommendations 
to other States Parties regarding the use of the media (for example, to Turkey678, 
Venezuela679, and Armenia680), the use of awareness-raising campaigns (for example, to 
Georgia681, Democratic Republic of Congo682, and Nicaragua683) and the use of public 
                                                     
675
 See e.g. CEDAW, A/55/38 part I (2000), para. 408. 
676
See e.g. CEDAW, A/54/38 part I (1999), para. 120. 
677
 See e.g. CEDAW, A/57/38, part I (2002), para. 55. 
678
See e.g. CEDAW, A/52/38/Rev.1, part I (1997), para. 197. 
679
See e.g. Ibid., para. 245. 
680
See e.g. Ibid., part II, para. 65. 
681
See e.g. CEDAW, A/54/38/Rev.1, part II (1999), para. 95. 
 221 
 
education campaigns (for example, to Portugal684 and Estonia685), to eliminate gender 
stereotypes. It also gave a similar statement in General Recommendation No. 3686. Here, the 
Committee “Urge[d] all States parties effectively to adopt education and public information 
programmes, which will help eliminate prejudices and current practices that hinder the full 
operation of the principle of the social equality of women”; this comes after the Committee 
had noted the existence of socio-cultural factors which perpetuated discrimination based on 
sex. Obviously, this is consistent and concordant with the recommendations which the 
Committee has made to Singapore and the other States mentioned, and no State has 
expressed disagreement with it at the Third Committee of the General Assembly. The use of 
the word “urges” indicates that this General Recommendation is of an exhortative rather 
than interpretive character, but it certainly provides a context of consistency, concordancy 
and commonality. While an absolutely affirmative statement is impossible at this stage, 
therefore, it certainly seems likely that the Step 2 requirements are fulfilled and we can state 
that authentic interpretive practice has likely been given commonly, concordantly and 
consistently, to the effect that States Parties have the obligation to cooperate with the media 
in undertaking awareness-raising and public education campaigns with a view to eliminating 
patriarchal attitudes and gender-role stereotyping, irrespective of socio-cultural factors; and 
that “customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the 
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women” includes the 
notion of the husband or father as breadwinner or head of the household. 
 We now turn to the question of agreement, of which there is a considerable number 
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of instances. In its reply to the List of Issues for the Third Report687, for example, in which the 
Committee had enquired about specific efforts to address these issues, the government of 
Singapore described efforts it had made to urge husbands and wives to share domestic 
responsibilities688 and to engage with NGOs in awareness campaigns689, while its delegates 
also discussed media guidelines to eliminate gender stereotypes in the constructive 
dialogue690; indeed, Singapore had been describing the use of the media to remove harmful 
stereotypes since its Initial Report (although it had no instituted a specific code on sex-role 
stereotyping in advertising, for instance)691. It is certainly difficult to find any examples of 
instances of disagreement on the part of the Singaporean government with the Committee’s 
interpretation of its obligations. This leads us towards the conclusion that there is 
subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties that traditional conceptions 
of the family are to have no effect on the manner in which Article 5 is implemented, and 
that the implementation of that Article requires the government to use the media, public 
awareness campaigns, and educational campaigns, to eliminate such stereotypes. 
 
Marital Immunity 
 
On the issue of marital immunity the conclusion is relatively straightforward. In the 39th 
session during its consideration of the Third Report the Committee had raised the issue of 
marital immunity, and it gave a specific and detailed interpretation in both its Concluding 
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Observations to Singapore’s Third and Fourth Reports: 
 
The Committee requests the State party to enact legislation criminalizing marital rape, defined 
as lack of consent of the wife/spouse.692 
 
The Committee urges the State party [to] review its Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code 
in order to specifically criminalise domestic violence and marital rape and ensure that the 
definition of rape covers any non-consensual sexual act.693 
  
This is clearly deliberate and intentional interpretation of Singapore’s obligations, to the 
effect that no socio-cultural factors (Asian majoritarianism, the need to prevent the 
complexion of marriage in Singapore changing, etc.) ought to have any effect on the 
implementation of Article 2, 3, 16 and others, and that implementation should include 
removal of marital immunity from the Penal Code. It therefore undoubtedly meets the Step 
1 requirement. 
 This interpretive practice is also given across two Reports, and hence can likely be 
viewed as consistent. It is also arguably given commonly and concordantly: the Committee, 
as we shall see, gave almost exactly similar interpretations to the obligations of Malaysia and 
Indonesia in this regard, as well as General Recommendation No. 19694. This latter 
interpreted Article 1 to include gender-based violence (defined as “violence directed against 
a woman because she is a woman, or that affects women disproportionately) under the 
broad umbrella of discrimination, and thus categorised marital rape as in contravention of 
that Article; and it also interpreted Article 2 (f), 5 and 10 (c) as being violated by family 
abuse (probably including marital rape). The Committee has also congratulated Germany on 
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criminalizing marital rape695, and urged South Africa696 and Belize697 amongst many others to 
do so. This interpretive practice almost certainly, therefore, meets the Step 2 requirements. 
 However, establishing agreement is less simple: Singapore itself clearly rejects the 
interpretation offered by the Committee – it considers its obligations under Article 16 with 
regard to marital rape to be tempered by a societal value: the need to preserve the status of 
marriage in Singaporean society. Nor do the summary records of the constructive dialogue 
clarify the issue, but reinforce the disagreement, as we have seen: the government insisted 
that on majoritarian grounds it was not prepared to go beyond its current ‘calibrated 
approach’ described in its Fourth Report.698 Thus, we can most accurately summarise the 
position as being one in which the Committee has given an authoritative interpretation 
which Singapore has rejected. This would mean that there is no agreement on this 
interpretation, and hence no subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties. 
 
Homosexuality and Women Members of Sexual Minorities 
 
The Committee’s interpretive practice with regard to Singapore in this area is relatively scant 
– despite a considerable amount of attention being paid to the issue of women members of 
sexual minorities in the Summary Records, there is only a tiny fraction of space devoted to it 
in the Concluding Observations: those on the Fourth Report, where the Committee exhorts 
Singapore “to put in place, without delay, a comprehensive strategy to modify or eliminate 
patriarchal attitudes and stereotypes that discriminate against women, including those 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity, in conformity with the provisions of the 
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Convention” [emphasis added].699 It does accord with the Committee's General 
Recommendation No. 28700, in which discrimination against women was linked to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, and in which lesbian women were described as a 
special category of women who were especially vulnerable701, but there are no instances of 
similar interpretive practice in the Concluding Observations to other States Parties. This, in 
itself, would probably obviate subsequent practice developing in the area, especially given 
that Singapore takes the diametrically opposite view that a comprehensive strategy to 
modify or eliminate stereotypes that discriminate against women on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity is not one of its obligations under the Convention, justified on 
the basis that Singaporean society does not wish for homosexuality to become mainstream. 
 
Stereotyping of Women as Sex Objects 
 
This issue, raised only in the Concluding Observations to the Fourth Periodic Report, can also 
be dealt with relatively simply. Constituting, as it does, only one instance of interpretive 
practice, it would not – yet – be possible to state that subsequent practice to the effect that 
States Parties have an obligation to modify the apparent cultural preference for women’s 
concern with their physical appearance and to institute “effective regulations on its 
commercial exploitation”702 has developed. It cannot be said that there is interpretive 
practice to the effect that implementation of any Article of the Convention requires the 
elimination of this (alleged) cultural preference. 
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v) Concluding Remarks 
 
The position in terms of Singapore’s obligations under the CEDAW, then, is rather mixed.  We 
have identified that subsequent practice has established the agreement of the parties with 
respect to the interpretation of Article 9 (2), to the effect that the “Asian tradition where 
husbands are the heads of households” should have no impact on how that Article is 
implemented, and also that the implementation of Articles 3 and 5 requires the use of 
awareness-raising and public education campaigns in cooperation with the media, 
educational institutions, women's organizations, and so on to eliminate societal stereotypes, 
particularly of the husband/father as the breadwinner, and that no traditional or societal 
values ought to be a consideration in how those Article are implemented – rather, the 
reverse. 
 However, it seems that no such statements can be made with any confidence about 
the other themes we have identified: there is no agreement from Singapore on the 
Committee's interpretive practice with respect to the position of marital immunity or 
homosexuality under the Convention, and the practice regarding the obligation to eliminate 
the commercial exploitation of cultural preferences for female beauty is not extensive 
enough to be common, concordant or consistent. In those areas, then, there is no clarity on 
whether the treaty is to be implemented taking into consideration socio-cultural values, or 
not. 
 
 
 
 
 227 
 
B. Indonesia 
 
i) General Remarks 
 
Indonesia, to an even greater extent than Singapore, is surprisingly eager to avoid discussion 
of Asian values – certainly as a factor influencing implementation of the Convention – and 
indeed, cultural particularism and socio-cultural mores are more-or-less uniformly depicted 
simply as barriers to progress which the government intends to remove. Moreover, 
Indonesia entered no substantive reservations to the treaty on ratification (it entered a 
procedural reservations regarding Article 29(1)). 
 In this context, Indonesia's comments on socio-cultural factors come to take on an 
explanatory purpose for not implementing the Convention in the manner in which it deems 
it is obligated to: “[N]orms and values persistent in the society still hinder women's full 
participation and constrain the full understanding on concepts of gender and development 
in society”703, and “many religious customs and traditional norms and values of society 
favour a male dominated social system, although de jure men and women have equal 
rights...[T]he majority of men are not willing to give up their acquired privileges, thus 
undermining the very foundation of the Convention”.704 
 This makes Indonesia's reporting practice especially notable for indicating the 
fundamental problem, described in Chapter IV, of using the standard ICJ/WTO-based view of 
subsequent practice in the context of human rights treaties. This will become more apparent 
as the reporting practice is discussed in detail, but in Indonesia's reports we can see the 
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disconnection between the position expressed by the State Party and the actions of its 
organs exhibited rather starkly: on a number of issues we find the Indonesian delegates 
analysing Indonesian law with a critical air, and citing reviews of national law conducted by  
government ministries such as the Ministry of Women Empowerment (MOWE) to identify 
discriminatory laws for amendment and revision – with particular focus on the Marriage Law 
No. 1 of 1974705 - while not detailing any apparent major changes. The most notable 
example of this disconnect can be found in the area of polygamy, which is officially 
discouraged – there is a clear intention to eliminate the practice within Indonesian society – 
and yet, despite recommendations to revise the relevant provisions of the Marriage Law No. 
1 1974, because of its “extremely discriminative”706 nature, the practice remains permissible 
to the present day. Thus, while the Indonesian government's statements of its own position 
appear to be consonant with that of the Committee, the practice of some of the organs of 
the Indonesian States are not so. This is an instance which is illustrative of the problems 
associated with examining the practice of domestic organs when attempting to establish 
whether agreement exists in relation to the establishment of VCLT subsequent practice for 
human rights treaties. 
 This issue is further complicated by the Indonesian State's decentralised nature, 
where by-laws, or “local laws”, are many and varied. Despite the official standpoint of the 
State and the position of national law, and despite the fact that these local by-laws are at the 
absolute bottom of the legal hierarchy707, the impression given is that the central 
government has some difficulty preventing the creation of local laws which it considers 
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discriminatory: the Ministry of Home Affairs annulled 2,524 by-laws between 2002 and 
2011, certain of which were “contradictory to Indonesian commitment in the promotion and 
protection of human rights”.708 Similarly, the Council of Ulemas (the MUI), the top Muslim 
clerical body in Indonesia, gives opinions and fatwas on a variety of different issues, some of 
which have conflicted with the government's official line and which, indeed, might be 
deemed to ultimately affect Indonesia's agreement or disagreement with the interpretive 
practice of the Committee if we took a very broad-based view of relevant actors - this will be 
further discussed below. 
 This leads us onto the question of Islamic traditions and customs in Indonesia. Unlike 
in either Malaysia or Singapore, in Indonesia Muslims comprise a large majority of the 
population. (Indeed, it is not unusual to find Indonesia described as the “largest Islamic 
nation” in the world or words to that effect, as indeed members of the Committee do during 
their dialogue with Indonesian delegates.709) This means that, unlike our discussions 
regarding Malaysia and Singapore, where Islam is represented within the legal system 
primarily in the form of personal law regimes, particularly in regard to marriage and divorce, 
it is entirely appropriate to include certain Islamic norms, values and traditions under the 
rubric of societal mores in the context of Indonesia, given that they form part of what any 
lay person would describe as ‘Indonesian culture’. Thus, whereas for Singapore and Malaysia 
we do not discuss Islamic personal law regimes in great depth when it comes to our core 
question, because it is not correct to view them as relevant when it comes to the issue of 
broad societal values as factors affecting implementation, in the Indonesian reporting 
history cultural values stemming from Islam precisely function at that broader level and are 
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suitable for our analysis. Thus the view of the Committee and Indonesian delegates on 
polygamy, female genital mutilation, and other practices rooted in Islam are discussed in 
more depth.  
 Finally, Indonesia uses nomenclature that is much more consonant with the kind of 
terminology and recommendations given by the Committee than do Malaysia or Singapore. 
In particular, Indonesia adopts a positive approach to “gender mainstreaming”, or 
“mainstreaming a gender perspective”, one of the Committee's particular focuses and a 
cornerstone of the United Nations development community since the mid-1990s. (It was 
formally described as follows: “Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of 
assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, 
policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as 
well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, 
economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not 
perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.”710) In the year 2000, indeed, a 
Presidential decree (Presidential Instruction No. 9) obliged all Government representatives 
and agencies “to mainstream gender in their policies, programs, projects, activities and 
budgets to eliminate gender-based discrimination”.711 Again, the importance of this issue in 
relation to the development of subsequent practice will be elaborated on during the 
overview of Indonesia's reporting history. 
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ii) Authentic Interpretations 
 
Initial Report 
 
Indonesia’s initial report was submitted in 1986712 and examined in 1988713. It must be 
borne in mind that, prior to 1990 the pattern of State Reporting established by the CESCR 
Committee (report submission followed by the list of issues and reply to list of issues, 
dialogue with the State Party, followed by Concluding Observations) was not being used by 
all of the treaty bodies. A simple account is given of the dialogue, alongside some of the 
questions raised and recommendations made. This means that this document provides 
something between a Summary Record and an authentically interpretive statement. 
 In it, we see some of the pattern which emerges over Indonesia's reporting history of 
referring to problematic traditional social and cultural practices as obstacles to 
implementation. For instance, “among the problems and obstacles to increasing women's 
participation in development” was “the traditional social and cultural value system that did 
not sufficiently support the aspirations of and opportunities for women to play an active role 
in material development”.714 The fact that the social development of Indonesia was 
“embedded in a pluralistic society, comprising various religions and subcultures with 
different levels of education and economic life”715 was also emphasised in answer to various 
questions aired by the Committee, presumably to indicate the difficulties faced by the 
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government in implementing its obligations under the Convention. 
 The Committee itself also raised concerns about Indonesian traditions and cultural 
practices. These included the fact that women tended to only pursue “traditional lines of 
university studies”716, that the law on marriage, especially for polygamy, did not seem to 
provide for equality between women and men717, and so on. However, it did not restrict 
itself to comments merely about Indonesian socio-cultural mores, but also implicitly 
disagreed with the delegates' portrayal of the government as restricted in implementing the 
Convention by culture and tradition: in its opinion, on a number of issues, government 
policy seemed to reinforce or supplement those traditions. For instance, the initial report 
overall “gave the impression that policies were not aimed at the advancement of women, 
but rather at improving the status of the Indonesian family and at emphasizing the maternal 
role of women...Women seemed to be given major tasks in the family, but not in decision-
making and economic activities and they did not have a big enough share in the 
development process” - this would “only perpetuate the traditional stereotypes”.718 
Continuing this line of approach regarding the family, the experts expressed the view that 
Indonesia's objectives in family planning – which specified the desirable number of children 
in each family – were not suitable, and State policy on family planning should consist only of 
giving information and guidance rather than putting out directives.719 Women's roles 
appeared to be clear in relation to their families, but the Committee was unsure whether 
their rights as individuals were also promoted by the State.720 Like Singapore, the Indonesian 
state appeared to be attempting to implement certain provisions of the Convention through 
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a family-centric lens, and a level of conflict between Committee and State Party can be 
discerned on this point. Similarly, government labour programmes which were cited in the 
Initial Report seemed to be directed at workers only in “traditionally female” jobs, which 
implied reinforcement by the government of the gender division in labour.721 This suggests 
that, as far as the Committee was concerned, the government was, consciously or 
unconsciously, perpetuating some of the traditional cultural stereotypes which were 
affecting the implementation of certain articles of the Convention. 
 Finally, there are some other miscellaneous issues of note for our purposes. One is 
the clear influence of religious norms, especially Islamic ones, on various facets of 
Indonesian law – for instance, adultery considered as a crime722, abortion made illegal and 
only permissible for health reasons723, and polygamy allowed only by decision of a religious 
court724. In contrast to some other Islamic States, however, women and men in Indonesia 
had equal rights to file for divorce.725 Marital rape was not considered a crime, although it 
constituted grounds for divorce726, and prostitutes were given religious teaching in 
rehabilitation centres, although the Committee asked why it was not also provided for men 
(presumably those using prostitutes)727. 
 Most of these issues can implicitly be linked to cultural particularist interpretations of 
how to implement various Articles of the Convention, even if this is not made explicit by the 
State. Some of these are directly religious – for instance, the illegality of abortion and the 
permission to practice polygamy on decision of a religious court, which in keeping with our 
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general policy on such issues we shall not discuss in this section except in overview. Others 
seem related to Asian values – the importance of the family, the prioritisation of 
communitarianism and consensus over individual rights – such as the emphasis on the 
woman's role within the family and directives on family planning which included 
recommended numbers of children. 
 
Second and Third Periodic Reports 
 
There was a considerable gap between the submission of the Initial Report and the Second, 
such that Indonesia was invited to submit its Second and Third Reports in a combined 
document, which it did on 6 February 1997728. This was examined in 1998, and concluding 
comments were provided on 2 February 1998729. 
 In general, the Committee was “convinced” that: 
 
[T]he existence of cultural attitudes that confine women to the roles of mothers and 
housewives presents a great obstacle to the advancement of women. Policies and programmes 
developed on the basis of those stereotypes limit women's participation and entitlements, 
thereby impeding implementation of the Convention. The Committee expresses the view that 
cultural and religious values cannot be allowed to undermine the universality of women's 
rights. It also states its belief that culture is not a static concept and that the core values in 
Indonesian society are not inconsistent with the advancement of women.730 
 
 This sort of comment – expressing the view that, effectively, women's rights are not 
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fundamentally contingent on culture (which brings to mind the criticisms of this view 
expressed by Jack Donnelly731) was not made in relation to Singapore (or Malaysia, as we 
shall see). It is not particularly coherently stated – one wonders about the reasoning of the 
Committee, and in particular what it views the “core values” in Indonesian society to be – 
but nonetheless, if we set aside the somewhat problematic final sentence of that paragraph, 
the opinion of the Committee in terms of its view on Indonesia's obligations is relatively 
clear at least in general terms – that it likely views policies and programmes based on the 
notion that women's role is that of the mother or housewife as in contravention of the 
Convention and that, in the broad sense, it did not view cultural and religious values as 
having an effect on how the Convention ought to be implemented. 
 It reiterated some of these remarks throughout its concluding comments, expressing 
its opinion that Indonesia’s rules on polygamy, the age of marriage (girls could marry at 16; 
males at 19); the requirement that a wife obtain her husband’s consent for a passport; the 
requirement that a wife obtain her husband’s consent to work at night; and the requirement 
for a wife to obtain her husband’s consent for sterilization or abortion, were on their face 
“discriminatory”732 – although the Committee’s also linked these issues to the “existing 
social, religious and cultural norms that recognise men as the head of the family and the 
breadwinner and confine women to the roles of mother and wife”733. This is, of course, by 
now a familiar motif in the Committee’s Concluding Observations in general, and is linked to 
further areas of concern for the Committee, such as the “predominant view” that married 
women might provide supplemental income for the family but should not pursue their own 
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careers734. A second, familiar motif was also raised in relation to school textbooks, which the 
Committee felt should be revised to eliminate stereotypes within education and thus modify 
cultural attitudes such as the notion that the husband ought to be the breadwinner.735   
 Referring to the constructive dialogue gives some more detail about the Committee’s 
views, and clarifies some of its comments regarding ‘core values’ of Indonesian society. One 
member described an “incongruity” between Indonesia’s expressed desire for equality and 
the continued existence of discriminatory legislation – for example, designating the man as 
head of the household or establishing different minimum ages of marriage for men and 
women.736 The Labour Force Act was criticised for its paternalistic provisions allowing a 
woman to work at night only with her husband’s permission.737 These types of legislation 
institutionalized women’s domestic roles, it was argued.738 Indeed, these were probably 
examples of what the Committee referred to as “laws designed to protect women [which] 
seemed to actually reinforce [their] traditional stereotyped role”.739 Regarding the 
requirement for a woman to seek her husband’s consent for sterilisation, the Committee 
deemed the matter a “free-choice issue” which was a “private matter for the woman to 
decide”, and the “Government’s position on spousal authority was in violation of the 
Convention”.740 This also applied to abortion: requiring the consent of the husband was “a 
clear violation of a woman’s right to reproductive health and her right to life”741 (the latter 
because the requirement for consent was by definition – since abortion was only legal in 
cases where the woman’s life was at risk – linked to the life of the woman concerned). 
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Polygamy was also singled out: it was even argued that, since Indonesia was the country in 
the world with the largest population of Muslims, it should outlaw polygamy, the obvious 
implication being that Indonesia should set an example to other Islamic nations.742 A final 
criticism, which did not appear in the Concluding Observations, was on the requirement for 
women to have permission from their husbands before taking maternity leave.743 
 The Committee members were also particularly eager to emphasise the role of 
education in modifying cultural attitudes. Textbooks needed to be revised in order to change 
deep-rooted attitudes744, and “education would have to be the starting point in overcoming 
the acknowledged difficulty of modernising a patriarchal society in a multicultural and 
multiethnic nation”.745 
 On the issue of ‘core values’, members had made a number of illustrative comments. 
“Some of Indonesia’s traditional values and religious principles constituted fundamental 
impediments to the implementation of the convention,” it was stated, and “Indonesia 
should examine its traditional values in order to determine those that were core values and 
those that were the result of patriarchal or historical customs, separate from the real core 
values... [the member] was sure that the basic core values of Indonesia were not in 
contradiction with human rights principles”.746 Meanwhile, “The main obstacle, recognised 
by the government, were the traditional norms and culture, reinforced by the patriarchal 
values of the religion, which defined women as wives and mothers and men as 
breadwinners. Such a separation of roles was also common in north-eastern Asia, where it 
harked back to Confucianism, but the premise was still so deeply rooted in Indonesia that all 
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attitudes towards women seemed to stem from it.”747 
 Such remarks do nothing to clarify the Committee’s reasoning in some respects – 
why the committee member felt “sure that the basic core values of Indonesia were not in 
contradiction with human rights principles” is not elaborated on. It is fairly obvious that this 
comment is based not on any particular familiarity with Indonesian society, but rather on the 
desire to perpetuate the notion human rights are implicit in societies without Western 
liberal backgrounds which Jack Donnelly roundly, and probably rightly, criticised.748 
Nonetheless, the implication in terms of Indonesia’s obligations under the Convention are 
clear enough: the Committee made it known that it did not, in general, accept the notion 
that socio-cultural values were a justification for implementing the provisions of the 
Convention in a particularist fashion. 
 For their part, the Indonesian delegates had in fact expressed similar views in the 
Report itself and the constructive dialogue to the Committee, as they did throughout the 
State’s reporting history, at least in a broad sense. Traditional norms were blamed for the 
lack of participation by women in public life749 for instance, and the delegates agreed that 
polygamy was undesirable: measures cited as efforts to abolish polygamy included denial of 
family allowances for second wives, loss of rank for civil servants and members of the armed 
forces who practiced polygamy, and so on.750 It also acknowledged the need to reform its 
school textbooks to remove stereotypes751, and to enact measures such as advocatory 
campaigns and guidance for teachers to encourage girls to study non-traditional subjects.752 
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It agreed that the sex-based division of labour in the family was an obstacle to female 
development753. And it revealed itself as keen to adopt the language of gender 
mainstreaming – in national development programmes754, education755, and so on. It did 
refer obliquely to Asian values in its insistence that “by tradition and culture, Indonesia 
sought to settle disputes through dialogue and consultation among the parties 
concerned”756, but it did not view this as a factor affecting the government’s “serious 
commitment” to implementing the Convention.757 Perhaps the only major voiced 
discrepancy between the views of the Indonesian delegates and the Committee members 
was on a point of fact: it was not the case that a woman must have her husband’s 
permission to apply for a passport in terms of law – this was merely a “moral 
acknowledgement of the husband’s existence” but the practice was “gradually diminishing” 
in any case.758 
 Indonesia’s combined Second and Third Reports give further evidence of, by and 
large, relatively concordant interpretive practice with the Committee – the crucial difference 
being the rather different view of the role of the State, with the Committee stressing the 
importance of government policy in shaping societal attitudes and Indonesia emphasising 
that the great difference between what was prescribed by law and what cultural belief and 
religious philosophy dictated made implementation difficult.759 At almost every point during 
its report, this point was reiterated in one form or other – for example, the problem is 
apparently acute in the private sector, where most firms are family owned enterprises where 
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social attitudes favour male heads; it is therefore difficult for the government to directly 
affect the number of women in leadership positions760. At other stages, the Report goes so 
far as to call the State’s own laws discriminatory, as for instance it does for Article 43 of the 
Marriage Act, which “clearly discriminates” against women in giving children born out of 
wedlock a civil claim to the mother and her family, but not the father.761 A further example is 
the Labour Act; Government Decree No. 37/1967 of the Wage System for Employees in State 
Companies stipulates that “dependants” are to be considered a man’s wife and children, 
meaning that women are classified as single regardless of their marital status and the 
woman will only be considered the main income earner if widowed or the husband does not 
work.762 
 Measures which Indonesia had implemented, or states it intends to implement, in an 
attempt to solve these problems include: 
 
 Instruction of the Minister of Women Affairs No. 28/1982, recommending women do 
not marry until the age of 19, and men 22763 
 Attempts to “engender” the school curriculum – measures such as revision of 
textbooks to eliminate stereotypes and sensitize women about possibilities open to 
them in terms of careers764 
 Measures to protect women in the workplace, such as Ministerial Decree 
04/MEN/1989, implementing an ordinance of 1925, providing that women shall not 
be obliged to work at night, except where it is essential to do so and that they are 
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over 18 and married, they have food and transportation provided, and they have the 
permission of their husband or guardian; and Act No.1/1951, which prohibits women 
from working in mines and pits765 
 Various items of legislation providing maternity leave766 
 The system of family allowance within the public sector, which considered married 
women whose husbands also worked in the public sector to be single, “needed to be 
revised”767 
 A recommendation that men do not marry until the age of 25 and women until the 
age of 20768 
 Permitting married women to set up trades and businesses without requiring the 
permission of the husband (although “because of culture and customs” women are 
reluctant to do this)769 
 
However, the law provides that the duty of the husband is to provide for the family and, 
although he must “jointly undertake household responsibilities” he is the head of the family 
and the wife is “the mother of the household”.770 
Indonesian measures also provide a certain contrast with the way Syariah law is 
reconciled with the Convention in Malaysia and Singapore. Here, there is not a large material 
difference between the right to divorce of the wife or the husband: the concept of 
repudiation, or the talaq, is not used in Indonesian law.771 Instead, either party to a Muslim 
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marriage may submit a letter to a district court containing the intent to divorce and the 
reasons, and thereby sue for divorce.772 There are, however, some restrictions on how long a 
woman may wait before remarrying after a divorce which do not apply to men, such as the 
requirement to wait for 130 days in the case of death of the husband, for the duration of the 
pregnancy in cases where the marriage was dissolved during pregnancy, and so on. Property 
acquired during the marriage is joint property, and that brought into the marriage by either 
party remains their respective property; on dissolution of marriage property is divided on 
this basis. Both parents continue to have responsibility for maintaining and educating the 
children, although it is the father who is accountable for all the expenses incurred.773 
  
Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports 
 
Indonesia’s Fourth and Fifth Reports were, again, submitted in a combined document due to 
lateness, this time on 27 July 2005.774 It was considered by the Committee at its 39th session 
between 23 July and 10 August 2007.775 The Concluding Comments continue the theme of 
emphasising the importance of changing traditional patriarchal attitudes within Indonesian 
society, but they also introduce some newer concerns, regarding restrictive interpretation of 
sharia law and female genital mutilation. 
 The Committee was once again 
 
Concerned about the persistence of entrenched patriarchal attitudes and stereotypes about 
the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family and society that discriminate 
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against women. Such stereotypes and attitudes [it continued] constitute serious obstacles to 
women’s enjoyment of their human rights and the implementation of the Convention and are 
the root cause of the disadvantaged position of women in a number of areas, including in the 
labour market and in political and public life...[It] encourage[d] the State party to design and 
implement comprehensive awareness-raising programmes to foster a better understanding of 
and support for equality between women and men at all levels of society, in accordance with 
articles 2 (f) and 5 (a) of the Convention. Such efforts should aim at changing stereotypical 
attitudes and traditional norms about the responsibilities and roles of women and men in the 
family and society and strengthening societal support for gender equality. The Committee 
further urges the State party to remove family and spousal consent requirements in the areas 
of women’s employment and health.776 
 
Of particular concern in this last regard was the requirement for a woman to obtain her 
husband’s consent regarding night work, or regarding sterilisation and abortion.777 Another 
issue requiring significant reform was the Marriage Act 1974, which perpetuated the 
stereotype that the man was the head of the household and the woman had merely a 
domestic role.778 Polygamy was still permitted, and the legal age of marriage for girls was 16 
– two areas which were singled out as examples of areas where amendments to the 
Marriage Act 1974 needed to be carried out.779 The Committee recommended that the State 
Party revise the Marriage Act 1974 to bring it in line with General Recommendation 21. 
 Indonesia had, in its report, explained that it had been undertaking a “critical review” 
of the Marriage Act 1974 since ratification of the CEDAW.780 This review had come to the 
conclusion that some of the articles of the Act were discriminatory, particularly regarding 
household responsibilities and the division of labour between the sexes – and it concluded 
that “there was a need to revise Article 31(3) which identifies the husband as head of the 
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family and the wife as a head of household. It was recommended that women should have 
equal rights as men to be the head of the family, so that stereotyped positions between 
women and men in the family should not be reaffirmed”.781 On polygamy, it had noted that 
Article 4(2), which permitted the practice, did so if the following reasons applied: the wife 
was unable to carry out her responsibility as wife; that she had a physical disability or fell 
victim to an incurable disease; or was unable to bear children782 - it was strongly 
recommended that this be totally amended because it was “extremely discriminatory”. 
Amendment of the Act was indeed on the legislative agenda for the years 2004-2009, and 
the Indonesian delegates stated that a new Act was likely to be adopted by the end of 2007. 
This would make the minimum age of marriage for men and women the same.783 The 
Marriage Act 1974 was defended, however, as it had vastly diminished paternal authority – 
prior to its adoption women had been viewed as property – and it had caused polygamy to 
decrease.784 
 On the marriage of girls under the age of 18, the government described a 
recommendatory, rather than prohibitive approach: although the minimum age for a girl to 
marry was 16, it recommended that girls not marry until the age of 20 (as it had stated in its 
previous Report) so they could continue their education and be more prepared for 
marriage.785 Law No 23 of 2002 on Child Protection had recommended an age of 18 for the 
minimum age for marriage, so as to discourage parents from forcing children into early 
marriages.786 The government also elaborated on this in its Response to the List of Issues787, 
                                                     
781
Ibid. 
782
Ibid. 
783
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 39
th
 Session, 800
th
 meeting, 27 July 2007, 
UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.800(A), paras. 34-38. 
784
Ibid. 
785
CEDAW, Indonesia’s Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report, supra note 705, para. 163. 
786
Ibid. 
 245 
 
blaming the continuing prevalence of child marriage in certain areas on the socio-cultural 
norms of society “which encourage the belief that marriage at a later age amounts to 
shameful conduct and therefore should be prevented”, as well as poverty. 
 Indonesia itself, in its Report, cited a number of further measures for combating 
socio-cultural stereotyping and, in particular, patriarchal biases in the population and the 
concept of the male breadwinner. One of these was the amendment of school text books, 
which it had discussed in previous sessions: a move towards more “gender sensitive” 
curricula and textbooks was described.788 A second was gender mainstreaming, which was 
cited on numerous occasions throughout Indonesia’s Report, in relation to Article 3789, 
Article 5790, Article 6791, Article 10792, and Article 12 (regarding reproductive health)793. The 
government was congratulated on this by the Committee, which commended this 
commitment to a policy of gender mainstreaming “at all levels”.794 
 On the issue of female genital mutilation, the Committee gave the following 
comment: 
 
The Committee is concerned about the incidence of the practice of female genital mutilation 
in Indonesia, which constitutes a form of violence against women and girls and is in violation 
of the Convention. It is further concerned about the reported phenomenon of the 
medicalization of the practice of female genital mutilation. The Committee is also concerned 
that there is no law prohibiting or penalizing the practice of female genital mutilation in 
Indonesia. 
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The Committee urges the State Party to speedily enact legislation prohibiting female genital 
mutilation and to ensure that offenders are prosecuted and adequately punished. It also 
recommends that the State party develop a plan of action and undertake efforts to eliminate 
the practice of female genital mutilation, including implementing public awareness-raising 
campaigns to change the cultural perceptions connected with female genital mutilation, and 
provide education regarding the practice as a violation of the human rights of women and girls 
that has no basis in religion.795 
 
 Although this does not refer explicitly to General Recommendation 14, it is clearly in 
line with it. The issue was not discussed in greater depth in session or in the list of issues and 
response, although the Chairperson of the Committee did argue that “female genital 
mutilation was not an Islamic custom, but rather an African one, [and] a clear fatwa had 
been issued specifying that the sharia prohibited the custom as a violation of a human 
right”796, though she did detail who had issued the fatwa or on what basis. 
 While female genital mutilation did not feature heavily in this reporting cycle except 
in the comment cited above, it leads us to the broader issue of Islamic custom, the sharia 
law, and restrictive/fundamentalist interpretations of it. This is a somewhat problematic area 
for our discussion, as we have hitherto attempted to draw a contradistinction between two 
conceptual strands of particularism: that which applies at the national or supranational level 
(Asian values, Singaporean Values, etc.), and that which applies at the individual minority 
level. Yet this issue is more complicated than it appears at face value. At one level is clear 
that the Indonesian State does not view sharia law as an element of its national character or 
legal system, but rather as an (unfortunate) by-product of its attempt to decentralise power 
and promote autonomy at the local government level. This was recognised, indeed, by the 
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Committee in its Concluding Comments: 
 
While appreciating the State party’s efforts to promote empowerment, flexibility and 
autonomy at the local government level and to increase the contributions of regional 
governments to the democratization of the country, the Committee is concerned that the 
process of decentralization has resulted in the uneven recognition and enforcement of 
women’s human rights and discrimination against women in some regions, including Aceh. The 
Committee is also concerned about the rise of religious fundamentalist groups advocating 
restrictive interpretations of sharia law, which discriminate against women, in several regions 
of the country.797 
 
The Committee then recommended that Indonesia review the implementation of local and 
regional laws to ensure that they fully complied with the national human rights laws and 
also Indonesia’s obligations under the Convention798, such as those regarding dress codes 
and similar, following comments in session to the effect that the central government, which 
had the authority to rescind local by-laws, “needed to be more forceful in exercising that 
authority in order to override discriminatory laws enacted at the local level”.799 
 So while we attempted to maintain a conceptual distinction between national or 
supranational values and those held by members of religious or ethnic minority groups 
within States, it is important to keep in mind this sub-theme in Indonesia’s reporting 
practice, as it has some relevance in terms of future concerns, and we shall also attempt to 
address some of its implications in the final section of this Chapter. 
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Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reports 
 
Indonesia submitted its combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reports in January 2011800; 
the Concluding Comments are pending and hence cannot be analysed, but a brief overview 
of the Report and some of the issues involved will be briefly given, followed by a summary of 
the List of Issues and the Response. 
 The Report begins with a reiteration of the problems associated with decentralization 
and democratization, which, despite the many positive opportunities it brought, and the 
growth in personal freedom, meant that a “moralistic perspective based on narrow 
interpretations of religious teachings that undermine women” had become legitimized.801 
Allowing people to determine what was best for themselves often “became construed with 
a gender-biased perspective”.802 However, alongside this, the new atmosphere now allowed 
societal problems “which were previously hidden” to be raised openly, and public 
participation in decision making strengthened.803 This illustrates rather neatly something of 
the wider concerns surrounding the Asian values discourse: the notion that individual 
freedom might lead to undesirable social outcomes. But it also indicates that, at least as far 
as Indonesia was concerned, the picture was more complicated that it might have been 
previously portrayed in the literature. 
 Gender mainstreaming, particularly as an attempt to break down patriarchal values, 
remains a constant motif. For instance, regional by-laws on gender mainstreaming in some 
areas are cited as measures designed to help implement Article 2804, and the universal 
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gender-mainstreaming strategy is cited as a measure under Article 3805. Additionally, a 30% 
quota for women representatives was introduced for political parties as a special temporary 
measure in view of the fact that, “culturally at the macro level” and “practices in micro 
circles and the family” were still not conducive for women playing active roles in politics.806 
This was also cited as a measure under Article 7 as a way of breaking down the “patriarchal 
mindset”.807 Gender mainstreaming was also used in education as a means to changing 
attitudes and biases.808 
 The Marriage Act 1974 remained controversial. It still set a young age (16) for women 
to enter marriage, and stipulated that the husband was the head of the family and that the 
husband could practice polygamy809, remaining unchanged from the state of play in previous 
reports. Efforts to reform it had been going on for “years”810, but had come up against 
considerable opposition and problems. 
Indonesia reiterated the problems associated with actual implementation of the 
Convention in view of the “de facto situation” in which values and cultural practices posed 
obstacles to change811. This was also true with respect to the implementation of Article 12. 
The practice of female circumcision in Indonesia was described in some detail812, with the 
conclusion being that, although “the majority of FGM practiced in Indonesia is symbolic 
and/or slight snips, and not brutal genital mutilation that cuts off parts of a baby girl’s 
genitalia”813, it would “be better to eliminate and prohibit female circumcision”.814 However, 
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the Ulemas Council, the government’s Islamic advisory body, had “banned the prohibition” 
of the practice815, and groups supporting female circumcision and women’s rights quoted 
hadiths that a woman’s clitoris ought to be nicked for sexual intercourse to be enjoyed.816 
Ultimately, it was felt that research ought to be conducted to “map the practice of female 
circumcision as well as study the various physical, biological, sexual, cultural, psychological 
and religious implications” so that a better policy could be produced.817 
 On Articles 15 and 16, the government highlighted, again, the obstacle of the 
difference between its own attitudes and those within society. In “certain cultures and sub-
groups”, for instance, discriminatory practices in matters of inheritance and the position of 
the husband and wife were still prevalent818 - the multitude of different ethnicities and 
cultures within Indonesia meant that some were more amenable to equal and mutually 
respectful “gender relations” than others. Furthermore, there were religious groups, driven 
by middle class women, which used the justification of women’s rights and religious 
teachings to advocate their presumably fundamentalist agenda and encourage polygamy.819 
In total, as an indication of the difficulty of the task of reconciling central government policy 
with regional by-laws, by 2007 the National Commission for Women had identified 1,406 
regional by-laws, out of 5,518 it had reviewed, that it recommended for annulment on the 
basis of being discriminatory towards women.820 
 The Committee took up some of these strands in its List of Issues, while also raising 
various questions that had been brought to it from NGOs.821 It was particularly concerned 
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about Islamic-based regional by-laws in the province of Aceh which apparently demanded 
dress codes for women, placed restrictions on their daily conduct, prevented menstruating 
women from participating in social life, criminalizing adultery, and so on.822 It also asked the 
government to explain the legal status of female circumcision; it referred to the 2010 fatwa 
on the subject (which the government had described as a fatwa “banning the prohibition” 
on female circumcision) and a subsequent Ministerial Regulation, No. 1636, which 
authorized female circumcision when practiced by medical personnel.823 It asked what steps 
were being made to withdraw this regulation and eliminate the “re-emerging practice” of 
female circumcision. Harking to its interactions with Malaysia and Singapore, the Committee 
also enquired about marital rape, a matter on which the Marriage Act 1974 was silent. Once 
again, the issue of the male domination of Indonesian society and culture was raised.824 
 In response, Indonesia explained that it was undertaking a number of measures to 
eliminate patriarchal stereotypes, including gender mainstreaming and reviewing school 
textbooks.825 It also explained its approach to female circumcision as follows: in 2006 the 
Director General of Public Health Management had issued a Circular Note prohibiting 
medical personnel from performing female circumcision, but the practice continued to take 
place performed by traditional medical practitioners, i.e. “dukuns” or shamans, which was 
likely to make it considerably more harmful to girls concerned. The situation was then 
rendered more complicated by the Indonesia Council of Ulemas’ 2008 fatwa that the 
abolition of female circumcision was against sharia provisions. This had resulted in Minister 
of Health regulation 1636 which provided a set of safeguards for medical personnel in 
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conducting the procedure, if requested to by parents. This “should not in any way be 
construed as encouraging or promoting the practice of female circumcision”826, but on the 
other hand “Indonesia pays attention to the dynamic of the implementation of rights and 
freedom of its citizens, particularly with regards to the freedom to practice their religion and 
beliefs”.827 This rather neatly encapsulates the difficulty of reconciling governmental and 
societal attitudes, but it also introduces that area of the cultural relativist issue which we 
have deliberately avoided discussing: the reconciliation of the rights of minorities to their 
religious and cultural practices where those practices conflict with internationally dictated 
standards. The caveats and comments regarding that issue that were stated earlier in the 
thesis still apply. 
 On marital rape, the government directed the Committee to its Law No. 23 of 2004 
on Domestic Violence, which “regulated marital violence such as marital rape”.828 This does 
not make it entirely clear whether it prohibited it or not, although it appears from a reading 
of the law itself that it prohibits sexual violence and that “Sexual violence, including marital 
rape...is defined as any act that constitutes forced sex, sexual harassment, abnormal and 
unwanted sexual relation, forced sex for commercial purposes and or for certain 
objectives”.829 
 And finally, on the topic of Aceh, which had been singled out in particular, the 
government described special cultural and economic privileges given to the province thanks 
to Law 11 of 2006 on Aceh Government. These had been instituted as part of the peace 
settlement which followed the lengthy independence conflict in Aceh, and provided for a 
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sharia court, a consultative assembly of Ulamas, and sharia police, which although subject to 
national law had a special and distinctive character; the government’s solution to problems 
arising in the sphere of women’s rights thanks to this special arrangement was training on 
gender perspectives to state apparatus and “other stakeholders” in the province itself.830 
 
iii) Analysis 
 
We can identify a number of different themes in the above overview which would constitute 
fruitful lines of inquiry in attempting to discern subsequent practice establishing the 
agreement of the parties on whether socio-cultural factors can justifiably affect the 
implementation of various provisions of the Convention. In keeping with our general 
approach, we will not address the questions of polygamy and female genital mutilation at 
this stage. The areas that have been identified are as follows: 
 
 Government guidelines on family size 
 Polygamy 
 The “breadwinner concept” and patriarchal attitudes in general 
 Requirements for women to seek consent from their husband or family for abortion, 
sterilization and night work 
 Minimum marriage ages 
 Quotas to encourage political participation 
 Female Circumcision 
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We shall now examine each of these in turn. 
 
Government guidelines on family size 
 
The Indonesian government had in its Initial Report stated that it put forth directives on the 
desirability of having a certain number of children in each family, and mentioned again in its 
Second and Third Report that the government suggested that the ideal family size was to 
have 2 children of either sex.831 The Committee took the view, in its comments in the Initial 
Report, that this was unsuitable, and that State family planning should only consist of giving 
information and guidance, and not directives of this kind.832 If we take an expansive view of 
the extent of Asian values and its impact, we can attribute Indonesia’s approach to family 
planning as an extension of the notion of a paternal government making decisions based on 
what is best for society, placed above the individual. If so, we can likewise portray the 
Committee’s comment as an authentic interpretation, to the effect that the socio-cultural 
values which would lead to the government issuing directives of this kind ought not to affect 
the way in which Article 12 obligations are implemented. 
 The recommendation that Indonesia's guidelines on family size were not an 
appropriate means to implement the Convention was given in only one Concluding 
Observation and it is also difficult to find any similar interpretive practice with respect to any 
other States Parties to the Convention; this thus probably fails to satisfy the Step 2 
requirements of commonality, concordancy and consistency, although it is true, as we have 
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established, that where there is practice in respect to only one State Party it can still be 
constitutive of VCLT subsequent practice if that State Party is the only relevant actor. Thus, if 
the Indonesia was the only State Party to have issued such recommendations, interpretive 
practice regarding that act could still possibly be considered. It is also worth noting that, in 
its General Recommendation No. 21, the Committee expressed the view that the decision of 
a woman to have children “must not be limited by spouse, parent, partner or 
government”833. Nonetheless, in the absence of other interpretive practice on this point, it 
seems most appropriate to suggest that there is no interpretive practice with regard to the 
Indonesian government's recommendation on family size to whether there is an obligation 
to implement Article 12 in this fashion or not. 
 
Polygamy 
 
The Committee takes a more-or-less consistent line on polygamy in Indonesia: that the 
practice was discriminatory and prohibited under Article 2 and Article 16 of the Convention. 
In its remarks on Indonesia’s Initial Report this is not made absolutely clear; indeed, the 
comments seem to imply that polygamy would be permissible were women to have the 
same right as men to take more than one spouse.834 Yet, at least from the Second and Third 
Periodic Report onwards, the Committee’s clear stance has been that polygamy is 
discriminatory per se – presumably on the unspoken basis that, since in practice the right to 
practice polygamy was never likely to extend to women there was little to be gained from 
entertaining the notion. The Committee’s interpretive practice in this area is specific, 
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focused, and simple: socio-cultural mores should not affect implementation of the 
Convention to the extent that they allow for the practice of polygamy in any form 
whatsoever. This is, then, authentically interpretive practice which meets the Step 1 
requirement. 
 The practice is also clearly consistent, in that it was stated more-or-less continuously 
throughout Indonesia's reporting history (with the possible exception of the Initial Report, 
where the Committee appeared to imply that allowing men and women the same right to 
marry multiple spouses would not be in violation of the Convention). Given what is stated in 
General Recommendation No. 21835, which expressed the view that the failure of a State 
Party to eliminate polygamy contravened women’s equality with men (presumably under 
Articles 2 and 3), and given what we know from the Committee's interpretive practice with 
regard to Singapore and Malaysia, let alone other States such as Uganda836, the Congo837, or 
Bhutan838 (to name but a few), it is undoubtedly the case that there is common, concordant 
and consistent interpretive practice indicating that Article 1, 5 (a) and 16 are to be 
interpreted to mean that States Parties have an obligation to eliminate polygamy where it 
exists, irrespective of socio-cultural norms. 
 The Indonesian government’s responses show obvious agreement with the 
Committee’s position: as our overview demonstrated, in practically every instance in which 
the issue of polygamy was raised, the government expressed the view that the practice 
ought to be prohibited and eliminated, whether in the constructive dialogue for its 
Second/Third Periodic Report839, or for the Sixth/Seventh, where polygamy was described in 
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purely negative terms, as a “problem” women faced840. Notwithstanding all of the difficulties 
that it faced in implementing this element of Article 16, in other words, from Islamic 
personal law to the campaigning of pro-polygamy women’s groups, Indonesia expressed its 
agreement with the Committee’s interpretive practice in this area explicitly.  
 However, the usual caveat applies that, whether or not Indonesia agrees with the 
interpretive practice of the Committee in this regard, disagreement of other States Parties 
on the permissibility of polygamy would prevent us from stating that there was subsequent 
practice establishing the agreement of the parties on this interpretation of Articles 1, 5(a) 
and 16. 
 
The “breadwinner concept” and patriarchal attitudes 
 
It is clear from the reporting history as a whole that the notion that the husband is the head 
of the household, and conversely the cultural attitudes that confined women to being 
mothers and housewives, is at the core of most of the concerns that the Committee has had 
with respect to Indonesia – whether it be expressed under comments regarding 
discrimination in general, health, education, labour, or elsewhere. Indeed, it is difficult to 
identify interpretive practice that is specific or detailed enough to constitute authentic 
interpretations meeting the Step 1 requirement, given that the theme is expressed so 
generally and universally: while statements such as “policies and programmes developed on 
the basis of these stereotypes limit women’s participation and entitlements, thereby 
impeding implementation of the Convention”841 are useful in terms of establishing the 
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Committee’s overall stance, they are not specific enough to constitute authentic 
interpretations – primarily because of the lack of intentionality discussed above. 
Nonetheless, there are some areas where more concrete interpretive practice sufficient to 
satisfy the Step 1 requirements can be identified. 
The first of these is gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming in itself is cited on 
so many occasions throughout Indonesia’s reporting history in relation to, primarily, efforts 
to combat stereotypes and socio-cultural factors which impact negatively on the status of 
women (patriarchal norms chief among them) that it is difficult to categorise the interpretive 
practice as anything other than a general assumption that the Committee deems it to be an 
appropriate means by which to implement the Convention in broad terms. Nonetheless, it is 
recommended by the Committee, and, more frequently, approved of by the Committee 
when raised by Indonesian delegates as a means of fulfilling Convention obligations, on a 
sufficient number of specific occasions, and in relation to sufficient number of specific policy 
areas, that we can readily state that there is authentic interpretive practice to the effect that 
gender mainstreaming is the preferable means by which to remove socio-cultural 
stereotypes and patriarchal attitudes. To put it more simply: gender mainstreaming ought to 
be used as a means to implement the provisions of the Convention, and, far from the socio-
cultural factors of patriarchal attitudes having any impact on the manner of implementation, 
those socio-cultural factors are by definition to be removed. 
The second of these is the use of school text books to combat stereotyping, which is, 
again, a prominent element of Indonesia’s reporting history – both as a recommendation of 
the Committee and as a response by the State. Here, the authentic interpretative practice 
would be that “engendering” the school curriculum ought to be used as a means of 
eliminating socio-cultural stereotypes under Article 5, and that prevailing cultural attitudes 
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ought to have no effect on this (and indeed will ultimately be undermined by it). 
The third is in legislation: the fact that the Marriage Act 1974 perpetuated the notion 
that the man was the head of the household and that the wife had a domestic role meant 
that the legislation had to be amended to eliminate the provisions in which this occurred. 
This is authentic interpretive practice to the effect that socio-cultural mores should be no 
consideration when delimiting the roles of husbands and wives – i.e. in the implementation 
of Article 16 insofar as it results in legislation which provides for the husband being the head 
of the household. 
The fourth and final is that the Committee approved of Indonesia’s 30% quota for 
women representatives in political parties. This constitutes authentic interpretive practice 
indicating that affirmative action in the form of quotas is an appropriate means by which to 
implement Article 7 and Article 4 of the Convention. 
 This is a complex area comprising a number of separate strands of interpretive 
practice. First, there is interpretive practice indicating that gender mainstreaming ought to 
be used to realise the general implementation of the Convention as a means of realising the 
obligations to eliminate gender stereotyping, discrimination, and genuine equality. Second, 
there is practice indicating that the revision of school textbooks to include non-stereotyped 
depictions of men and women is an effective means of eliminating gender stereotypes and 
overturn patriarchal attitudes. Third, there is practice indicating that legislation stipulating 
that the husband/father is the head of the household perpetuates stereotypes, patriarchal 
attitudes, and the “breadwinner concept”, and hence Indonesia has the obligation to alter 
that provision. Finally, there is practice indicating that quotas are a suitable and effective 
means of resolving the problem of a lack of female participation in politics due to traditional 
custom or societal attitudes. 
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 Gender mainstreaming is mentioned so often by the State Party itself, and 
interpretive practice praising its use in the implementation of various Articles of the 
Convention so frequent, that it is difficult to argue that the view it as anything other than 
consistent: the Committee interprets the Convention to require gender mainstreaming as a 
means by which to realise at the least Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 and 12, specifically insofar as it 
would reduce stereotyping and patriarchal attitudes, and mitigate against religious or 
cultural factors which might perpetuate them. It must also be regarded as common and 
concordant – it is required of numerous other States Parties in relation to a wide range of 
Articles, among them the Dominican Republic842, the UK843, Trinidad and Tobago844, and 
Canada845. It may be recalled that the Committee also criticised Singapore for failing to pay 
adequate attention to gender mainstreaming or demonstrate a clear understanding of what 
it meant846. It would seem that the interpretive practice viewing gender mainstreaming as a 
requirement for fulfilling Indonesia's obligations under the Articles mentioned passes both 
Steps 1 and 2. 
 Revision of school textbooks as a means for eliminating stereotypes and patriarchal 
attitudes is likewise a fixture of the reporting history of Indonesia, as it is for many States 
Parties, such as Nepal847, Croatia848, Israel849, and so on. As with gender mainstreaming, 
then, it seems relatively clear that the interpretive practice viewing the revision of school 
textbooks to remove content perpetuating stereotypes or patriarchal attitudes as necessary 
in Indonesia's implementation of Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 is common, concordant and 
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consistent. 
 On the obligation to alter the provision in the Indonesian Marriage Act 1974 to 
remove provisions perpetuating the notion of the husband or father as the head of the 
household and, hence, the breadwinner, it is certainly the case that the Committee has given 
similar interpretations of Convention obligations in other areas. In General Recommendation 
No. 21 the Committee had described the tendency in some countries towards a belief in 
patriarchal family structures which places a father, husband or son in a favourable position in 
negative terms850, and had given a similar view regarding the amendment or abolition of 
legislation which set the husband or father as head of the household in its Concluding 
Comments towards Burundi851. This makes the case for arguing commonality and 
concordancy somewhat less complete for the interpretive practice in this area, but still 
perhaps plausible, although the Human Rights Committee has, in fact, been much more 
likely to interpret the removal of this type of provision in the ICCPR context than has the 
CEDAW Committee852; it is clear in the wider context that the CEDAW Committee takes the 
view that State Parties have the obligation to change societal attitudes placing males as head 
of households by dint of their sex, although the question of whether the interpretive 
practice is widespread enough to be common, concordant and consistent remains 
debatable. 
 Finally, we come to the question of quotas as a suitable and effective means of 
increasing female participation in politics and thus circumventing or diminishing socio-
cultural attitudes. The Committee has certainly expressed views on this in a wide variety of 
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contexts. In General Recommendations No. 5 and  No. 23 it gave the opinion that quotas and 
numerical goals were appropriate special measures under Article 4 giving effect to Articles 7 
and 8, and noted that a rate of female participation in politics of around 30% was needed.853 
The need for quotas as a means of implementing Article 7 in particular has also frequently 
been expressed by the Committee to other States Parties, among them Estonia854, 
Guatemala855, Brazil856 and Yemen857, and has often given the number of 30% as a 
recommended figure, as it did with, for instance, Peru858. It is certainly arguable that the 
interpretive practice here is common, concordant and consistent. 
 Agreement regarding the use of gender mainstreaming, the revision of textbooks, 
and the use of quotas to encourage female participation in politics on the part of Indonesia 
itself should be obvious from our overview of its reporting history, in which agreement is 
made explicit by numerous examples of the measures taken by the government in those 
areas. Likewise, in its Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report, the government described the review 
it had undertaken on its Marriage Act 1974 and its conclusion that the law had to be revised 
and amended to remove the provision establishing the husband as the head of a 
household859, demonstrating clear agreement with the interpretive practice of the 
Committee. Only a comprehensive assessment of the views of the other States Parties would 
reveal whether there were instances of disagreement, however; and in fact there are some 
reasons to be dubious about agreement on the issue of gender mainstreaming: Singapore, at 
least, expressed the view that it did not deem gender mainstreaming to be necessary in 
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order to meet its obligations under the CEDAW.860  
 
Requirements to seek consent 
 
The Committee expressed concern about a number of areas in which women were required 
under Indonesian law to seek the consent of their husbands in order to undertake various 
activities. These included abortions, sterilization, working at night, and taking maternity 
leave (though this appeared only in the summary record of the 378th meeting and not in any 
Concluding Comment, so its consideration as authentic interpretive practice is doubtful). The 
interpretation that socio-cultural values should have no effect on women’s rights to equality 
in health care (regarding abortion and sterilization) and right to equality in employment 
(regarding night work) is specific and detailed enough, and has the requisite intentionality, to 
satisfy the Step 1 requirements. 
 The Committee several times expressed the opinion that the provisions in Indonesian 
law requiring women to gain the consent of their husband before undergoing sterilization or 
an abortion, or from their husband or father before performing work at night, perpetuated 
patriarchal attitudes and were in contravention of the Convention. The interpretive practice 
certainly qualifies as consistent, having been mentioned by the Committee throughout 
Indonesia’s reporting history. The Committee has also stated that any decision on whether 
or not to have children must not be limited by either the spouse or the government under 
Article 16 (1) (e), in General Recommendation No. 21861, and has required States Parties to 
similarly amend legislation requiring spousal consent for “tubal ligation” (i.e. sterilization) in 
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Saint Vincent and the Grenadines862, for sterilization in Chile863, and for abortion in 
Turkey864. Regarding night work, a cursory survey of the Committee’s Concluding Comments 
for other State Parties did not reveal similar interpretive practice as that for Indonesia 
expecting the State to remove the requirement for spousal or parental consent, though 
there were instances in which general provisions prohibiting women from working at night 
were required to be removed.865 The interpretive practice deeming the requirement for 
spousal consent regarding abortions or sterilization is arguably common, concordant and 
consistent, therefore, although the case for making a similar argument regarding spousal 
consent for night work is less well established. 
 Agreement regarding the interpretive practice is however, not apparent. Indonesian 
delegates appeared to take a fundamentally different view to that of the Committee with 
regard to the issues of sterilization and abortion and night work, apparently deeming the 
requirement for spousal consent regarding abortion to be justifiable on the basis that it 
reflected the “mutual consent and responsibility within the family”866 and for night work to 
ensure extra safety and provide additional protection by a woman’s family for her rights and 
dignity867. The connotations between these views and the Asian values tropes of the strong 
family are obvious, and indicate somewhat robust disagreement on the part of Indonesia 
with the Committee’s view that socio-cultural attitudes should not affect implementation in 
this sphere. Thus, simply on the basis of Indonesia's reaction to this line of interpretation 
alone, we can conclude that there is no subsequent practice establishing the agreement of 
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the parties that socio-cultural values should not affect how Article 16 is implemented insofar 
as spousal consent for abortion, night work or sterilization is concerned. 
 
Minimum Marriage Ages 
 
The Committee consistently recommended that Indonesia revise its laws on marriage to 
make the minimum age of marriage for both men and women at least 18. Indonesia’s 
recommendatory approach, in which girls were advised to marry at the age of 20 or above, 
was not considered suitable, and the socio-cultural norm that marriage at a later age was 
“shameful conduct and therefore should be prevented” was no justification for not 
instituting equality in this regard. 
 The Committee’s view the Indonesia was requirement to amend its laws on marriage 
to make the minimum age 18 for both men and women is given consistently throughout its 
reporting history, and clearly a mere recommendation on the part of the government that 
women not marry until 20 is not viewed as satisfactory. Here, of course, there are in fact two 
separate lines of interpretation: that the minimum marriage age for men and women should 
be the same, and that it should be at least 18. This is concordant with General 
Recommendation No. 21, which had expressed the view that the minimum age for marriage 
should be 18 for both men and women, notwithstanding the provisions of the CRC, and 
provisions setting different marriage ages for men and women ought to be abolished as 
discriminatory and based on what the Committee deemed to be a false view about rates of 
development.868 The Committee has also given many similar interpretations with regard to 
the obligations of other States Parties, both in terms of making the minimum age the same 
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for both sexes, and it terms of raising the minimum age to 18 or greater, such as Romania869, 
Moldova870, Armenia871, Mexico872 and others. The case for commonality, concordancy and 
consistency is therefore reasonably strong. 
 The question of agreement here is somewhat complicated, however. Indonesia’s 
overall approach was to recommend that girls not marry until the age of 20 and boys not to 
marry until the age of 25; it clearly, then, disagreed with the fundamental reasoning of the 
Committee as given in General Recommendation No. 21 that there was absolutely no 
difference in intellectual development between boys and girls, and different marriage ages 
based on this rationale was based on an “incorrect assumption”.873 It also, clearly, seemed 
to view the fact that marriage at a later age amounted to “shameful conduct” in the socio-
cultural norms of some groups within Indonesian society meant that it had to take a 
sensitive or pragmatic approach.874 However, at the same time a review of the Marriage Act 
1974 had resulted in a draft Act that would make the minimum marriageable age for men 
and women the same.875 This draft Act apparently remains a draft, yet it indicates a certain 
commonality of views between at least some elements of the government and the 
Committee. While in the Sixth and Seventh Report Indonesia describes ongoing efforts to 
reform the Marriage Act, it does not give a final opinion on amending the provision on the 
minimum marriage age. The case for Indonesia’s agreement, then, is uncertain, and given 
that this is the case, we must conclude that there is no subsequent practice establishing the 
agreement of the parties on the interpretation of Article 16 in this regard. 
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Female Circumcision 
 
The Committee’s stance on female circumcision was clear: that it constituted a form of 
violence against women and hence the existence of the practice was a violation of 
Indonesia’s obligations under Article 1 and 12. Despite the socio-cultural and religious values 
surrounding the practice, therefore, interpretive practice indicates the Committee believed 
that those values should have no impact on the implementation of Indonesia’s obligations in 
this area. 
 The issue of female circumcision does not arise until later in Indonesia’s reporting 
history, although it is dealt with across two reporting cycles. The Committee gives 
categorical statements establishing that it views Indonesia’s obligation as to eliminate the 
practice without delay, irrespective of societal values and the difference between its form in 
Indonesia as opposed to societies in Africa where it is practiced. This is concordant with the 
Committee’s General Recommendation No. 19 and No. 24; it is also in common with the 
Committee’s interpretive practice regarding Uganda876, Yemen877, Switzerland878, Ethiopia879 
and Nigeria880. The case for its consistency, concordancy and commonality is therefore very 
strong. 
 There is also a good case for agreement, at least on Indonesia’s part if not those 
other States. The Indonesian government, in its Sixth and Seventh Reports, expressed the 
view that it “would be better to eliminate and prohibit female circumcision” even though, in 
its opinion, the practice as it occurred within Indonesia was far less damaging than the 
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manner in which it took place in Africa.881 However, there is also some ambiguity on this 
point: after going into some detail on the role of the Ulema in “prohibiting the ban” on 
female circumcision, as the Indonesian delegates put it, the ultimate conclusion appears to 
have been that research ought to be conducted to “map the practice of female circumcision 
[and] study the various physical, biological, sexual, cultural, psychological and religious 
implications” so that a better policy could be produced.882 The implication of this statement 
appears to be that Indonesia’s view on the matter is not settled, and some level of leeway 
for Islamic or cultural norms regarding the practice was being considered. This undermines 
the case for arguing that the interpretive practice of the Committee here meets all of the 3 
Steps for subsequent practice, and if Indonesia’s qualified statements on the matter are too 
ambiguous to be viewed as constituting agreement, then development of subsequent 
practice establishing the agreement of the parties on the matter would be obviated.  
 
iv) Concluding Remarks 
 
Thus, despite the spirit of cooperation present in Indonesia’s interactions with the 
Committee, the results are somewhat mixed. Regarding government recommendations on 
family size, it is difficult to state anything definitive, as the interpretive practice of the 
Committee in that area seems to relate to Indonesia alone: we have seen that practice of, or 
in relation to, only one State Party to a multilateral treaty would be extremely unlikely to be 
constitutive of subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties, unless that 
State Party is the only relevant actor – and even then, at least based on the WTO 
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jurisprudence, there would have to be some reluctance in drawing any conclusions from it.  
 On polygamy, the situation is much clearer: commonality, concordancy and 
consistency are certainly present in the Committee’s interpretive practice, to the effect that 
under Article 1, 2, 3, 5(a) and 16 States Parties have an obligation to eliminate and prohibit 
polygamy, irrespective of social or cultural mores. And Indonesia, at least, appears to agree 
with this interpretative practice, even given the difficulties associated with implementation. 
The usual caveat that disagreement may exist on the part of other States Parties, does of 
course apply. Similarly, we can with a degree of certainty argue that there is commonality, 
concordancy and consistency in the interpretative practice on Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 
inasmuch as the use of gender mainstreaming, textbook revision, and quotas to encourage 
female participation in politics are to be implemented irrespective of socio-cultural values – 
and, indeed, to directly affect those values; but that disagreement may exist, and, in the 
case of gender mainstreaming, does appear to be expressed by Singapore at the very least.  
 However, in other areas (requirements to seek consent, minimum marriage ages, and 
female circumcision) Indonesia’s responses to the Committee’s interpretive practice make 
the results ambiguous at best – too ambiguous in the case of the requirement to seek 
consent and the minimum age for marriage, indeed, to satisfy the Step 3 requirement for 
agreement implied by silence. Indonesia’s disagreement by itself would be enough to 
prevent us from drawing a conclusion that there was subsequent practice establishing the 
agreement of the parties on the Committee’s interpretations, setting aside the responses of 
other States Parties.    
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C. Malaysia 
 
i) General Remarks 
 
Malaysia has currently submitted two Reports to the CEDAW Committee, though due to 
tardiness they were ultimately submitted together in one document883; this is the only 
document which the Committee has thus been able to give Concluding Observations to.  At 
the end of its Concluding Observations to that first Report884 the Committee invited Malaysia 
to submit its Third and Fourth Reports in a combined form in 2008, which it did not do. 
 There is an interesting difference in tone between the Committee’s treatment of 
Malaysia and Singapore, and indeed between the approaches taken by Malaysia and 
Singapore. Surprisingly, Malaysia does not adopt the standpoint that the government has 
any role in giving effect to Asian values – at least with respect to women’s rights – and 
nowhere claims that particularist interpretations of the Convention are required. By 
contrast, like Indonesia, Malaysia tends to portray socio-cultural factors as hindrances to the 
implementation of the Convention which need to be ameliorated or removed. On numerous 
occasions throughout its combined report the government “recognises that poverty, lack of 
education and sometimes culture and tradition are major hindrances to women’s 
progress”885, that “access to social services is, to some extent, culturally and socially 
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determined”886, and that “various cultural and institutional factors which are predicated on 
restrictive notions of a woman’s role in society often intersect to form barriers to the 
advancement of women’s career and upward mobility in an organisation”887. It bemoans 
that fact that “in many cultures in Malaysia, the man is normally the head of the household 
while the wife is subservient and has to attend to his needs and comfort as well as take care 
of the children and elderly relatives in an extended family”.888 Perhaps most surprisingly, 
given Malaysia’s recent history with regard to human rights, it even cites Asian values as a 
barrier to progress: “Gender roles and ethnicity have been found to impact women’s 
participation in nation building. In the construction of gender role, each ethnic group in 
Malaysia is influenced by Asian values, which determine the role of women in the 
domestic/private sphere while men dominate the public sphere”.889 
 Unlike Singapore, whose stance was more ambivalent, the Malaysian government, 
like Indonesia's, casts itself in the role of working against these “conservative and traditional 
attitudes”890, which form barriers to its implementation of the Convention, leading women 
to women prioritising their family over their career due to “social conditioning”891, causing 
girls to choose traditionally female-oriented university courses892, being detrimental to the 
opportunities of women to become managers and decision-makers in business893, and failing 
to reward women economically for the fact that they bear most of the responsibility for 
maintaining the health of their families.894 The government, in this context, has the duty to 
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“eradicate stereotypical/negative assumptions about women in the workplace”895, to 
introduce gender mainstreaming and facilitate changes in the socio-cultural environment896, 
to address and change prevailing perceptions about the role of women so as to allow them 
more effectively to enter the labour market, and so on. 
 What is also notable is that, while the government does describe Asian values as a 
kind of umbrella term to describe commonalities between the different cultural and ethnic 
groups within Malaysia, it does not talk about Malaysian society in the kind of unified terms 
in which Singapore does. By contrast, the government is eager to emphasise that Malaysia 
has a pluralism of different groups, each with somewhat different customs and traditions, 
even if these have similar effects. For instance: 
 
In most cultural practices of the ethnic groups in Malaysia, the concept of family includes also 
the extended families of the respective husband and wife. Thus, this affects the autonomy and 
decision-making powers in a family particularly decisions pertaining to woman issues [sic] as 
well as the rights of a wife. For instance, in all cultures in Malaysia, a wife is expected to obey 
her husband who includes the husband’s family and to behave according to their wishes.897 
 
Or: 
 
In many cultures in Malaysia, the man is normally the head of the household while the wife is 
subservient and has to attend to his needs and comfort as well as take care of the children and 
elderly relatives in an extended family.898 
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Or: 
 
In the construction of gender role, each ethnic group in Malaysia is influenced by Asian values, 
which determine the role of women in the domestic/private sphere while men dominate the 
public sphere. The Malays are influenced by the customs or “adat” and religious (Islamic) 
teachings...Likewise, the Indian community is also influenced by the Hindu religion and Indian 
customs. The Chinese, on the other hand, determine gender roles through customary rather 
than religious practices.899 
 
It rarely talks in general terms about the values or norms of Malaysian society in general, 
and even draws attention to varying attitudes between economic classes: “Although the 
ideas about the role of women have changed and become more liberal among the educated 
or modern communities in Malaysia, there are still many people who cling to the traditional 
socio-cultural stereotypes and attitudes about the role of women”.900 
 The overall impression is that, while both Malaysia and Singapore take socio-cultural 
values relatively seriously as factors which affect the implementation of some aspects of the 
Convention, Malaysia’s view of those socio-cultural values is predominantly negative, where 
Singapore’s is mixed. Where the government of Singapore to a certain degree takes on some 
socio-cultural values as its own – for instance, the focus on the strong family - Malaysia 
portrays itself in opposition them. 
 Nonetheless, it is important to note the one major exception which Malaysia sets out 
in this schema – Islamic personal law. The government had entered a number of 
reservations in this respect, declaring itself not to be bound by the Convention where its 
provisions might clash with Islamic personal law or its constitution. Gradually, in 1998 and 
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2010 these reservations were partially withdrawn, although as of writing Malaysia still 
retains the following reservation: 
 
The Government of Malaysia declares that Malaysia’s accession is subject to the 
understanding that the provisions of the Convention do not conflict with the provisions of the 
Islamic Sharia’ law and the Federal Constitution of Malaysia.  With regard thereto, further, the 
Government of Malaysia does not consider itself bound by the provisions of articles 9 (2), 16 
(1) (a), 16 (1) (f) and 16 (1) (g) of the aforesaid Convention. 
 
In relation to article 11 of the Convention, Malaysia interprets the provisions of this article as a 
reference to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of equality between men and 
women only. 
 
In practice, this primarily relates to the rules on marriage for Muslims, which for a separate 
regime than for non-Muslims. The primary differences in substance in this category are 
different rules on polygamy (which is prohibited under civil law but permissible for Muslims 
– despite there being a tradition of polygamy in Chinese custom it is not permitted for 
Chinese non-Muslims901), the right to dowry of Muslim brides902, and a separate system for 
divorce for Muslims incorporating the concept of the talaq, the fasakh and the khuluq.903 As 
we shall see, this area was one in which the Committee voiced a number of concerns. 
 It bears repeating that this thesis does not have the aim of addressing questions of 
minority rights, personal law regimes, or cultural rights in depth. As was stated in Chapter II, 
and in the section of this Chapter on Singapore and the CEDAW, although those areas are all 
conceptually linked to cultural particularism in some respects when it comes to traditional or 
religious practices, our analysis does not have a minority-rights or cultural-rights 
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perspective.  
 Nonetheless, as with Indonesia, it seems appropriate to discuss what we might 
describe as Islamic traditions or Islamic values in our analysis, since those values form part of 
what any lay person would describe as ‘Malaysian culture’: the majority of the population 
are Muslim and the Constitution of Malaysia makes Islam the state religion904 and stipulates 
adherence to Islam as one of the constituent elements of being a Malay; indeed, if an ethnic 
Malay were to abandon Islam, his or her ethnic status would, constitutionally, no longer be 
Malay905. Since Malays constitute more than half of the population, then, in effect Islamic 
marriage rules affect the majority of the people of Malaysia. This means that we shall 
include these Islamic marriage rules as an element of the broad, societal-level cultural values 
which this thesis focuses on. 
 
Initial and Second Periodic Report 
 
The Committee gave its Concluding Comments to Malaysia’s combined Report on 31st May 
2006.906 In contrast to the approach taken with Singapore – a reflection, perhaps, of 
Malaysia’s own approach – the Committee adopts a somewhat more conciliatory 
perspective. One of its first recommendations was that Malaysia remove its reservations to 
Article 9 (2), 16 (1) (a), 16 (1) (c), 16 (1) (f), 16 (1) (g), and 16 (2) – especially those to Article 
16, which it deemed to be contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.907  (At no 
stage during the 731st meeting, however, does it appear to have discussed the reasons for 
the reservations to Article 16 with the Malaysian representatives.) These reservations, which 
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create exemptions for the application of Islamic personal law, refer to: 
 
 Equal rights for men and women in choosing the nationality of their children 
 The same right to enter marriage 
 The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and its dissolution 
 The same rights and responsibilities for guardianship of children 
 The same personal rights as husband and wife 
 The betrothal of a child having no legal effect 
 
Of particular concern to the committee were the issues of polygamy (the same right to enter 
marriage), the marriage of minors, division of property, and the question of divorce, though 
most of these issues were raised only in the meetings and thus are not mentioned in great 
detail in the Concluding Comments. It is notable also that there was a general comment 
made in session that Malaysia seemed to be adopting a narrow reading of the sharia, which 
was not in keeping with the “encouraging trend” to adapt Islamic personal law to “the 
current realities of women's lives” in some jurisdictions.908 
 Regarding polygamy, while the question was aired as to why women did not have a 
reciprocal right to take more than one husband909, the main comments revolved around the 
specific  application of the law on polygamy (the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) 
(Amendment) Bill 2005 (IFLA)). The emphasis was on “controlling” the practice of polygamy, 
and in particular there were questions about the provision in the IFLA after amendment 
which allowed the sharia court to grant a polygamous marriage where it was “just or 
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necessary” as opposed to the previous “just and necessary” (the former apparently being a 
looser set of criteria).910 The answer was provided that, in fact, the word “just” was more 
difficult to prove if it was not tied to necessity and thus the amendment made the law more 
stringent.911 A second concern was on the relationship between Islamic and civil law: it was 
not clear what the status of a first wife and her children would be if her husband was a non-
Muslim who converted to Islam and then married a second wife.912 For its part, Malaysia 
stressed that Islam “favours monogamy” and that polygamy under Syariah law was an 
exception; it seems relatively clear that disapproval of polygamy is strongly implied.913 
 In any event, the Committee does not issue the direct recommendation that 
polygamy ought to be prohibited. This may be in recognition of the fact that, in spite of its 
own stance that Malaysia's reservations to Article 5 (a) and the various provisions of Article 
16 are against the object and purpose of the Convention, it needed to take a pragmatic 
stance and argue for a reconciliation between this area of Islamic personal law and the 
Convention given that Malaysia's reservations remained in place. It is important to note that 
the Committee has, in its General Recommendation 21, expressed the view that, where a 
constitution guarantees equal rights for men and women, and yet polygamous marriage is 
permitted in accordance with personal or customary law, this would violate that 
constitutional right. (Although, somewhat inexplicably, it deems this to be a violation of 
Article 5 (a) of the Convention, on the removal of gender stereotyping.) 
 On the marriage of minors, the Committee expressed the general concern about the 
fact that the minimum age of marriage for women was 16 but 18 for men, and the opinion 
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was expressed that removing the reservations to Article 16 (1) (a) and (b) with a view to 
making the minimum age of marriage 18 for both sexes would strengthen the position of 
women in society.914 However, a more pressing concern that emerged in session was the 
marriage of girls in the 10-14 year old bracket, which was “entirely unacceptable”.915 
Although Section 8 of the IFLA states that no marriage where the man is under 18 or the 
woman under the age of 16 may be solemnized or registered, it provides an exception 
where the Syariah Judge “has granted his permission in writing in certain circumstances”.916 
These certain circumstances are not revealed in the Report or in the Summary Records, but 
it is clear from the Summary Records that figures for marriages of girls between the age of 
10 and 14 were made available to the Committee – presumably through an NGO submission 
– and this was not denied by the Malaysian representatives. Indeed, the delegation “shared 
the Committee’s concern”.917 
On the division of property, the pre-sessional working group had inquired about 
certain provisions of the IFLA which appeared to give a Muslim man “the right to claim a 
share of his existing wife’s assets upon his polygamous marriage and the right to get a court 
order to stop his wife from disposing of her assets, forcing a wife to choose maintenance or 
division of marital property upon a husband’s polygamous marriage”.918 This, the delegation 
explained, was a misrepresentation, or misunderstanding, since the law itself was relatively 
clear in stating that “any party to [a] marriage” registered by the Syariah Court could make 
an application for the division of assets jointly owned by the husband and wife, and that this 
                                                     
914
Ibid., para. 34. 
915
Ibid., paras. 39-40. 
916
See CEDAW, Malaysia’s Initial and Second Periodic Reports, supra note 883, paras. 399-402. 
917
CEDAW, 35
th
 Session, Summary Record of the 732
nd
 meeting, supra note 909, para. 47. 
918
CEDAW, List of issues and questions with regard to the consideration of an initial and periodic report: 
Malaysia, 10 February 2006, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/Q/2. 
 279 
 
did not apply to assets acquired solely by the wife.919 The Syariah Court had the power to 
issue orders for a husband to provide maintenance for a wife, for a husband to provide 
maintenance to children, or for the distribution of assets jointly acquired by the husband 
and wife during marriage, but no more.920 There remained some confusion on this point – in 
session, one of the Committee members expressed the concern that “allowing a polygamous 
husband to dispossess his existing wife or wives and use the joint matrimonial assets to 
prepare the dowry for a new wife implicitly forced those women to choose between 
maintenance and the division of matrimonial property”.921 This was not possible, according 
to the delegates, because any property acquired by the wife alone during the course of a 
marriage was not regarded as joint property, and a husband would have no claim to 
property belonging to his wife before their marriage.922 A number of Committee members 
confessed to being “confused” by the laws on polygamy and the disposal of property923, but 
the rules as explained in Annex IX to Malaysia’s reply to the list of issues seem relatively 
clear; they also indicate that, at least insofar as disposal of property was concerned, it was 
determined that there should be no discrimination. 
Finally, in its list of issues the Committee had raised a potential violation under 
Article 16 of the Convention in the way Syariah rules on divorce were applied in Malaysia: 
traditionally men had the right to talaq divorce (repudiation of marriage) whereas women 
could only petition the court for divorce (through falakh), and yet amendments to the IFLA 
meant that men would now also be able to divorce through falakh while the woman did not 
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receive the reciprocal right to talaq.924 This indicates, again, a somewhat pragmatic 
perspective on the part of the Committee: while separate systems for divorce operated for 
men and women, the primary concern should be that men did not have access to both 
systems where women had only one. The Malaysian delegates justified extending the right 
of falakh to men on the grounds that it was only to be used in limited circumstances, so that 
it did not result in a man having to pay maintenance to his wife where “conditions of the 
wife defeats the intention of the marriage”, as he would if he could only divorce her through 
talaq.925 
The pre-sessional and sessional discussion of all of these issues seems to have 
remained oddly inconclusive in the final analysis. The Committee’s Concluding Comments on 
the area are as follows: 
 
The Committee is concerned about the existence of the dual legal system of civil law and 
multiple versions of Syariah law, which results in continuing discrimination against women, 
particularly in the field of marriage and family relations. The Committee is also concerned 
about the State party’s restrictive interpretation of Syariah law, including in the recent [IFLA], 
which adversely affects the rights of Muslim women. The Committee is further concerned 
about the lack of clarity in the legal system... 
 
The Committee urges the State party to undertake a process of law reform to remove 
inconsistencies between civil law and Syariah law, including by ensuring that any conflict of law 
with regard to women’s rights to equality and non-discrimination is resolved in full compliance 
with the Constitution and the provisions of the Convention and the Committee’s general 
recommendations, particularly general recommendation 21 on equality in marriage and family 
relations. In this regard, it encourages the State party to obtain information on comparative 
jurisprudence and legislation, where more progressive interpretations of Islamic law have 
been codified in legislative reforms. It also encourages the State party to take all necessary 
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steps to increase support for law reform...926 
 
 This is somewhat nonspecific – it is not clear, for instance, what “progressive 
interpretations of Islamic law” refers to - and leads us back to general recommendation 21, 
which we have discussed above. 
 Besides the rules on marriage and related issues, the Committee aired concerns in a 
number of other relevant areas – marital rape and gender stereotyping. 
Like Singapore, Malaysia does not criminalise marital rape: sexual intercourse by a 
man with his wife is not rape, except where the wife is living separately, where there is an 
injunction, and so on.927 In keeping with the different approaches taken by the two 
countries, however, Malaysia does not seek to justify this through appeal to societal mores 
in its report. It does, nonetheless, raise the defence of its laws as an attempt to reconcile 
women’s rights with the sharia law: a Parliamentary Select Committee had discussed the 
issue and concluded that marital rape could not be made an offence as this would be 
“inconsistent with sharia law”, but a compromise was the proposal that hurting or 
threatening to hurt a wife in order to compel her to “have relations” would constitute an 
offence.928 However, the Committee deemed this to be unsatisfactory: “the Committee is 
concerned that the proposal before Parliament on this issue is narrowly tailored to 
criminalise sexual assault based on the use of force and death threats by the husband, 
rather than marital rape based on lack of consent of the wife....the Committee requests the 
State party to enact legislation criminalizing marital rape, defining such rape on the basis of 
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lack of consent of the wife”.929 It is notable, however, that there was some confusion over 
which Article of the Convention this issue fell under: Article 2 or one of the provisions of 
Article 15 or 16. 
 Finally, the issue of gender stereotyping is also raised. In its Concluding Comments 
the Committee recommends that Malaysia “implement[s] comprehensive measures to bring 
about change in the widely accepted stereotypical roles of men and women...[including] 
awareness-raising and educational campaigns addressing women and men, girls and boys, 
and religious leaders with a view to eliminating stereotypes associated with traditional 
gender roles in the family and in society.”930 It also urged Malaysia to encourage political 
parties to introduce quotas, like it did to Indonesia, and also to use training programmes “on 
leadership and negotiation skills for current and future women leaders”931.  Although, by 
and large, there was much less discussion of this area than there was for some of 
Singapore’s reports, presumably because Malaysia did not at any point raise even a partial 
justification for gender stereotyping in its Report or its response to the list of issues. When 
Committee members stressed the importance of eliminating gender-based stereotypes over 
the long-term, calling cultural change a “long and difficult process” and opining that the 
“ideological shift necessary to bring about lasting attitudinal changes” would take “much 
longer than the corresponding legislative process”932, the Malaysian delegates expressed 
more-or-less complete agreement, and cited a number of measures designed with the long-
term goal of eliminating gender-based stereotypes in mind, both during the dialogue and 
the response to the List of Issues. These included, for instance, using guidelines on school 
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textbooks to attempt to combat stereotypes of women as inferior to men, or being 
incapable of holding leadership positions933, and providing a 30% quota for the number of 
leadership posts in the civil service to be held by women934. 
 The Committee also “noted with concern that restrictions on women’s employment, 
as well as protective employment legislation, policies and benefits for women, perpetuate 
traditional stereotypes regarding women’s roles and responsibilities in public life and in the 
family”.935 This ‘protective employment legislation’ refers to the Employment Act 1955, 
which amongst other things contained provisions preventing women from working between 
10pm and 5am and preventing them from working underground; the government delegates 
suggested that exemptions from the former provision were generally given blanket approval 
by the Director General of the Department of Labour936, though this was not true of the 
prohibition on night work. 
 
ii) Analysis 
 
As was said at the start of this section on Malaysia, there is not a large amount of actual 
interpretive practice by the Committee in relation to Malaysia, because of the fact that the 
State has effectively only submitted one report to this date. 
 Nonetheless, what has emerged from this brief survey is certainly of interest, 
especially when we compare Malaysia and Singapore: aside from the thorny issue of Islamic 
personal law, Malaysia makes practically no attempt to justify the manner in which it 
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implements the Covenant by referring to socio-cultural factors – quite the opposite, in fact. 
And, indeed, even when it comes to Islamic personal law, Malaysia (despite its apparent 
obsession with the Asian man as persona religiosa937) hardly portrays itself as unwilling to 
attempt to better reconcile the Sharia with the Convention, as its comments in the Summary 
Records and its gradual withdrawal of its various reservations shows. 
 That said, however, there are three areas which bear a more detailed examination for 
the purposes of our illustrative analysis. These are the issue of marital rape; gender 
stereotyping in the family, the political field, and the labour market; Islamic rules on 
marriage and divorce; and minimum marriage ages. 
  
Marital rape 
 
The Committee’s views on marital immunity in Malaysia are very clearly expressed: it is of 
the opinion that Malaysia has the obligation under Articles 2, 15 and 16 to criminalise the 
practice, defining it as lack of consent of the wife.938 This is a clear instance of authentic 
interpretive practice which also meets the Step 2 requirements, given the fact that the 
Committee has expressed the view that marital immunity for rape is in violation of the 
Convention to a number of States Parties and in its General Recommendation No. 19, as was 
discussed earlier in this section. However, as we have also seen, Singapore seems resistant 
to that interpretation and in disagreement, considering marital immunity to be an area in 
which socio-cultural factors – the importance of preserving the special character of marriage 
in Singapore – ought to affect how the Convention is implemented, to the extent that 
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marital immunity ought to be permissible. Thus, there is no subsequent practice establishing 
the agreement of the parties regarding this apparent interpretation, and the Committee’s 
recommendation to Malaysia is of exhortative value alone. The fact that a Parliamentary 
Select Committee had dismissed the possibility of criminalising marital rape outright 
because it would conflict with sharia law suggests that Malaysia’s stance, too, could not be 
categorised as one of agreement with the Committee. Although this raises the question of 
whether a Parliamentary Select Committee could be deemed a relevant actor for expressing 
agreement or disagreement, in the absence of statements from the delegates themselves it 
is certainly indicative.  
 
Gender stereotyping in the family and the political sphere and the labour market 
 
The Committee, as we have seen, had recommended to Malaysia that it institute two sets of 
measures to attempt to eliminate traditional stereotypes portraying women in a subservient 
role in the family, and in the political field, as obligations under Article 2 (f) and 5 (a)939. This 
included educational and public awareness campaigns, and encouraging the use of quotas 
for female candidates in political parties. As we have seen from the reporting history of 
Indonesia and Singapore, both of these are consistent with recommendations that the 
Committee has made to other States Parties in Concluding Observations, and in the form of 
General Recommendations, in a common, concordant and consistent fashion. 
 Malaysia’s reply to the List of Issues for its Initial and Second Periodic Report, and the 
summary records of the constructive dialogue, also do not indicate any form of 
disagreement with any of this interpretive practice. Indeed, in the constructive dialogue 
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delegates explained that the government encouraged NGOs to conduct educational 
campaigns to combat gender stereotypes940, and that it had instituted a so-called 
“SMARTSTART” campaign to encourage newly married couples to share responsibilities 
equally in the household.941 It also described efforts on the part of political parties to 
establish leadership programmes for young women942. And it is worth noting that, at least at 
the time of Malaysia’s report, 32.3% of the members of the Federal Parliament and 32% of 
the members of the Senate were women. This does not necessarily indicate agreement on 
the use of quotas, of course, but nor does it indicate disagreement. Regardless, the 
agreement on using educational and public awareness campaigns to reduce gender 
stereotypes in the family and political field is clear. 
On the issue of the Employment Act 1955 and its restrictions on women working 
between 11pm and 5am and working underground, there was no discussion in the 
constructive dialogue, and thus the Malaysian delegates did not have an opportunity to 
expand on the issue or give the government’s opinion on the matter. The Committee has, 
however, expressed concern with ‘paternalistic’ restrictions on women’s capacity to work to 
some States Parties, such as Morocco943, Armenia944, and Kuwait945. It will also be recalled 
that protective restrictions on women’s right to work instituted by the government of 
Indonesia were viewed as in violation of Indonesia’s obligations under Article 11. However, it 
will also be recalled that Indonesia’s response to this recommendation can hardly be 
categorised as in agreement, and given that the issue was not raised in the constructive 
dialogue on Malaysia’s Report, the case for this interpretive practice meeting the Step 3 
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requirement is somewhat weak on this basis alone. 
 
Marriage and divorce 
 
As we have seen, the Committee’s interpretive practice regarding the rules on marriage in 
Malaysia is inconclusive and vague – possibly as a result of the complexity of the rules 
themselves. Though a recommendation is made that Malaysia should “undertake a process 
of law reform to remove inconsistencies between civil law and Syariah law”946, and it is 
encouraged to “obtain information on comparative jurisprudence and legislation, where 
more progressive interpretations of Islamic law have been codified in legislative reforms”947, 
and although the Committee does refer to its general recommendation 21, it hardly needs 
emphasising that its concluding observations here are non-specific, open to further 
interpretation, and probably unable to even satisfy the Step 1 requirement of being 
authentically interpretive.  
 Moving into the summary records of the constructive dialogue, we find more detail, 
but we have already established that statements made in this format should not be viewed 
as being authentically interpretive for VCLT subsequent practice purposes. Thus, although 
the Committee’s views on talaq and fasakh divorces and the division of property, for 
instance, are relevant as supplementary means of interpretation, they are not relevant 
insofar as Article 31.3(b) is concerned. Nonetheless, here we also find items of relevance for 
our analysis of the interpretive practice of the Committee regarding Indonesia. It will be 
recalled that the Committee gave common, concordant and consistent statements 
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expressing its view that permitting polygamy under any circumstance was in violation of 
Article 1, 5(a) and 16 of the Convention to Indonesia and various other State Parties, and 
that Indonesia appeared to be in agreement; but it is doubtful that this is also true of 
Malaysia. Although the Malaysian delegates expressed disapproval of polygamy and 
favoured monogamy, it is also true that they seemed to view polygamy under the Syariah 
law as an exception948. Thus, it is hard to categorise Malaysia as being in agreement – 
implied or otherwise – with the Committee on this point: it seems to view Islamic values as 
being a permissible influencing factor in how Articles 1, 5(a) and 16 are implemented insofar 
as polygamy is concerned. If this were the case, it would mean that there is in fact no 
subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties in the Committee’s 
interpretive practice in this regard. 
 
Minimum marriage ages 
 
We have already seen that it is difficult to view the Committee’s interpretive practice 
regarding minimum marriage ages as constituting subsequent practice, because Indonesia’s 
stance is best characterised as being in disagreement. Malaysia’s own stance would seem to 
reinforce this: although the Malaysian delegates shared the Committee’s concern about girls 
aged 10-14 being married949, they did not take issue with separate rules based on the 
Syariah in this respect (though, of course, this exception is based on reservations Malaysia 
entered to Article 16 (1) (a) and (b)).  
 
                                                     
948
 See supra notes 908, 909. 
949
 See supra note 908. 
 289 
 
iii) Concluding Remarks 
 
More than is the case for Singapore and Indonesia, we can see that the Committee’s 
Concluding Observations towards Malaysia are generally too broad and nebulous to be 
definitive enough to satisfy the Step 1 requirement, and that most of its specific concerns 
are expressed in the List of Issues and the dialogue with the Malaysia delegates, which have 
value as supplementary means of interpretation rather than as elements constitutive of 
subsequent practice. This is, undoubtedly, in part due to a lack of clarity in Malaysia’s 
combined Initial Report and a lack of expertise with Malaysia’s legal system on the part of 
Committee members, preventing more definitive recommendations from being made. 
 This makes it worth repeating that our assessment makes no normative critique of 
the way in which the treaty bodies give their recommendations: our aim is to address the 
extent to which, specifically, those recommendations can be constitutive of subsequent 
practice establishing the agreement of the parties to the CEDAW on the interpretation of its 
provisions, and in this sense at least we can say that, regarding Malaysia, the interpretive 
practice of the CEDAW Committee does not do so to a great extent. This, in turn, suggests to 
us that even where, superficially, there appears to be less disagreement than might be 
guessed at, given the history of the State Party concerned, it may still be the case that there 
is sufficient lack of agreement to, in turn, hinder the development of subsequent practice 
and hence, ultimately, evolutive/programmatic interpretation.  
 
D. Other Issues 
 
Finally, our overview of the reporting practice of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia has 
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raised a number of other issues which do not come under the rubric of subsequent practice, 
but which are worth briefly discussing. These are, firstly, reservations, and secondly, various 
areas in which the Committee seemed to view certain socio-culturally particular 
implementations of the Convention as being permissible, or at least did not raise objections 
to them. 
 
i) Reservations 
 
We have seen, from the overview of the reporting histories of Singapore and Malaysia, that 
those States both entered a number of reservations on ratification of the CEDAW – sufficient 
in number to show that they are certainly an area which bears further consideration and 
analysis. Singapore, for instance, entered the reservation that: 
 
Singapore is geographically one of the smallest independent countries in the world and one of 
the most densely populated. The Republic of Singapore accordingly reserves the right to apply 
such laws and conditions governing the entry into, stay in, employment of and departure from 
its territory of those who do not have the right under the laws of Singapore to enter and 
remain indefinitely in Singapore and to the conferment, acquisitions and loss of citizenship of 
women who have acquired such citizenship by marriage and of children born outside 
Singapore. 
 
This does not imply that there is any socio-cultural value at stake in making this reservation 
to Article 9950. However, in its Initial Periodic Report it was stated that the reservation was 
entered to “ensure that [Singapore's] immigration policy remains in line with our Asian 
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tradition where husbands are the heads of households”951, as we have seen. 
The Committee took the view that this reservation was unjustifiable: 
 
The Committee urges the State party to further amend the nationality law so as to eliminate 
discrimination against women, and withdraw its reservation to article 9. The explanation that a 
Singaporean woman cannot transfer nationality to her child when a [sic] marries a foreigner 
and the child is born overseas, since dual nationality is not recognized, is unconvincing. The 
Committee wishes to point out that since both mother and father can transfer nationality to 
children born within the country in many countries, including Singapore, the same problem 
can arise with respect to the children born of Singaporean men and foreign women.952 
 
However, it is notable that these remarks make no particular reference to the ultimate 
rationale given by Singapore in the Initial Report – that the state immigration policy had to 
remain consonant with the Asian tradition where husbands are the heads of households – 
and rather rely on a (somewhat difficult to follow) instrumentalist position953, seemingly 
arguing that Singapore's reservation was unsuitable to achieving the goal which the 
government entered it for (and not necessarily implying that the Committee actually saw the 
goal itself as problematic). That is, it seems that the Committee’s objection was not based on 
the reservation being incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty per se, but 
rather on it being incompatible to the extent that it deprived Singaporean women of equality 
with men in a fashion that was disproportionate to the desired goal. 
 In other words, it is not entirely clear that the Committee took the view that 
absolutely no discrimination would be permitted regarding Article 9 (2) on socio-cultural 
grounds. As mentioned above, the rationale for the Committee's position on that 
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reservation seemed to rely on a relatively standard proportionality-based analysis: nowhere 
in its reasoning did it state that it was of the opinion that Singapore's nationality law was 
inherently incompatible Convention. Rather, it adopted a functionalist perspective, taking 
Singapore's explanation as a failure on its own terms: 
 
The explanation that a Singaporean woman cannot transfer nationality to her child when a 
[sic] marries a foreigner and the child is born overseas, since dual nationality is not recognised, 
is unconvincing. The Committee wishes to point out that since both mother and father can 
transfer nationality to children born within the country in many countries, including Singapore, 
the same problem can arise with respect to the children born of Singaporean men and foreign 
women.954 
 
This suggests that its opposition was based on the fact that the law would not achieve the 
end set for it (and hence the discrimination was not proportionate, in the sense that it 
would have no positive effect) rather than an absolutist perspective that discrimination in 
this regard would never be acceptable were the State to provide a coherent justification for 
it. Certainly, it is difficult to take from the Committee's reasoning on this issue that it judged 
cultural particularism in implementing the obligations contained in this Article to be entirely 
unjustifiable in all circumstances. 
 It is worth referring to the Summary Records of the meetings where these Reports 
were considered. Here, the Singaporean representative had stated that: 
 
[A] key reason for [the reservation to Article 9] was to allow the non-citizen father the first 
opportunity to register his son or daughter as a citizen of his own country. Singapore did not 
recognize dual nationality and its prevailing social values and norms considered it primarily the 
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father’s duty to provide for the child.955 
 
This makes the Committee’s reasoning more confused – it is not abundantly clear how its 
comment actually incorporates any sort of response to this justification, nor what it is 
referring to as “the same problem” – but setting that issue aside, it remains the case that its 
rationale seems based on an ECJ-style proportionality argument (the discrimination is 
disproportionate to the intended goal, in the sense that it would not be effective in realising 
it) rather than speaking directly to the socio-cultural particularist justification given by 
Singapore itself that there was a need to recognise the prevailing social values and norms 
which considered the father to be the head of the household and to have the duty of 
providing for children. Of course, the Committee has expressed its views on such social 
values and norms on numerous occasions, but it is somewhat unusual that in the context of 
this reservation it did not apparently deem such a justification as incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the Convention.   
This probably indicates that this reservation was, in fact, permissible as not being in 
contravention of the object and purpose of the Convention. Some States did object to 
Singapore’s other, more general reservations, but only the Netherlands objected to this 
reservation to Article 9, stating that it was “an implicit reservation to Article 9, which is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention”956. This indicates that the 
Netherlands was of the opinion that any reservation to Article 9 – or, perhaps, any 
reservation to the Convention itself – was by definition inadmissible. It seems to have been 
alone in this view, however, and in any event the Netherlands did not see its objection as a 
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barrier to the entry into force of the CEDAW between itself in Singapore. 
 Of course, Singapore ultimately withdrew this reservation shortly before its 
submission of its Third Periodic Report: 
 
[I]n April 2004, the Singapore Parliament passed a bill to amend the Constitution of the 
Republic of Singapore to allow overseas-born children to acquire Singapore citizenship by 
descent from their Singaporean mothers.  Hence, Article 122 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Singapore is now gender neutral in that where a child is born on or after 15 May 
2004, he/she shall be a citizen of Singapore by descent if at the time of his/her birth, either 
his/her father or mother is a citizen of Singapore, by birth, registration or descent.957 
 
No particular reason was given for this, although it can be surmised that the government 
had not been able to adequately justify the discrimination and had perhaps been persuaded 
by the proportionality-based reasoning offered by the Committee during its consideration of 
the prior Reports. 
 This does, however, demonstrate that there are perhaps areas in which States Parties 
to the CEDAW or other human rights treaties might make use of reservations to attempt to 
make allowances for socio-cultural values in the way in which they implement human rights 
treaty provisions, and that such reservations might not be incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the treaty or viewed as such by the relevant treaty body. A detailed analysis of 
the reservation practice of other State Parties under other treaties would be required to 
make any further assessments on this point. 
 Malaysia, of course, entered a great deal more reservations than Singapore – initially 
to Articles 2(f), 5 (a), 7 (b), 9(1), 9(2), 16(a) 16(b), 16(d), 16(e), 16(1)(f), 16(1)(g), 16(h), and 
16 (2) – all on the basis that they conflicted with the provisions of its Constitution and sharia 
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law. These were objected to by Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and Finland, 
generally on the basis that some or all were incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
Convention, were too general, or contravened the principle that internal law should not be 
invoked as a justification for failure to perform treaty obligations. By the time of its 
combined Initial Report Malaysia had already withdrawn its reservations to Article 2(f), 9(1), 
16(b), 16(d), 16(e) and 16(h), and in 2010 it further withdrew those to Articles 5 (a), 7 (b) 
and 16 (2). It also modified several of its reservations to make them more specific, and 
attracted further objections, from Austria and France. However, the Committee’s views on 
these reservations were expressed in a cursory fashion – “the Committee urges the State 
party to review all its remaining reservations with a view to withdrawing them, and 
especially reservations to article 16, which are contrary to the object and purpose of the 
Convention”958, and difficult to interpret (it is not clear whether the Committee meant that 
any reservation to Article 16 would be impermissible in its view, or whether it was implying 
that Malaysia should withdraw those reservations to Article 16 which were contrary to the 
object and purpose of the CEDAW; this then raises the question of which reservations those 
were). It is clear that here, too, further assessments would require a more detailed and 
thorough analysis than is possible in this thesis, locating the reservations of Malaysia and 
Singapore in a wider context of reservations to human rights treaties and their permissibility 
or otherwise. 
  
ii) Permissible means of implementation 
 
At various stages during the reporting history of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia we find 
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instances in which measures of implementing the Convention are described in a manner 
which suggests that socio-cultural factors are of significant importance in how the treaty is 
put into effect, and which the Committee impliedly views as permissible by not drawing 
attention to them as being in any sense incompatible with the Convention either during the 
dialogue with the State or in Concluding Observations. 
 One such area is the use of censorship, in particular to ban pornography. All three 
States Parties cite measures taken in this regard. In Singapore’s Initial Report, for instance, 
we find the State Party stating that: 
 
In Singapore, censorship plays a role in creating a balance between maintaining a morally 
wholesome society and becoming an economically dynamic, socially cohesive and culturally 
vibrant nation. It helps to protect the young against undesirable influences and safeguards 
central values such as the sanctity of marriage, the importance of the family, respect for one’s 
elders, filial piety, moral integrity, and respect for and tolerance toward different racial and 
ethnic groups. Pornographic materials are banned in Singapore.959 
 
The use of censorship, in the Singaporean government’s view, contributes towards the 
elimination of gender stereotypes under Article 5 of the Convention. And these comments, 
clearly, link censorship with protecting precisely the kind of values that are the hallmarks of 
the Asian values movement – the importance of the family, filial piety, social cohesion, and 
also the view of the government as benevolent and paternal guardian of society. 
 Likewise, Malaysia, in its reply to the list of issues for its Report, cites its 
Communications and Multimedia Content Code, which bans pornography under ‘obscene 
content’960, as a measure to combat the stereotyping of women, again under Article 5. And 
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Indonesia, too, instituted a law banning pornography on the recommendation of its Ministry 
of Women’s Empowerment in 2008961, and again cites this as one of its measures taken to 
implement Article 5 of the Convention. Malaysia and Indonesia were less prolix in their 
explanations for the reasoning behind the banning of pornography, but the Indonesian 
delegates at the 39th session explained that “[the law’s] intent was to stipulate how the 
Indonesian people should be protected from the harmful effects of pornography”962, again 
calling to mind the notion of the State in the Asian values schema as the benevolent 
guardian. 
 The Committee did not pass comment on such measures in any of its Concluding 
Observations, or during its dialogue with any of the States Parties, indicating that, at the 
very least, it did not view them as being in any way incompatible with the Convention, and 
that Article 5 could be interpreted to so as to be implemented in this fashion – i.e. by 
censoring or banning pornography. While it would perhaps not be correct to discuss 
subsequent practice developing on this issue, it is certainly not the case that the Committee 
takes a view that any of the socio-cultural factors involved in the three governments’ 
decisions to ban pornography ought not to affect implementation of Article 5. 
 Another example is the various measures enacted by Singapore in particular to 
strengthen the position of the family and incentivise marriage, which are also presented as 
means of implementing Article 5. For example, in its Initial Report Singapore describes how 
“strengthening families…to build a strong and resilient society is given strong emphasis by 
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the government”963, through organising a National Family Week every year and setting up a 
Family Development Division within its Ministry of Community Development to “co-ordinate 
policies and programmes to strengthen families and to adopt a family approach in solving 
problems”.964 Alongside these generalised policies, however, are other more specific 
measures, such as the Public Scheme for public housing, which requires a ‘family nucleus’ 
comprising either an applicant and spouse with children if there are any; the applicant and 
his/her parents and/or siblings; or the applicant and children in his/her custody if widowed, 
separated or divorced – two single people must generally be over the age of 35 in order to 
purchase a publicly owned property.965 Likewise, priority schemes for public housing include 
the Multi-Tier Family Scheme to encourage extended families to live in the same flat, the 
Third Child Priority Scheme to “promote three-child family norm”, and the Joint Selection 
Scheme encouraging married children and parents to live in the same estate to foster family 
interaction and care of aged parents.966 These schemes – which it is arguable constitute a 
form of discrimination based on personal status – are not taken up by the Committee, and it 
seems that, again, the argued Asian preference for the strong family seems to have been 
impliedly deemed as an influencing factor in the manner in which Article 13 is given effect in 
Singapore, and that the Committee has not rejected that perspective. 
  Another such instance is the Malaysian government’s emphasis on what it calls 
“Women for Health”: emphasising the role played by women in maintaining the health of 
family members and noting that, particularly in the informal sector, it is women who attend 
to the health needs of the family rather than men.967 The government seems to view the 
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fact that women are not recognised for this financially or economically as problematic, but 
does not seem to view this socio-cultural tendency as one requiring elimination or 
rectification, and the Committee does not take a view on the matter.   
 Finally, the Committee also has an ambiguous relationship with sharia law, giving the 
impression in some instances that it believes Islamic law to be capable of being interpreted 
‘progressively’ and in a manner compatible with the Convention (in other words, that Islamic 
values might affect how the Convention is implemented in form, but not substance) while on 
others expressing the view that the existence of a “dual legal system” was itself a concern. 
Perhaps the best example of this dichotomy is found in the Concluding Observations to 
Malaysia’s combined Initial Report, in which, in the space of two paragraphs, the Committee 
both gives a negative assessment of the lack of clarity in the dual legal system in Malaysia, 
“which results in continuing discrimination against women”, while at the same time 
encouraging Malaysia to draw from “comparative jurisprudence and legislation” to develop a 
more progressive interpretation of Islamic law968.  It is not altogether clear whether the 
Committee itself is sure whether it views the existence of separate systems of Islamic 
personal law as intrinsically in violation of the Convention per se, nor where the line 
between progressive and non-progressive interpretations of Islamic law might lie. 
Nonetheless, it is by the same token arguable that the Convention might be implemented 
while maintaining separate legal regimes for Muslims. 
 This indicates that further research is required, taking the reverse perspective to that 
offered in this illustrative analysis – i.e., examining States Parties’ own interpretations of the 
Convention to attempt to discern agreement and commonality, concordancy and 
consistency, since it is the States Parties themselves from which this interpretive practice 
                                                     
968
 See supra note 884. 
 300 
 
seems to flow. Such an analysis would further complement the approach taken in this 
section of the thesis, and provide a more complete and accurate answer to our initial 
question. 
 
E. Future Developments 
 
It is important to emphasise once more that this illustrative analysis is incomplete in several 
respects, and has not been intended to be comprehensive. Several of these areas of 
incompleteness have already been described and the reasons given, but in summary, those 
are as follows. First, we have not examined the role reservations play in any great detail, 
aside from Singapore’s reservation to Article 9. This was an omission made by choice, 
because the reservations which these States Parties did make tended to relate specifically to 
Islamic personal law rules, but it is an omission nonetheless. It is clear that further analysis 
of the role reservations play in carving out culture-based exceptions is necessary if we wish 
to answer our core question regarding the permissibility of cultural values affecting 
implementation, particularly in light of the ILC's 2011 report discussed in Chapter IV. Such an 
analysis would likely examine the treaty bodies’ views on reservations in greater detail, and 
survey the reservations entered by all States Parties to attempt to discern any patterns and 
to judge them against the ILC’s standards, which would require assessing their compatibility 
with the object and purpose of the relevant treaty and hence assessing what the actual 
‘object and purpose’ of the treaties are. 
Our analysis is also incomplete in that general recommendations are only included as 
an element of the commonality, concordancy and consistency test for subsequent practice 
arising out of the reporting process. This is, clearly, important, but it is not the only 
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relevance that general recommendations have. As we discussed in Chapters III and IV, 
general comments are certainly of interpretive character themselves, and hence formative 
of subsequent practice in their own right, provided of course that the 3-Step test is satisfied. 
Again, this is an omission made by choice, for reasons given in Chapter III, but it is still an 
omission, and further analysis incorporating this awareness of the role of general comments 
and recommendations must also be carried out. Additionally, much of these remarks could 
also be made about the individual complaint mechanisms. It so happens that neither 
Indonesia, Singapore nor Malaysia has ratified the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW, but it is 
impossible to imagine that individual complaints would have no bearing on the development 
of interpretive practice, despite the problems with that view that were discussed in Chapter 
III. This, clearly, is an area which would bear more thought. 
And finally, given the nature of the requirements of commonality, concordancy and 
consistency, and of agreement implied by silence, it was not possible to form any absolute 
conclusions on the existence of subsequent practice, simply because it was not feasible to 
analyse the reporting histories of all States Parties to the CEDAW to assess agreement or 
disagreement on every point. Our analysis is therefore preliminary in nature, and would 
have to change were it to emerge through more refined and extensive study that other 
States Parties indicated disagreement with the interpretive practice of the Committee on 
any given issue. This is doubly true when we consider the size of the sample we have taken. 
There are important differences between all three of our State Parties. Singapore is notably 
more willing to disagree with the Committee than Malaysia and Indonesia for instance, while 
Malaysia makes far more use of reservations to attempt to carve exceptions for Islamic 
personal law in particular; Indonesia on the other hand presents a more ameliatory stance 
than either. Given that these differences are so apparent just between these three 
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geographically contiguous and culturally somewhat similar societies, we should expect even 
greater differences between other States Parties – so the potential for disagreement with 
the interpretive practice of the Committee is likely to be correspondingly great. 
 This naturally leads us to the question: what follows from our preliminary analysis? 
Three different analytical routes suggest themselves. The first would be addressing issues 
surrounding Asian values specifically. The second would be answering the broader issue of 
cultural relativism in the implementation of human rights treaties in general. And the third 
would be providing a method for analysing the interpretive practice of the treaty bodies in 
general as subsequent practice under the VCLT. 
 
i) Asian Values 
 
Our first route would lead us to conclusions about Asian values specifically: to what extent is 
it permissible for the implementation of human rights treaty provisions to be influenced by 
Asian values, however they are defined? This would involve the following pattern of analysis. 
 Firstly and most obviously, Step 3 of our three-step analysis requires examining all of 
the responses of all of the relevant actors to determine whether there is disagreement or 
agreement with any interpretive practice of the treaty bodies which is common, concordant 
and consistent. This would mean, at the very least, surveying all of the responses of all of the 
delegates to the Concluding Observations of the CEDAW Committee, including the responses 
to the Lists of Issues and summary records of the dialogue, to ascertain whether there was 
any disagreement with anything meeting the criteria for common, concordant, and 
consistent interpretive practice of the Committee with respect to Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia. This would obviously be an extensive and time-consuming process, encompassing 
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the reporting histories of 184 States Parties. However, nor would it be an unfeasible task, 
and it will have been noted that, once the pattern of analysis has been crystallised, an 
examination of these documents would be a relatively straightforward matter. Thus, it is 
proposed that the next and most important stage in the process would be to extend our 
analysis to cover the other 184 parties to the CEDAW, focusing on those issues which our 
preliminary examination of the reporting histories of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia 
revealed to be of particular interest. These would be those issues which, at least within the 
reporting histories of these three States, appear to satisfy all of the requirements for the 3 
Step analysis – the purpose being to provide a comprehensive conclusion to whether Step 3 
is satisfied for the interpretive practice regarding those issues, through the extensive survey 
of all of the States Parties. 
 This would provide us with concrete answers, as far as the issues raised in respect of 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia were concerned, within the CEDAW interpretive practice 
context. The next stages would require broadening the analysis to cover the interpretive 
practice of the CEDAW Committee with respect to those other States which have been 
involved in the Asian values discourse – China, and to a lesser extent South Korea, Taiwan 
and Japan – following a similar pattern, identifying interpretive practice and subjecting it to 
our 3-step analysis. Once done, this would allow us to begin to make definitive statements 
about the extent to which the CEDAW is currently permitting of implementation influenced 
by socio-cultural factors – primarily in the general context of ‘Asian values’ – although it 
would also have to be accompanied by a more complete and nuanced overview of the 
Committee’s General Recommendations and views on individual complaints where they 
existed. 
 Naturally, what would then follow would be a replication of this process with regard 
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to the other human rights treaties: the CRC (to which all of the States concerned are 
signatories) and then to the ICCPR, ICESCR, and so forth. The results from such a survey 
would provide us with a more conclusive and definitive answer to the question to what 
extent is it permissible for the implementation of human rights treaty provisions to be 
influenced by Asian values. This, in turn, would provide us with the full legal perspective 
which was identified in Chapter I of this thesis as lacking in the Asian values debate.  
 The pattern of analysis could also be productively applied, it will not have gone 
unnoticed, to what was described in Chapter I as the ‘economic relativism’ expressed by 
nations such as China in tandem with the wider arguments in favour of cultural values being 
a mitigating factor in the face of universal human rights norms. This, as has been noted, led 
to – in extreme cases – Chinese political representatives at the Vienna Conference arguing 
that until a certain level of economic development had been achieved, “human rights were 
out of the question”. But it is also present in much of what is provided in the State Reports 
to the CEDAW Committee by Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. We have seen, for instance, 
how Singapore described the negative effect the poor state of the regional economy (in its 
view) had on its capacity to fully realise its efforts to ensure full female participation in the 
work place and to ensure that maternity and paternity leave were provided in its Initial and 
Second Periodic Reports. Just as examining the interpretive practice of the treaty bodies as 
VCLT subsequent practice allowed us to provide a legal perspective on the cultural elements 
of the Asian values debate, so it could also provide a perspective on the economic ones.  
 
ii) Cultural Relativism in General 
 
Asian values is, of course, only a facet of a much wider debate surrounding culture and 
 305 
 
economic development and how these variables should affect how human rights treaty 
obligations are implemented, as was elaborated upon in Chapter I, and as has been implicit 
in the thesis even if not explicitly addressed. Clearly, our analytical framework also has the 
capacity to contribute towards filling what was identified as a gulf in the scholarship in this 
wider discourse at the beginning of this thesis: using it, we can begin to answer the question 
of how far international law permits factors such as culture to impact on implementation.  
 However, it has to be accepted that attempting a comprehensive answer is likely to 
be overambitious. Attempting to survey, let alone analyse, the reporting histories of all 
States Parties to all of the major human rights treaties in an attempt to discern commonality, 
concordancy and consistency of interpretive practice regarding socio-cultural values, and 
agreement or disagreement with it, would be an effort monumental in scope. Less 
ambitiously, however, this analytical framework could fruitfully be used to address more 
specific and narrow questions about the legal weight of a given treaty body’s interpretation 
of a given treaty provision. 
 For example, to take an obvious issue that has been discussed extensively in the 
scholarship on cultural relativism and human rights, the legal value of the various treaty 
bodies’ interpretations of provisions in their respective treaties regarding female 
circumcision could be relatively simply assessed through the use of this framework. The 
process would involve examining all of the treaty bodies’ interpretive practice on the issue 
(in Concluding Observations, General Comments, and so on) and weighing its commonality, 
concordancy and consistency before surveying State Party responses for agreement or 
disagreement. If all of the requirements set out in our framework were met, it could then be 
argued that there was subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties on the 
interpretations given by the treaty bodies; and, likewise, the reverse if those requirements 
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were not met. Other areas where such an analysis could be applied will be obvious. 
 This, it goes without saying, could apply equally to the interpretive practice of the 
treaty bodies regarding minority rights or personal law regimes. As we saw in Chapter II, 
minority rights regimes and personal law regimes are intimately connected with cultural 
rights, and hence provide us with an additional layer of complexity, but the crux of the 
relationship between international human rights norms and minority rights regimes is 
usually where the line between cultural rights and other rights (of women, children, etc.) 
lies, and that itself is an area in which interpretation is of paramount importance. The treaty 
bodies, that is, must offer views on whether minority rights regimes or personal law regimes 
are being reconciled in a permissible fashion with treaty obligations, and this act is by its 
nature interpretive. Since this is the case, our framework can also be used productively to 
provide us with a particular, more concrete legal perspective on that relationship.  
 
iii) General interpretative practice of the treaty bodies 
 
Finally, since so much of the work of the treaty bodies is interpretive, a similar pattern to 
that undertaken in this thesis could also be productively applied to their work in general, 
again on an issue-by-issue basis. For instance, to take an obvious example, the CEDAW 
Committee generally expresses a view that a quota of 30% female participation in political 
parties is required in order to provide the critical mass to encourage women to enter into 
politics of their own volition and thus realise the right to political participation expressed in 
Article 7 for the female population of a given State. It is not difficult to imagine how, based 
on our 3-Step analysis, we could examine this view as a potential instance of VCLT 
subsequent practice. It might also be suggested that the 3-step analytical framework could 
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be used for assessing the effect of final views on individual complaints where they exist, and 
General Comments issued by treaty bodies, by subjecting them to the same process: 
locating them in context and deciding whether they form part of a body of interpretive 
practice that is common, concordant and consistent, and whether States Parties agree.  
None of this, it should be repeated, is to suggest that the interpretive practice of the 
various treaty bodies is without value if it cannot be considered constitutive of subsequent 
practice under the VCLT. The monitoring process is not fully judicial, and its role has always 
been presented as being exhortative or persuasive: put simply, the work of the treaty bodies 
is, in large part, an exercise in attempting to cajole States Parties into compliance with what 
the treaty bodies view as being their obligations. This, of course, does not require their 
interpretations to have the kind of legal weight which being subsequent practice under 
Article 31 (3) (b) of the VCLT would carry.  
 At the same time, however, we should take seriously the suggestions of those such as 
Mechlem, who notes that the legitimacy of the process is at stake if the treaty bodies do not 
operate in the same ‘normative background’ as States Parties do; in other words, if they do 
not follow the same rules. As we know from disputes involving the United States, France and 
the Human Rights Committee, this not an imaginary concern: it potentially undermines the 
entire process. This means that an awareness of the legal rules that could potentially inform 
the process is important, even if it is not decisive.   
 As well as providing us with considerable insights into how cultural values are 
permitted to affect implementation, then, our analysis has also provided us with a pattern 
which we can apply, productively, in a wide variety of contexts – indeed, wherever 
conceptualising the work of the treaty bodies as being potentially constitutive of subsequent 
practice under the VCLT would be useful or important. It also, naturally, suggests its own 
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expansion and elaboration, firstly as a means of providing a definitive legal perspective on 
the Asian values debates in the CEDAW context and ultimately within all of the major human 
rights treaties, then by giving more particular legal perspectives on specific issues wherein 
cultural values intersect with treaty interpretation and implementation. These, of course, are 
the next steps which follow on from this thesis. We now turn to what has been achieved 
within it. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has attempted to address what was identified in Chapter I as a critical problem in 
the previous scholarship on cultural relativism in general and Asian values in particular: the 
focus on concerns which were by turn philosophical (such as the work of Donnelly or Beitz), 
political (such as that of Langlois or An-Na’im), or sociological (such as that of De Bary or 
Woodiwiss). International law itself, it was argued, was underrepresented, both in its own 
right – the focus was on either compliance or on theoretical foundations, and hence either 
less, or more, abstract than the level at which international human rights law itself is 
operant – and doctrinally, for there has been little or no scholarship examining cultural 
relativism as a question of law. 
 This led us to attempt to establish what the legal aspects of that issue might be – 
how, in other words, cultural relativism might be addressed within the law as a matter of 
doctrine, and also how its legal basis might be analysed. This led us to the conclusion that if 
cultural relativism was a question of law, it was fundamentally a matter of interpretation; 
the issue was, in effect, whether the law was interpreted to permit cultural values to exist as 
factors influencing the implementation of treaty provisions, and to what extent. This, in turn, 
led us to dismiss cultural rights as the correct locus for our examination: our interest was in 
cultural values as extraneous, independent variables affecting implementation of human 
rights treaty norms, not the balancing of cultural rights versus other rights.  
 Since cultural relativism was fundamentally a matter of interpretation, this led us to 
consider how international human rights law is to be interpreted in general, and how the 
unique aspects of human rights law – the manner in which it creates obligations between 
States to protect third parties, and the inappropriateness of contract-making quid pro quo – 
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require a special doctrine of programmatic, evolutive interpretation, and necessitate the 
creation of independent bodies to participate in the interpretive process, rather than leaving 
States to auto-interpret their own obligations. This was linked to a more practical 
consideration: international human rights treaties, for good reason, lack textual specificity, 
leaving their interpretations open and amorphous at first glance. This meant that, as well as 
being programmatic, interpretation of human rights treaties required elaborate and lengthy 
consideration, and was far from straightforward. At the same time, however, we concluded 
that, despite the interpretation of human rights treaties necessitating these ‘special’ 
considerations, it still must take place against what we described as the normative 
background of international law – it must still be conducted in a manner compatible with the 
rules of international law generally understood. 
 This led us to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and in 
particular to Article 31(3)(b), which provides “subsequent practice establishing the 
agreement of the parties” on the interpretation of a treaty provision as one of the rules 
guiding interpretation itself. This, it is most often argued, is the legal basis for programmatic 
interpretation, and also for the interpretive work of the United Nations treaty bodies in their 
Concluding Observations on State reports, their General Comments, their views on 
Individual Communications, and so on; and it was decided that, if we were interested in to 
what extent cultural values were permitted to influence the implementation of human rights 
treaty provisions, our window ought to be this rule of subsequent practice. In other words, 
for any given human rights treaty provision, does subsequent practice establish the 
agreement of the parties on its interpretation; and if so, what does that agreement say 
about the role of cultural values in implementation? 
 Once this was decided upon, it became necessary to develop a framework of rules – 
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what we have called a ‘pattern of analysis’ – for assessing whether subsequent practice 
exists or not in any given instance. This has not hitherto been addressed in the context of 
human rights, except briefly by the International Law Association, and so we were led to 
examining how such patterns of analysis have been developed in other contexts – in the 
International Court of Justice, in other international tribunals, and in particular in the 
Dispute Settlement Procedure of the World Trade Organization. This led us to a framework 
which drew upon the way in which subsequent practice has been dealt with by those 
tribunals, while taking account of the ways in which international human rights law is 
distinctive and separate. This framework – the 3-step analysis – is as follows: 
 
Step 1 requires determining whether a given instance of interpretive practice (a treaty body 
offering an interpretation of a treaty provision) was ‘authentically interpretive’: that is, 
whether it was intended to be a definitive interpretation, and whether it was specific 
enough to be viewed as such. By and large, it was considered that only interpretive practice 
in the form of Concluding Observations, General Comments and final views on individual 
communications could be deemed authentically interpretive on a prima facie basis, and that 
even in those forms, some statements were too lacking in specificity or intentionality to be 
truly definitive interpretations. 
 
Step 2 requires taking an instance of authentic interpretive practice and assessing whether it 
could be deemed common, concordant and consistent. Are interpretations of that treaty 
provision made with some amount of frequency across the monitoring practice with respect 
to other States Parties? Are those interpretations given in a manner that is similar? And are 
there any instances of contradictory interpretation? These requirements were left 
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somewhat vague, because of the way in which interpretation of human rights treaties by the 
treaty bodies occurs – being cyclical, infrequent, and, except in the case of General 
Comments, specific to individual States Parties. Yet it was made clear that isolated instances 
of interpretive practice should certainly not be viewed as potentially constitutive of 
subsequent practice, and contradictions should likewise obviate it.  
 
Finally, Step 3 requires determining whether States Parties expressed their agreement. In 
general, it was accepted that agreement could be implied by silence: that, provided States 
Parties did not expressly disagree with an instance of interpretive practice performed by a 
treaty body, it could be assumed that they agreed with it impliedly. However, Step 3 is a 
strict requirement: any disagreement expressed by a State Party with any instance of 
interpretive practice of a treaty body would be enough to render it non-constitutive of 
subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties. States Parties, it was 
decided, primarily express agreement or disagreement through delegates to the treaty 
bodies and in other international forums. Domestic organs are not generally relevant actors 
for this purpose, because if they were deemed as such it would result in a tautologous 
situation in which the very institutions which are charged with the protection of rights would 
feed into the process by which their obligations were interpreted.           
 
While we were not able to conduct a full analysis of the CEDAW as a case study in how this 
pattern of analysis could be used, our survey achieved three things. Firstly, it allowed us to 
test whether this 3-step, subsequent practice-based analysis was a fruitful method by which 
to answer our question about cultural relativism: to what extent are cultural factors 
permitted to affect implementation of human rights treaty provisions? Secondly, it gives us 
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some insights into the conceptual arguments surrounding cultural relativism that were 
outlined in the first half of Chapter I of this thesis. And thirdly, it allows us to make some 
preliminary comments about the legal elements of the ‘East Asian challenge’.  
 On the 3-step analysis generally, even though our case study was only preliminary in 
nature (primarily because it was not possible to conduct a full enough examination of the 
interpretive practice regarding all of the States Parties to meet the Step 3 requirements), we 
were still able to see how it could provide us with valuable insights: we were able to see, for 
instance, among other things, that subsequent practice does not indicate agreement of the 
parties that cultural values should not affect the implementation of Article 16 regarding 
minimum marriage ages or spousal consent for sterilization or abortion, but that it does 
seem to indicate agreement of the parties that cultural values permitting polygamy should 
be ignored in the implementation of Article 16. This, in itself, demonstrates how this sort of 
subsequent practice-based technique could function, while also providing us with some 
concrete – though contingent - results.  
 When it comes to the broader, conceptual debates about cultural relativism and 
human rights, our legal analysis also provides valuable insight. It was argued that an 
understanding of the legal issues was what was missing from the scholarship on this issue in 
general, and indeed, we can see how this understanding helps us evaluate the theoretical 
positions that are often advanced. 
 For instance, the very process of State reporting which we have examined calls to 
mind the kind of discursive, evolutionary, inconclusive mechanism – ‘agonistic pluralism’ – 
which Anthony Langlois advocates. As will be recalled, Langlois’ view was that human rights 
should be seen not as fixed philosophical standards but as contested, discursive, and 
emergent processes: as he put it, “the criteria for what is finally adopted into the discourse 
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are determined by the state of the discourse at any one point in time, conceptualised as a 
set of living shared practices, combined with those ideas and ways of life that can be 
absorbed through interaction, discussions, living together, and so forth”. As this thesis seems 
to show, this is in fact a summation of the legal processes which currently exist, and which 
we can surely describe as ‘agonistic’ themselves, being composed of a discourse between 
the treaty bodies and the States Parties which is itself formative of law, and which evolves 
and changes over time. The present system, indeed, could be said to contain both the 
potential for discursive pluralism and a considerable level of discourse inherent to it. The 
recognition of conflict, diversity and disagreement which Langlois calls for already seems to 
exist within the field of human rights as law. In failing to take account of this, indeed, his 
arguments could be said to be superseded, at least as far as their normative content is 
concerned.  
 Beitz and An-Na’im, as we saw, also concern themselves with dialogue and discourse, 
and, as should be apparent, a better understanding of the legal processes can also inform 
their approaches. Beitz argues that human rights are not an order of values deriving from 
deep universal norms but, rather, a ‘global practice’, which arises from the process by which 
members of the global community use human rights as a means for deliberating and arguing 
about how to behave. He attempts to provide a ‘practical conception’ of human rights, 
repositioning them around their usage rather than philosophical foundations, and in the end 
concluding that reasonable disagreement should be possible between members of the 
international community in most cases, and that ensuring that decisions on rights issues 
were legally binding would hinder ‘practical reasoning about conduct in global politics’. 
 None of what is revealed by our analysis would contradict any of these points, and, 
like Langlois, Beitz seems in fact to be describing what, in fact, occurs: there is, certainly, 
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room for reasonable disagreement in the reporting process, and, perhaps most crucially, as 
our 3-step method reveals, practical reasoning about conduct in global politics is not 
hindered by the process, since nothing is binding without the consent of the State Parties - 
despite the authoritative nature of the treaty bodies’ interpretive practice. And his 
description of human rights as emergent values rather than foundations deriving from 
universal norms is compelling, but also seems to be, in effect, an impressionistic description 
of the creation of subsequent practice through the monitoring work of the treaty bodies: we 
can envision human rights treaties, without difficulty, as the basis on which emergent 
processes clarify and crystallise agreement between the parties through discourse and 
dialogue – with the treaty bodies as facilitator and central organiser. Indeed, it could be 
reasonably argued that our legal, subsequent practice-based analysis provides us with a 
better understanding of the mechanisms whereby Beitz’ notion of ‘global practice’ takes 
place. 
 An-Na’im’s views are also given flesh by a closer reading of the legal processes. His 
argument, as we saw, was fundamentally one of legitimacy: if a right could be located within 
the cultural practices of a society, rather than being imposed from outside, it would be likely 
to be seen as legitimate and hence more likely to be complied with. The basic flaw with this 
argument – that there is no methodologically empirical way of confirming or refuting it – is 
still apparent, but our analysis has clarified the extent to which the cultural practices and 
values of societies in Southeast Asia tend to be viewed as barriers to the implementation of 
human rights treaty provisions, rather than as by means of giving effect to, and legitimising, 
that implementation. Where An-Na’im portrays the process as one in which liberal Western 
values are imposed, however, we have seen that in fact, at least as far as Southeast Asia is 
concerned, it is just as much a question of governments imposing values on their own 
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populations than it is of treaty bodies or Western States, and that in general government 
delegates tend to portray their own populations as (regretfully) intransigent on women’s 
rights, for example. This may be a crucial consideration to those, such as An-Na’im, who 
express concern about the legitimacy of human rights norms which do not find expression in 
existing social values or express cross-cultural consensus, and it adds a considerable 
requirement for nuance to these critiques. 
 For Donnelly, our framework provides a technique for solving what was identified as 
the crucial flaw – the lack of a concrete means for assessing the extent to which consensus 
actually exists around a given norm. Donnelly’s argument, as will be recalled from our survey 
in Chapter I, was deemed crucially lacking in that it assumed that agreement between States 
would generally exist at some level of abstraction, but the assertion was meaningless 
without some means by which to discover at what level that agreement or consensus 
existed. Our framework permits us to make more concrete statements about what States 
agree on, and to what extent: it allows us to judge at what level Sunstein’s incompletely 
theorised agreements are present, if at all. At the preliminary stage, we might say that, at 
the very least, the level of abstraction at which agreement exists varies a great deal, but is 
relatively ‘low’ in most cases: in general, disagreement tends to occur around relatively 
specific and narrow issues – whether marital immunity should exist or not, for instance – 
and concerns how implementation is to be effected. That is not to say, of course, that 
consensus over grand and abstract norms is to be assumed. Discussion of the philosophical 
bases for treaty provisions, and even over foundational questions such as the 
appropriateness of censorship, is extremely rare within the treaty monitoring process: rather 
than there being ‘agreement’ on higher, more abstract questions, indeed, we might better 
characterise the entire system as one in which there is agreement to disagree on 
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foundations, with much of the discourse surrounding specifics: Sunstein’s incompletely 
theorised agreement operating at the ‘mid-level principle’, in other words. 
 In the final analysis, then, it seems that in actual fact it is those theorists – Langlois 
and Beitz – who view the process as emergent, discursive and evolutionary who are most 
descriptively accurate: the vision of human rights as a framework in which agreement is 
gradually and progressively, and perhaps inconclusively, arrived at through practice, rather 
than from foundations or theory, is compelling. What has not hitherto been adequately 
acknowledged, however, is that the mechanisms of international law-making, interpretation 
and implementation are themselves constitutive of the framework by which these discursive 
and practice-based processes occur. This, as we have seen, is primarily achieved because of 
very way in which these processes work: they are, in themselves, dynamic and evolutive in 
nature, as is required because of the nature of international human rights law itself, which is 
almost unique in the ambivalence of its provisions and the way in which it creates 
obligations for States Parties. That is, human rights treaties, owing to their own lack of 
specificity, and owing to the way in which they are monitored and implemented, create the 
very need for evolutive interpretation, and that in itself creates the space in which discourse 
and practice solidify and crystallise meaning and agreement. 
 This, finally, illustrates the truth of what many scholars have identified as the crucial 
element of the human rights system’s success: its absence of foundational or philosophical 
justifications, allowing reasons and norms to be contested. To paraphrase Maritain’s 
anonymous Chinese delegate at the drafting of the UDHR, the system of international 
human rights law has created the means by which the conditions for agreement are created, 
without a requirement to ask the reason why agreement occurs. Previous scholarship has 
failed to adequately take account of the fact that international law is itself part of that 
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mechanism. 
 As far as Asian values is concerned, if the preliminary analysis of the reporting history 
of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia under the CEDAW is broadly indicative of the reporting 
history of other States Parties to that Convention, and of all of the States Parties to other 
human rights treaties, then we can be relatively comfortable in stating that in the great 
majority of instances, socio-cultural factors are usually deemed within the interpretive 
practice of the treaty bodies to be a hindrance to the implementation of treaty provisions 
which ought to be removed. Aside from some nebulous comments to the effect that human 
rights are not incompatible with traditional culture in Indonesia, or with some ‘progressive’ 
conceptions of sharia law, in almost no circumstances do the treaty bodies view socio-
cultural values with a sympathetic eye or view it as permissible for those values to be taken 
into account in the manner in which implementation occurs. In some areas there seems to 
be tacit or implied acceptance, as in the case of censorship as a means for eliminating 
gender stereotypes in Singapore and Malaysia, which is sometimes tied to Asian social 
values. 
  What is perhaps somewhat surprising is that, at least as far as the reporting 
procedure is concerned, we can safely assert that, as Sonia Harris-Short discovered in her 
analysis of African and Islamic States' reports under the CRC, it is rare, if ever, that delegates 
take an uncompromising line on tradition or culture.969 Indeed, like her, we can state that 
“an important feature [of the reports] is that, in many instances, the 'appeal to culture' is 
not being used to launch a direct challenge to the basic legitimacy or relevance of the 
Covenant's standards but instead comes down to a less contentious plea for patience and 
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sensitivity while working towards change”.970 This is less true, perhaps, of Singapore, which 
as we saw in our overview does take what might be considered an 'uncompromising line' on 
some issues – most notably on marital immunity and homosexuality. However, it can 
certainly be argued with respect to Malaysia, and even more so of Indonesia. The 
overwhelming tenor of the comments made by delegates from those States Parties at least 
in the CEDAW context is one of broad support for the interpretations offered by the 
Committee, coupled with an almost rueful acknowledgement that ordinary members of 
society do not share the delegates' attitudes. Like Harris-Short, we might even say that the 
delegates adopt an almost hostile perspective towards their society's traditions.971 It might 
be concluded, of course, that this signifies the importance of human rights norms becoming 
'internalised' within pre-existing cultures and traditions if they are to be implemented 
successfully, calling to mind the arguments of An-Na'im discussed in Chapter I. Clearly, that is 
an argument that takes us beyond the limits of this thesis, however. 
 Following on from this, we have seen how government members and intellectuals 
from Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia alike have made sometimes strident remarks about 
the undesirability of human rights, about the cultural imperialism which the treaty bodies 
represent, and so on, in political forums and in opinion pieces in journals. However, when it 
comes to matters of law, we find that much of this variety of disagreement disappears – that 
once obligations have been undertaken under the CEDAW, these States Parties do not make 
any attempt to present an anti-imperialist cultural defence of their traditions. Rather they 
seem, at least at face value, to view obligations under the CEDAW as actual legal obligations, 
and while they do not in all instances discuss the interpretation of the provisions of the 
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Convention as a matter only of law, nor do they do so purely as a matter of international 
politics. When Singapore, for instance, disagrees with the Committee on marital immunity or 
homosexuality, its delegates at no point make any attempt to raise cultural imperialism or 
Western values or anything of that nature as an attempt to divert any critique; largely, it 
resorts to simple majoritarianism: Singaporean society does not wish for homosexuality to 
enter the mainstream, for example. The disagreement is overwhelmingly framed as one of 
interpretation, not foundation.  
  
The value of this thesis is threefold, then. First, it provides an empirically legal perspective on 
cultural relativism by setting out an analytical framework for examining how cultural values 
interact with international human rights law itself, and thus contributing to answering our 
core question: To what extent does international law permit cultural values to affect how 
human rights treaty obligations are implemented? Second, because of this empirically legal 
perspective, it begins to fill a gap in a branch of scholarship which has hitherto focused on 
cultural relativism in international human rights as a philosophical, political, sociological, but 
not legal question – to its detriment. And thirdly and finally, it sets the stage for further, 
more elaborate, and more conclusive research, which will provide definitive answers as 
regards how far international law permits cultural values to influence the implementation of 
human rights treaty obligations, and hence, if not provide a solution to reconciling 
universality of human rights standards with profound diversity, at least provide a means by 
which to assess to what extent this reconciliation already occurs.  
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